Frames of reference: three late-modernist case studies in music composed after painting by Green, Julian Jay
Frames of Reference:
Three Late-Modernist Case Studies in Music 
Composed after Painting
Julian Jay Green
Submitted for the Degree of PhD, Cardiff University
2008
UMI Number: U584327
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U584327
Published by ProQuest LLC 2013. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
NOTICE OF SUBMISSION OF THESIS FORM: 
POSTGRADUATE RESEARCH Ca r d if fU N I V E R S I T Y
P R I F Y S G O L
CaeRDY[§>
Julian Jay Green -  Student Number 0229725
DECLARATION
This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not concurrently 
submitted in candidature for any degree.
S igned  l l lS S S ^ r r .  (candidate) Date . . . 1 . .....
STATEMENT 1
This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of PhD
S igned   (candidate) Date ' 0(5
n ae< 
U l c
STATEMENT 2
This thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where otherwise stated. 
Other sources are acknowledged by explicit references. /
/S igned   —  (candidate) Date
STATEMENT 3
I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter- 
library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations.
S igned  ....................... (candidate) Date . A /.? .$ ..........
STATEMENT 4: PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BAR ON ACCESS
I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter- 
library loans after expiry of a bar on access previously approved by the Graduate 
Development Committee. y >
S igned   ................  (candidate) Date . . ) . ? /  }.?r. .
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements vii
Abstract viii
INTRODUCTION 1
Part I: Mechanisms and Models
CHAPTER ONE Situating the Concept 21
1.1 Between Ideation and the Pragmatic 21
1.2 Between the Programmatic and the Absolute 27
1.3 Medium and Message 41
1.4 Frames and Boundaries 44
1.5 Successive and Simultaneous 47
1.6 Time and Space 54
CHAPTER TWO Between the Embodied and the Ideated 62
2.1.1 Perception as Embodied Experience 62
2.1.2 Music as Lived Experience 65
2.1.3 Multi-Sensory, Trans-Sensual Experience 68
2.1.4 The Imaginative Supplementation of Musical Meaning 76
2.1.5 The Percept and the Image 80
2.1.6 Musical Affordance and the Listener’s Subject-Position 84
2.2.1 Reader-Response Theory: from Perception to Reflection 86
2.2.2 Actualizing Latent Textual Meaning 94
2.2.3 Construction and Ideation 99
CHAPTER THREE Conceptual Listening and the Mechanism of 109
Metaphor
3.1 Representation 109
3.2 Aspect Perception: Seeing and Hearing As 113
3.3 Projection 122
3.4 Music as Metaphor 127
3.5 Cross-Domain Mapping and MaP 133
3.6 From the Virtual to the Actual 143
3.7 Musical Signification 149
Part II: The Case Studies
CHAPTER FOUR Phenomenological Impressions of Time and Space
in Morton Feldman’s Rothko Chapel 158
4.1 Mark Rothko and the Rothko Chapel 159
4.2 Morton Feldman and the New York School 166
4.3 The Programme 170
4.4 The Analysis: 173
4.4.1 Rothko Chapel 175
4.4.2 Dynamics and Immersion 176
4.4.3 The Antiphon 179
4.4.4 The Processional 182
4.4.5 Stasis 185
4.4.6 Hebrew Melody 199
4.4.7 Dissonance and the Gaze 201
4.5 Conclusion 203
ii
CHAPTER FIVE Colour, Space and Movement in Henri Dutilleux’s
Timbres, Espace, Mouvement ou La nuit etoilee 208
5.1 Vincent Van Gogh (1853-90) and La nuit etoilee 211
5.2 Henri Dutilleux and Timbre, Espace, Mouvement ou La nuit etoilee 213
5.3 The Analysis:
5.3.1 Ordering and Chronology of the Titles 216
5.3.2 Colour 218
5.3.3 Space 222
5.3.4 Movement 228
5.3.5 Stationary Effects and the Prolongation of Time 237
5.4 Conclusion 240
CHAPTER SIX Making Audible: Unlocking Time and Movement in
Tan Dun’s Death and Fire: Dialogue with Paul Klee 245
6.1 Paul Klee 246
6.2 Tan Dun and Death and Fire: A Dialogue with Paul Klee 253
6.3 The Analysis: 259
6.3.1 Part I: Tan’s Structural Sections I, II and III
I. Portrait 260
II. Self Portrait 264
III. Death and Fire 268
6.3.2 Part II: Inserts 1-7
Insert 1: Animals at Full Moon 273
Insert 2: Senicio 279
Insert 3: Ad Pamassum 282
Insert 4: The Twittering Machine 286
iii
Insert 5: Earth Witches 290
Insert 6: Intoxication 296
Insert 7: J. S. Bach 301
6.4 Conclusion 305
CONCLUSION 308
Bibliography 313
iv
List of Illustrations
Figures
1.1 Francis Bacon, Blood on the Floor (1986) 29
3.1 Joseph Jastrow’s duck-rabbit (1899) 114
3.2 J. M. W. Turner, Sun Setting over a Lake (1840) 115
3.3 Francis Bacon, Study after Velazquez's Portrait o f Pope Innocent
*(1953) 146
4.1 Schematic of the interior of the Rothko Chapel 163
4.2 Installation view: north apse triptych flanked by northwest and
northeast angle-wall paintings 165
4.3 Viola part, distributional analysis 193
4.4 Celesta part, distributional analysis 196
5.1 Vincent van Gogh, La nuit etoilee (1889) 209
5.2 Whirlpool Nebula, M51 (1845) 213
5.3 Timbre, Espace,Mouvement: orchestral layout 215
6.1 Paul Klee, Neue Harmonie (1936) 249
6.2 Paul Klee, Fugue in Rot (1921) 250
6.3 Paul Klee, Rosegarten (1920) 251
6.4 Paul Klee, Alter Klang (1927) 252
6.5 Tan Dun’s ‘Structure of Orchestral Coloring’ 257
6.6 Paul Klee, Young Man Resting (1911) 260
6.7 Paul Klee, Lost in Thought (1916) 264
6.8 Tan Dun, Self Portrait 265
6.9 Paul Klee, Tod und Feuer (1940) 269
6.10 Paul Klee, Tiere im Vollmond (1927) 273
v
6.11 Paul Klee, Senecio (1922) 279
6.12 Paul Klee, Ad Parnassum (1932) 283
6.13 Paul Klee, Die Zwitscher-Maschine (1922) 287
6.14 Paul Klee Erdhexen, (1938) 291
6.15 Paul Klee, Rausch (1939) 296
6.16 Paul Klee, Polyphon gefasstes Weiss (1930) 304
vi
Acknowledgements
I am indebted to the School of Music at Cardiff University for awarding me a 
studentship, allowing me the opportunity to write this PhD. Thanks also to the entire 
music library staff for helping me locate all of the resources needed and for having a 
kind word or two when times were tough. A very special thank you must also go to all 
of my friends who have at different times given freely of their time and support in 
reading earlier drafts of this thesis. I am and always will be grateful. Special mention 
must go to my dear parents, Maggie and Pete, who believed in me throughout and 
who gave me the push (and finances!) I needed to continue when inspiration was short 
in supply. I would also like to thank my first influential teacher, Mr Brown, for 
encouraging me at an early age and for being an excellent role model; Professor 
David Nicholls who gave me the push to continue studying at postgraduate level; 
Helen Graham for believing in both me and my writing; Russell Kirk my first music 
teacher -  a wonderful musician and artist -  who taught me how to listen; and Colin 
Hutchins for his enthusiasm for music and for his inspirational guitar playing when I 
was growing up. A mention must also go to Professor John Tyrrell for taking the time 
to offer his interest into my progress and for his kind and wise words to motivate 
towards the project’s end. In addition, my gratitude is extended to Sophie Tolputt for 
doing such an excellent job in type-setting my distributional analyses in Chapter 4. 
And last, but certainly not least, a very special thank you to my supervisor, Dr Charles 
Wilson, with whom it has been an honour and a rare privilege to work with at this 
level -  his tireless dedication and extraordinary intellect will stay with me long after 
this project’s completion.
Abstract
Music composed ‘after’ painting has featured prominently in the repertory of Western 
art music, yet it has received little scholarly attention as an aesthetic phenomenon. 
Despite certain commonalities with programme music on the one hand and forms of 
musical multimedia on the other, music after painting (MaP) differs crucially from 
these manifestations, in that the non-musical component -  the painting -  is 
conspicuous by its absence, hence its more usual treatment as a feature incidental to 
the music, a mere citational allusion. But what happens when the painting is treated as 
integral to the aesthetic experience? In what ways can music reach towards this other 
experiential domain, and how might the seeming incommensurability of music and 
painting -  as ‘temporal’ and ‘spatial’ media -  be transcended?
Drawing on, among other sources, the philosophy of Adorno, the 
phenomenology of Husserl and Clifton, the literary theory of Iser and recent theories 
of metaphor (Scruton and Guck), this thesis argues that the experience of music is 
never phenomenally ‘self-present’, that it is always supplemented by an element of 
‘ideation’ (Iser), the evocation of non-existent or absent objects. Moreover, theories of 
multi-sensory perception challenge the idea of a musical experience that is purely 
auditory, demonstrating, rather, its susceptibility to a crossed modality in which one 
domain of experience either invokes or proves to be dependent on the memory or 
excitement of another. A dynamic response theory is therefore put forward to account 
for the painting as a frame of reference which directs, selects and contextualises this 
embodied experience. These possibilities of cross-domain mapping are then explored 
in three case studies — Morton Feldman’s Rothko Chapel (1971); Henri Dutilleux’s 
Timbre, Espace, Mouvement: ou La nuit etoilee (1978) and Tan Dun’s Death and 
Fire: Dialogue with Paul Klee (1992) -  each of which highlights a different aspect of 
the music-painting conjunction while suggesting reasons for the resilience of MaP 
within aesthetic modernism.
INTRODUCTION
Music composed ‘after’ painting (henceforth, music after painting or ‘MaP’) is a 
familiar notion in Western art music, yet despite its ubiquity it has rarely received 
attention as regards its aesthetic significance. Few have examined the precise role that 
an association with a painting plays in the reception of a musical work. Accordingly, 
this thesis sets out to ask a number of questions. At what level does the association 
with a painting come into effect, and are all modalities of such association valid? Is 
the painting merely a contingent aspect of the work’s reception, forming the ‘context’ 
within which the artistic ‘message’ proper (the music) is transmitted, or is the 
painting, or an imaginative recreation of it, integral to that message and an equally 
valid and essential part of the aesthetic experience? Might the music be seen as 
translating the message or materials of the painting, or might the two artistic media 
converge at some further, ideational level? Last, but by no means least, do the 
mechanisms of musical representation in MaP resemble other types of musical 
representation, such as programme music, or might there be a kind of MaP that does 
not involve ‘representation’ at all?
The tradition of pairing music with another medium is one that has a long and 
well-established history. Examples of such combinations range from music with a 
verbal text, such as song, to music with an integral visual and dramatic content, such 
as opera, music video or film. In addition, these art forms assume that their discrete, 
or at least theoretically separable, media are presented together, simultaneously. 
Hence, the interaction or cooperation of both media -  the ‘seen’ and the ‘heard’ 
dimensions -  is assumed and expected. This leads to an aesthetic experience created 
by and emergent from both. A large body of musicological research exists concerning
1
the synergetic effects of composing and presenting music alongside other media. For 
example, Nicholas Cook has written extensively on the subject of what he calls 
‘musical multimedia’, discussing how the convergence of the visual and the musical 
(such as in film and television) produces a new or emergent meaning which goes 
beyond the additive meaning of either, by allowing for a fusion of elements between 
the two.1
However, what tends to distinguish MaP from the various forms of musical 
multimedia is the physical absence of the non-musical element -  the painting. 
Therefore we must ask what effect this has, whether for the listener entirely 
unfamiliar with the painting, for the listener already familiar with the painting, for the 
listener who seeks out the painting having first heard the music, and for any such 
listener who subsequently revisits the music in light of that new acquaintance. 
Evidently, for the first category of listener (the listener unfamiliar with the painting) 
there is no imaginative engagement with the painting other than the metaphorical 
associations and imagery of any reference to it in the music’s title -  whether that title 
is the actual title of the painting or not. It is only in the other three instances that the 
painting itself comes into play as an aesthetic stimulus, and accordingly our focus 
here will be on those instances when the painting is within the listener’s purview, 
even while that scope is one that involves their memory and imagination.
Despite a large and significant body of musical works that claim to have been 
composed after paintings, there has been a dearth of research dealing with this genre 
compared to that of programme music in general. Musical aesthetics has tended to 
subsume the phenomenon within broader discussions of musical representation and 
musical meaning, and it has rarely separated MaP from the field of programme music
1 See Analysing Musical Multimedia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
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itself. For this reason, the inquiry here sets out to discover if MaP has a unique status 
in the field of musical experience compared to, say, that of programme music with a 
literary source.
To situate our topic, it will be useful to chart a rough historical survey of the 
phenomenon of MaP. The first important example is probably Franz Liszt’s 
symphonic poem Hunnenschlacht (‘Battle of the Huns’, 1857), after Wilhelm von 
Kaulbach’s painting Die Hunnenschlacht (ca. 1850). In his preface to the score, Liszt 
explains how he aimed to transfer to music Kaulbach’s ‘impression of two 
supernatural and contrasting lights’, representing the pagans and Christians ‘by means
- j
of two motives’. Accordingly, his performance instructions assign certain musical 
episodes narrative duties. Thus we find the Crux fldelis melody (marked dolce 
religioso) used to represent the Christians, and a battle cry (‘Schlachtruf) 
representing the Huns. The ultimate victory over the Huns, and hence over barbarism, 
is highlighted by the addition of the organ, which, with its associations of religious 
ceremonial, resounds throughout the triumphant conclusion of the piece.4
Less than two decades later came perhaps the most famous example of the 
genre in Modest Musorgsky’s Kartinki s vistavki (‘Pictures from an Exhibition’,
1874), composed after architectural drawings, stage designs and watercolours 
presented at the memorial exhibition of his friend Viktor Hartmann. Moving into the 
twentieth century, we find another notable example in Sergei Rachmaninoff s Ostrov 
myortvikh (‘The Isle of the Dead’, 1909), after Arnold Bocklin’s painting of the same 
name. And, four years later in 1913, Max Reger composed one of his Vier
2 For an exhaustive list of works of music composed after visual art, see Gary Evans, Music Inspired by 
Art: a Guide to Recordings (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2002).
3 Franz Liszt, Hunnenschlacht, in Franz Liszts Musikalische Werke, 1/1: Die Ideale, Hunnenschlacht 
(Leipzig: Breitkopf und Hartel, cl908; repr. Famborough: Gregg Press, 1966).
4 See Michael Saffle, ‘Orchestral Works’, in The Liszt Companion, ed. Ben Arnold (London: 
Greenwood Press, 2002), 259-60.
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Tondichtungen nach Arnold Bocklin (‘Four Tone Poems after Arnold Bocklin’) after 
this same painting.
Although Claude Debussy did not compose any of his music directly after any 
one particular painting, his Nocturnes took their title from J. M. Whistler’s Nocturne 
paintings from the 1870s, themselves probably named after Chopin’s Nocturnes for 
solo piano.5 A few years later, in correspondence with the Spanish pianist Ricardo 
Vines, Debussy wrote that the piano pieces Masques (1904) and L ’isle joyeuse (1904) 
were influenced by paintings of J. M. W. Turner that he had seen in London in 1903.6 
While the composer’s most explicit reference to a painting concerns the orchestral 
score for La mer (1903-5), which was adorned with a reproduction of Katsushika 
Hokusai’s Kanagawa oki nami ura (‘The Great Wave of Kanagawa’, 1831-33), it was 
never claimed, by the composer or anyone else, that the woodcut print had provided
n
any kind of formative stimulus for the work.
We may nonetheless mark the period of La mer's composition as a turning 
point towards the modernist period, during which programme music proper fell into a 
sharp decline. The period immediately after La m er’s composition saw the 
development of modernist impulses which tended to resist overt programmatic 
references in instrumental music. Gustav Mahler famously removed programmatic 
titles from his early symphonies, and Arnold Schoenberg originally left out the 
movement titles to his Fiinf Orchesterstilcke (1909), only adding them later at the 
request of his publisher.
5 Ronald Anderson and Anne Koval write that it was the patron and Liverpool ship owner F. R.
Leyland who gave Whistler the title ‘Nocturne’, and that Leyland was an amateur pianist and great 
admirer of Chopin. See James McNeill Whistler: Beyond the Myth (New York: Carroll & Graf, 1995), 
168.
6 See Francois Lesure, ‘Claude Debussy’ Grove Music Online ed. L. Macy 
<http://www.grovemusic.com> [accessed 24 October 2007].
7 See Edward Lockspeiser, Debussy: His Life and Mind, vol. 2: 1902—18 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978) for a discussion o f the influence o f painting on Debussy’s music.
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Yet, through modernism and into high modernism, MaP has continued to 
flourish. In 1935 Paul Hindemith’s completed his Mathis der Maler Symphony, an 
offshoot from his opera based on the painter Matthias Griinewald, whose ‘Isenheim 
Altarpiece’ triptych provided the stimulus for each of the three movements. Bohuslav 
Martinu completed Les fresques de Piero della Francesca in 1953, after the painter’s 
frescos in San Francesco, Arezzo. And in 1958 Gyorgy Ligeti composed his 
electronic Artikulation, citing, amongst other influences, works by Joan Miro. 
Harrison Birtwistle’s Carmen Arcadiae Mechanicae Perpetuum (1977) was 
composed, but not titled, after Paul Klee’s Die Zwitschermaschine (‘The Twittering 
Machine’, 1922); the third movement of Peter Maxwell Davies’s Five Klee Pictures 
(1960, rev. 1976) is also composed after this painting. More recently, the British 
composer Mark-Anthony Tumage (1960-) composed Three Screaming Popes (1989) 
and Blood on the Floor (1996) after paintings by Francis Bacon, and Dispelling the 
Fears (1995), after an abstract painting by Heather Betts.
The case studies selected in this dissertation are: Morton Feldman’s Rothko 
Chapel (1971), Henri Dutilleux’s Timbre, Espace, Mouvement: ou La nuit etoilee 
(1978), and Tan Dun’s Death and Fire: Dialogue with Paul Klee (1992). Dutilleux’s 
work refers to a single painting by Vincent van Gogh, Feldman’s invokes a single set 
of paintings by Mark Rothko, and Tan’s work selects seven paintings by Paul Klee as 
cited references. Stylistically, each of the musical works chosen here embodies 
modernistic traits, such as atonality and a focus on the sonorous, timbral aspects of 
their sound.
The rationale for these particular examples is twofold. Firstly, each of the 
paintings concerned lacks an explicit narrative, whether overtly depicted in the 
painting or invoked by it according to historical or epic tradition, such as is patently
5
the case in Hunnenschlacht, for example. This is significant because many examples 
of MaP from the Romantic period involve paintings that themselves portray a story of 
some kind. Liszt’s symphonic poem, it could be argued, depicts programmatically the 
event also referred to by the painting, making the medium in which Liszt encountered 
his subject of lesser aesthetic relevance. The examples here are therefore chosen not 
only for their distance from the notion of programme music, but also because they 
reflect instances where the medium of paint itself was of evident interest to the 
composer. This is not to say that these case studies lack the potential for narrativity 
altogether, only that no such overt narrative has been intentionally provided.
So, by choosing musical works composed after paintings without an explicit 
narrative of their own, we are perhaps better able to explore the effect of the painting 
itself upon the aesthetic response of the listener than if there were a specific narrative 
implied in the immediate space of the painting. We are thus able to focus on the overt 
content of the painting rather than any reconstructed narrative. The crucial point here 
is to make a distinction between MaP on the one hand and programme music that 
takes its cue from a visual stimulus on the other. The former relies on the listener’s 
own mediations from the visual field of reference, whereas in the latter, the listener’s 
interpretation is tied essentially to the ideas conveyed by a literary field of reference, 
which lies behind both a musical and a visual representation.
Although some of our case studies include paintings that may be classed as 
representational, much of their import lies in their physical and material constructions, 
which encourage the listener to concentrate on the medium itself rather than the 
subject matter. Accordingly, through the thickly-daubed swirls of paint in Van Gogh’s 
La nuit etoilee (1889) we see a painting that seems to express emotional experience 
rather than just concrete subject matter and the effects of light. The seven paintings by
6
the Swiss artist Paul Klee after which Tan Dun’s work is composed were in the 
vanguard of modernism through their exploration of colour and movement. 
Meanwhile, Feldman’s Rothko Chapel (1971) is based on a set of abstract paintings 
housed in an ecumenical chapel in Houston, Texas, by the abstract expressionist Mark 
Rothko, whose non-representational colour fields engage the observer’s interest in 
their construction, textures and hue.
These examples of painting are notable for drawing the viewer’s attention 
towards their surface structures more than to the subject matter itself or, referentially, 
to objects which lie outside the space of the painting. And clearly, the focus on the 
medium itself and self-referentiality are central themes of modernism. Nevertheless, 
we have to ask how MaP sits within the modernist aesthetic. The art critic Clement 
Greenberg wrote that, for modernism, ‘ [t]he task of self-criticism became to eliminate 
from the specific effects of each art any and every effect that might conceivably be
o  •  •  •borrowed from or by the medium of any other art’. If this music is reaching out 
towards the medium of the painting, is it, in the Greenbergian sense, disqualifying its 
status as modernistic? Or do the musical works in these case studies, by drawing 
heavily upon their own materials and focusing on aspects of the sonic medium itself, 
such as instrumental timbre, sonic signals, and melodic gestures, fulfil in this way at 
least part of the modernist agenda? Furthermore, although there may be coincidences 
between the painting and the music, and the composers have obviously stated their 
intent with regard to how the painting might guide the listener’s perception, these 
coincidences and ways of hearing are not necessarily at odds with the tenets of 
modernism. For one of the ways the music may follow the painting is through 
pursuing its own materials rather than any extra-musical aspirations.
8 Clement Greenberg, ‘Modernist Painting’, in Art in Modern Culture: an Anthology o f Critical Texts 
ed. Frascina Francis and Jonathan Harris (London: Phaidon, 1992), 309.
Let us now consider some of the ways a painting may be represented 
musically. This does not promise to be an exhaustive list of such modes of 
representation but is intended rather to provide a brief overview of the strategies that 
various composers have used. Imitation or mimesis is often held to be the most 
explicit form of representation. A painting of a cuckoo, for example, may be 
musically represented by an instrument mimicking a cuckoo’s call: the representation 
becomes ‘isosonorous’, to borrow Carolyn Abbate’s term,9 or iconic in the Peirceian 
sense. However, in this case, once the music sounds like its object, it collapses into 
the object which it purports to represent, thus blurring the boundary between the 
representation and the thing (notionally) represented.
A composer may also resort to what are known as ‘musical topics’ -  
recognisable musical formations that have been conventionalised through their 
historical usage and previous association with particular programmes.10 Unlike 
isosonorous musical moments, these topics may bear no sounding resemblance to the 
object with which they are associated. In this way, certain styles of music may come 
to be associated with particular musical ideas. And while this is a general musical 
phenomenon, applicable to many areas of musical behaviour, it must still have 
currency for our subject here. For if a composer wishes to represent a pastoral scene, 
then there are particular musical styles which have, through association, become 
conventionalised as pastoral.11 Similarly, if a military allusion needs to be made, there
9 See Carolyn Abbate, Unsung Voices: Opera and Musical Narrative in the Nineteenth Century 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 33.
10 See Leonard G. Ratner, Classic Music: Expression, Form and Style (New York and London: 
Schirmer Books, 1980); Kofi Agawu, Playing with Signs: a Semiotic Interpretation o f Classic Music 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1991); and Raymond Monelle, The Musical Topic: 
Hunt, Military and Pastoral (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).
11 See, for example, David Wyn Jones, Beethoven: Pastoral Symphony (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 15; and Robert S. Hatten, Musical Meaning in Beethoven (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1994), 80-98.
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is a large repertoire of historical formulations on which to draw -  the use of a 
marching rhythm, for example.
Clearly, the above devices are established through historical usage and their 
attendant associations rather than any intrinsic or necessary relationship between the 
music and the extra-musical idea or object. Another method at the disposal of the 
composer, though not involving ‘isosonorous’ resemblance, nonetheless retains an 
element of iconicity: instead of mimicking the sound of an object, this type of 
representation mimics its physical or gestural qualities by exploiting the sonorous 
possibilities of the musical medium itself. Hence the musical sounds themselves may
represent a non-sounding object -  a line, a curve or, to take a piece of vocabulary
1 0common to music and visual art, an arabesque. And, significantly, because of its 
focus on aspects of process and material, this is a method which lends itself admirably 
to works composed after non-representational paintings or paintings with no 
discernible subject matter. If, for example, a composer wishes to represent something 
about the facture of an artwork whose paint has been applied roughly in a dark hue, 
then they may decide to use an instrument played in a very low register, with 
performance directions suggesting a sonority that can be metaphorized as texture. A 
cello, for example, played in its lowest register is generally perceived as having a 
thicker and darker texture than if played at the higher end of its range. Similarly, a 
direction to apply force and pressure to the bowing may produce a textural quality that 
appears to match sonically the visual and tactile qualities of a roughly painted surface. 
And, clearly, there is a vast range of other timbral effects at the composer’s disposal 
which might serve to represent other surface aspects of a painting.
12 See, for example, Gurminder Kaur Bhogal’s fascinating essay, ‘Debussy’s Arabesque and Ravel’s 
Daphnis et Chloe (1912)’, Twentieth-Century Music 3/2 (2007), 171-99.
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One further method concerns the positing of a musical narrative.13 But this 
involves less a story with characters, perhaps, than a temporal trajectory -  a trajectory 
that reflects a personal apprehension of the painting, incorporating the idea of musical 
topics and the use of timbral and instrumental effects to suggest some kind of 
narrative. In the Dutilleux case study, for example, the composer alternates relatively 
static sections of music with whirlwind-like episodes, symbolising, perhaps, his 
affective experience of viewing Van Gogh’s La nuit etoilee, his gaze moving from the 
more static sections of the painting to the turbulent rendering of the stars. This also 
raises the problem of time in music: how does the composer prolong in sound the 
immediacy of the painting’s visual impact and the relatively stable aspects, say, of 
colour or a particular subject matter? We will see in the Feldman and Dutilleux case 
studies that the composers sustain and re-circulate pitch material to approximate, 
sonically, the visual effects of static sections of a painting -  static, as implied by the 
subject matter or through the invariant use of colour.
The rationale for this thesis emerges from the conviction that any intended
association with the painting, whether it is made by the composer or the listener, has
an aesthetic function. In other words, the researcher must start from the premise that
the deliberate alliance created by naming a composition after a painting conveys a
statement of intent for that work’s reception to be guided in some way by the painting,
rather than a mere casual or passing reference or, worse yet, an opportunistic attempt
by a composer to accrue cultural capital by aligning their music with prestigious
examples of visual art. It is undoubtedly tempting for a composer to attempt to
heighten a listener’s interest in and attentiveness towards their music by drawing
associations with painters of stature. But, equally, it might reflect a genuine desire to
13 For a thorough exploration of musical narrative see Anthony Newcomb, ‘Once More “Between 
Absolute and Program Music”: Schumann’s Second Symphony’, 19th-Century Music, 7/3 (1984), 233- 
50.
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communicate with listeners by means of examples of work with which they are more 
likely to be familiar.
Accordingly, it will be necessary to qualify what we mean by our use of the 
word ‘after’ here. And by explicating the application of this preposition we alight 
upon one of the essential theoretical foundations of this dissertation. On the face of it, 
‘music after painting’ suggests that the genesis of the musical work followed the 
composer’s encounter with the painting. This assumes that the composer set about his 
or her musical work with the painting firmly in their sights. But, of course, this rarely 
involves the literal presence of the artwork: in almost all case, the composer writes 
music from an impression or memory of a painting, from a reproduction, physical (in 
a book or on a postcard) or virtual (on the internet or on television). So the ‘presence’ 
of the painting during the creative process cannot in any way determine the validity of 
the ‘music after the painting’ designation.
Music ‘after’ painting also implies a chronological order of precedence. But 
what if, for instance, the composer was searching around for an enticing name for 
their finished composition and alighted upon the title of a particular painting ex post 
facto? If the encounter with the painting did not precede the musical composition, is 
this still a form of ‘after’? ‘Music after painting’ seems to presuppose the artwork’s 
bearing on the work’s compositional beginnings, its process and progress. That this 
may not always be the case appears to present our prepositive use of ‘after’ with a 
problem. If the association was a mere afterthought, and neither the title nor the 
painting itself was instrumental in the work’s creation, can the painting still be said to 
be aesthetically relevant to our listening experience?
The thesis put forward here is that the composer’s intent, whether expressed 
through the act of titling or not, is sufficient for the painting to form part of an
11
aesthetic consideration of that work, irrespective of its priority vis-a-vis the 
composition. In this way, we may retain the phrase ‘music after painting’, for the 
proposition is that whatever helps create a particular aesthetic experience is in some 
way part of it. Hence, if the painting affects how we hear the musical object then 
accordingly it may be considered ‘after’ the painting, as we are cognizing it in that 
particular way -  the music still has a viable relationship to the painting. Further still, 
perhaps we do not even need the composer’s intention for there to be an aesthetic 
effect from an association with a painting or visual scene. For example, Beethoven’s 
‘Moonlight’ Sonata was not so named by the composer, but it is hard to imagine 
listening to it without drawing somehow on the imagery associated with its now 
common subtitle.14
The reason the painting is deemed to be aesthetically relevant regardless of the 
chronology of its intervention in the creative process -  before, during or after 
composition -  emanates from the idea that there is a response to the musical object 
conditioned by our expectation, projection and imagination. Thus the representation 
becomes about what the listener wants to hear rather than the mere sounds 
themselves. But let us be careful, for this seems to suggest that any piece of music 
may be heard as anything -  a kind of aural carte blanche. Such an idea would lead us 
quickly to a full stop, for the case would be solved: music can mean anything we want 
it to mean. However, the theory expounded here posits the view that although musical 
meaning is reified at the point of the listener, it must occur in conjunction with the 
musical object itself.
What is important, though, is how this object sounds to the listener, not the
nature of the sounds in themselves. In other words, if the music is to provide us with a
14 The nickname owes its provenance to a review by the poet Heinrich Rellstab who commented that 
the first movement reminded him o f moonlight on Lake Lucerne. See The New Oxford Companion to 
Music, s.v. ‘Moonlight’ Sonata’.
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sense of existing ‘after’ a painting, the importance must rest in our phenomenological 
encounter with the musical work, what it is like in the ear of the listener, rather than 
on the page of the musical score. Accordingly, what follows in Part I is a theory of 
aesthetic response to MaP, but also one grounded in a phenomenological encounter. 
There is obviously no questioning the fact that we listen to music, that we perceive its 
sound aurally, and that it must stimulate us in certain ways -  even if some of those 
ways might range between dire boredom and consumed intoxication -  but we also 
respond to the music aesthetically.
In order to explicate this position further, and to demonstrate how easy it has 
been for previous criticism to fall into the trap of positing a straightforward linear 
relationship between music and painting, it may be useful to consider the 
phenomenon in terms of a classic schema of communication:
Producer —► Message —► Receiver
The notion that the producer (the composer in our case) creates a message (the music) 
received by the listener suggests something unadulterated and also something passive: 
that is, we hear the message intended by the producer. This simple schema belies the 
fact that meaning, especially in the case of MaP, is the result of a complex interaction 
between music, painting and listener. Accordingly, the musical semiotician Jean- 
Jacques Nattiez explains that it is possible for the listener to assign multiple meanings 
to the message. The meaning of a text ‘is not a producer’s transmission of some 
message that can be subsequently decoded by a “receiver.”’15 Instead, meaning is a 
construction assigned jointly by the producer and the receiver. After Jean Molino,
15 Jean-Jacques Nattiez, Music and Discourse: Towards a Semiology o f Music, trans. Carolyn Abbate 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 11.
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Nattiez proposes a schema to represent this three-dimensional communication 
process, one that involves an ‘interpretant’ (the poietic concerns the production and 
the esthesic the reception of a work):
Poietic Process Esthesic Process
Producer —► Trace <— Receiver
The consequences of this schema of symbolic functioning are that the esthesic 
and poietic processes 4do not necessarily correspond’.16 In other words, the composer 
may not always leave a Trace’ of his intention in the musical form, and the listener 
4 will project configurations upon the work that do not always coincide with the
1 7poietic process’. The trace, Nattiez explains, is a 4material trace, not in itself the 
bearer of an immediately decipherable meaning, but without which meaning(s) could 
not exist: a trace that we can analyze’. In this way, it is a neutral level which emanates 
from the poietic process and which forms the foundation of any meaning ascribed to 
it. Thus, we may think of this level as the 'material reality of the work (its live
1 ftproduction, its score, its printed text, etc.)’.
This important contribution to semiotics presents immediate benefits for the 
clarity of our discussion, since the dialectical relationship posited between the 
composer and the listener points to the non-linearity of communication flow between 
these agents in the chain: meaning is not there to be received but is projected upon the 
material trace by the receiver. Accordingly, the meaning that emerges at the end of the 
communication is not necessarily the same as that intended by the composer at the
16 Ibid., 16-17.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., 15 (italics original).
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beginning of the chain. In other words, the notion that meaning, any meaning, is 
transmitted intact from music to listener must be a fallacy.
If we take the present subject of MaP and suggest a further diagram, we will 
see more clearly that meaning results from a creative process which reconstitutes or 
reconstructs the original message from the musical object and the painting. If we 
simply substitute musical terms in place of the terms in the diagram above, already we 
are able to see the limitations of Nattiez’s model for our subject, for where does the 
painting fit into this schema?
Poietic Process Esthesic Process
Composer —► Music <— Listener
In accordance with our qualification of the term ‘after’, the painting does not 
necessarily have to reside next to the poietic level, but nor does it reside ‘neutrally’ 
next to the material trace either, for it is not phenomenally present in the way that the 
musical object is. This is not to suggest that the painting does not influence the 
compositional process, the musical trace. Rather it seeks to illustrate that the aesthetic 
response of the listener, the esthesic process, may be affected, as we have said, 
regardless of the timing of the painting’s intervention before, during or after the 
creation of the musical work. The perceiver may project meaning equally upon both 
media and also from one medium to the other in the process of reconstituting the 
perceived ‘message’. Hence, there is a real potential for a disjunction between the 
poietic and esthesic processes (between the intended meaning and the perceived 
meaning), and so we may therefore never fully recover, perhaps even partially, the 
‘original message’ of the composer -  assuming that such a definitive object ever
15
existed. The following diagram illustrates this non-linearity between the production of 
the ‘message’ and its reception:
Poietic Process Esthesic Process
Composer —► (Paintingx) —► Music <— (PaintingY) <— Perceiver
The term ‘painting’ has here been parenthesized to denote its effective absences at 
both ends of the communication chain. Any potential mismatch between the intended 
meaning and the perceived meaning arises because we cannot be apprised of the 
composer’s experience of the painting, only our own. To indicate that the composer 
and listener will probably have a different imagining and memory of the painting, its 
appearances at both the poietic and esthesic ends of the chain are superscripted x and 
y respectively. Moreover, the poietic construction of the painting by the composer 
does not necessarily correspond with any subsequent musical manifestation. The 
painting must undergo at least three stages of mediation: that of the composer in their 
conception, the music in its realisation, and the listener in their interpretation of both 
the painting and the music. Thus, the only relatively fixed element of this schema is 
the music, for this element is at least phenomenally available and present, unlike the 
painting. The unschematized variables are the composer’s response to the painting 
and the listener’s response to the music and the painting.
The problem with such a diagram, then, is that it fails to account for the levels 
of sophistication involved in the aesthetic experience of MaP. What it does show, 
however, is that musical meaning for the listener is somehow parsed through their 
imaginative reconstruction of the painting, which is unlikely to be anything like the 
painting that the composer had in their mind while composing. But the point is that
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listeners will create meaning when they situate the music in relation to the painting. 
This is not about converting one medium into the other in a form of transmutation, nor 
is it about transliterating individual components of the painting into elements of a 
musical ‘language’. It is potentially both less and more than this. For why would the 
composer wish to say the precise same thing that has already been said in the other 
medium? The interesting fact must be the frame of reference which the painting 
provides the listener. Knowledge of the painting, it is argued, will privilege certain 
musical hearings whilst denying others; that is to say, it will enable the listener to 
make a particular selection of musical attributes and to hear those in relation to the 
horizon of the painting.
The responses we make as listeners, therefore, may differ markedly from the 
original intention or signification. Meaning must now be about the listener’s 
interpretation of the painting as well as the composer’s interpretation, and can no 
longer be musical alone. If the composer is in the business of communicating meaning 
in a manner similar to a writer or painter, we may ask whether communication occurs 
only when the music written has the same meaning for the person who composes it as 
it does for the listener who responds to it. But if meaning is transmitted -  any 
meaning, regardless of the intention behind it -  something has still been 
communicated.
An example given by Leonard B. Meyer will help to clarify this point. If 
person A observes person B winking, and interprets this as a friendly gesture, it has 
meaning for person A. But, Meyer writes, ‘if the wink was not intentional -  if, for 
instance, B simply has a nervous tic -  then no communication has taken place, for to
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B the act had no meaning’.19 Thus the gesture has meaning only for person A (and an 
erroneous meaning at that); but what of the meaning for person B? It is true that the 
gesture was not intended as a friendly wink, but the fact that it was received as a 
friendly gesture means that meaning was communicated whether or not person B 
intended it. And so it is the same with any work of art, literary, plastic or musical: it is 
as much about our reception of a work as it is about the producer’s original intention.
Meyer’s concern seems to be about a lack of connection between the meaning 
intended by person B and the meaning received by person A -  obviously no meaning 
was intended by person B. But even if there was no intention, there has still been a 
communication: a meaning has been imparted and understood by at least one part of 
the communication chain. And, further still, we may take the example of an individual 
who has been happily mishearing a favourite song lyric for several years only to be 
dismayed to finally hear or read the correct one. The issue becomes, then, one of 
importance: does it matter if we misinterpret an encounter with any particular 
artwork, and is it ever possible to correctly interpret an artwork?
It seems, then, that the issue at stake is not one of correctly interpreting MaP, 
but rather one regarding the creation of meaning: what are the conditions which allow 
the music to become meaningful? There must always be a certain amount of slippage 
between the original intention of a message and the message received, for our 
understanding of concepts must differ at an individual level. However, the interesting 
aspect concerns the mechanism of imparting this meaning to the receiver (the 
listener). By invoking the painting in this way, the composer has set up a triadic 
relationship: meaning does not inhere within the stimulus alone nor in the listener but
19 Leonard B. Meyer, Emotion and Meaning in Music (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 
40.
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in the complex dialogue that exists between the musical work, the painting to which it 
refers, and the listener.
One of the important issues under discussion in this thesis concerns whether 
there exists in MaP the potential for a new kind of aesthetic experience. In other 
words, does the relationship with the painting create an interaction in the mind of the 
listener which somehow helps them understand the music? Such a mechanism clearly 
involves the use of our imagination and memory in the formation and connection of 
imagery and sounds. If this is the case, the listener potentially draws information from 
the painting, providing a framework and context in which to hear the music, and thus 
a new type of aesthetic response emerges that would not be available from the music 
on its own. That framework is a platform held in the mind of the listener, and amounts 
to a kind of scene-setting by means of which the listener is primed or sensitised to 
hear the music within or from a particular perspective.
Accordingly, something about the musical logic of these pieces may depend 
upon an intermediation of ideas seen in the painting which is then used to direct our 
musical hearing. The listener is being enjoined at the very least to cognize the subject 
of the painting, its physical and fictional spaces, and whatever association, 
connotation and imaging it might give rise to. If we are dealing with an interpretation, 
this implies some kind of negotiation with the musical object and the painting, and the 
corollary is that musical meaning is something made and not given. Such a dialogue 
fully implicates the musical object In affording such meaning in the first place, but it 
is contingent on what is an extra-musical dimension: the painting. The conditions 
which set forth this interaction and the way in which the painting comes to affect our 
understanding and hearing of the music will be the subject of Part I. In Part II, the 
three case studies will be analysed to explore different aspects of this interaction.
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In Part I, MaP will be situated by means of a comparison with programme 
music in general. The first theme considers the ontological status of music -  what 
music is -and to what extent the experience of it is similar to and different from that 
of painting. To do this, the immediate physical and phenomenological encounter with 
a musical work will be discussed. The second theme is predicated on there being 
something more than just a phenomenal encounter with this genre of music. If the 
relationship with the painting is to affect our aesthetic experience, this implies the 
transference of concepts from one domain to another. This mechanism will be 
explored through a discussion of reader-response theory, metaphor, and the notion of 
‘hearing / seeing as’ through the projection of ideas onto the music. The assertion 
made is that such meaning cannot be located exclusively in the music nor in the 
listener but in a negotiation and interaction between the two.
The case studies in Part II are designed to demonstrate that although the 
meaning of works of MaP may be considered protean, such meaning is not by any 
means unrestricted and may come in certain contexts to appropriate and communicate 
certain meanings, whilst denying others. By positing analogical coincidences between 
the music and the painting, this section will attempt to demonstrate how music may 
become a bearer of meaning. Thus, the various and disparate ways these case studies 
refer to or represent their respective painting will be examined and discussed in 
relation to the theorised mechanisms put forward in Part I.
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Part I: Mechanisms and Models
CHAPTER 1: Situating the Concept
1.1 Between Ideation and the Pragmatic
Before embarking on our theoretical and methodological discourse, and in order to 
demonstrate the need for an exclusive study of MaP, it will be necessary to make a 
brief examination of the existing literature on this subject. This will be followed by an 
attempt to situate MaP within the broader fabric of programme music, with which it 
shares certain similarities while asserting its distinctiveness as a phenomenon in other 
ways.
There exists an abundance of literature on the subject of musical 
representation, on whether music is able to represent extra-musical ideas, or to invoke 
objects, people, and places, and some of this will be discussed later; but given the 
popularity and enduring nature of MaP, there has been surprisingly little scholarship 
on it as a distinct phenomenon. On the one hand there are studies that examine how 
painting has appropriated musical ideas, for example Andrew Kagan’s Paul Klee: Art 
and Music and Karin von Maur’s The Sound o f Painting: Music in Modern Art.1 And 
on the other hand, there are examinations of influences on music of paintings and 
painterly ideas. To date, however, there have been only two English-language 
treatises on the subject of MaP: Edward Lockspeiser’s Music and Painting: a Study in 
Comparative Ideas from Turner to Schoenberg and Siglind Bruhn’s Musical 
Ekphrasis: Composers Responding to Poetry and Painting.
1 See Andrew Kagan, Paul Klee: Art and Music (Ithaca and London: Cornell University
Press, 1983) and Karin von Maur, The Sound o f Painting: Music in Modern Art (London: Prestel, 
1999).
2 Edward Lockspeiser, Music and Painting: a Study in Comparative Ideas from Turner to Schoenberg 
(London: Cassell, 1973) and Siglind Bruhn, Musical Ekphrasis: Composers Responding to Poetry and 
Painting (Hillsdale, New York: Pendragon Press, 2000).
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In his short book, Edward Lockspeiser examines a few individual artists in his 
quest to posit the interpenetration of ‘comparative ideas’ between different media. In 
it we find as much emphasis on the discussion of painting’s reliance on music as on 
music’s reliance on painting. Expressing his unease with what he regarded as the 
increasing dominance of technical descriptions of music, Lockspeiser adopts a 
humanistic perspective in the ‘pursuit of an underlying purpose or idea’. This 
position is exemplified for him by Sir George Grove’s analysis of Beethoven’s 
‘Pastoral’ Symphony in 1896 ‘when style was still discussed in terms of poetic 
imagery’. Here the work is described in terms of repetitions which invoke the 
monotony and repetitiveness of nature, and Lockspeiser aligns this observation with 
the ‘accumulated repetition of a sensation’ associated with Impressionism, writing 
that the ‘repetitive manner in the First and Second Movements of the Pastoral 
symphony suggests a musical anticipation of this technique’.4 Seen thus, Beethoven’s 
music prefigures these Impressionist ideas by some fifty years.
In the second chapter, the author makes a link between the English painter 
John Martin (1789-1854) and certain works by Berlioz, through the composer’s 
fascination with and programmatic uses of the catastrophic visions that also featured 
strongly in Martin’s paintings. Lockspeiser seems intent on establishing general 
aesthetic links that stem from the exchange of ideas between music and painting in the 
nineteenth century, discussing what he calls the ‘pictorial basis’5 in particular works 
by Mendelssohn, Beethoven, Weber and Berlioz. But what we do not have is a 
discussion of musical works which invoke a specific painting: hence there is no 
consideration of problems of representation involved in MaP, perhaps because 
Lockspeiser is sceptical of such possibilities.
3 Lockspeiser, Music and Painting, 5.
4 Ibid., 15.
5 Ibid., 4.
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Describing the ‘regions of representation and abstraction’ as ‘indefinable’, he 
adds that ‘[t]he representational technique belongs to painting but not to music; in fact 
in music any form of representation is impossible except by illusion or symbolical 
associations’.6 Clearly, for Lockspeiser, music cannot be representational without 
recourse to these symbolic aspects, and by ‘symbol’ he does not mean ‘iconic’ in the 
Peirceian sense, but ‘arbitrary’. This suggests that music conveys some thing beyond 
itself, and this something may be abstracted and taken out of the music itself. By 
virtue of convention and association, the music becomes representational by standing 
for something else, and therefore, in his view, the broad manner of ideas exchanged 
between painting and music is a shared web of ideology which is not specific to any 
one musical example. Instead he points to systems of value and purpose, and 
historical, cultural, political and sociological influences which were important to a 
group of practising artists in a given period, for example the Impressionist movement, 
which affected a generation of poets, painters, writers and musicians who all shared a 
common thread of interest in rendering sensations and impressions. Moreover, these 
impressions were often represented as nebulous and vague. As the author explains, 
this is one aspect of Impressionism which appealed to the composer Debussy.
Siglind Bruhn’s book is more comprehensive in scope, covering a range of 
music composed after poetry, literature, stained glass, painting and mixed media. And 
while Lockspeiser’s analyses posit connections through a comparison of ideas, 
Bruhn’s generally focus on any such ideation through the explicit connection borne by 
the musical work’s title. As the title indicates, the work is predicated on what the 
author calls ‘musical ekphrasis’. Ekphrasis (alternately spelled ecphrasis) is a literary 
term originally intended to denote poetry and literary works concerned with the visual
6 Ibid., 60.
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arts or visual scenes in general; hence Keats’s poem ‘Ode on a Grecian Urn’ would be 
considered an example of this genre. Here Bruhn generalises the term to mean ‘a 
representation in one medium of a text composed in another medium’.7
Wary of describing the process of musical ekphrasis in terms tied up with 
music-specific meanings (transposition, transformation and transcription), and in 
terms which allude to either an exact correspondence (translation and transcription) or 
suggest ‘a difference of quality between the former and the latter’ (transmutation and 
transfigurations), Bruhn offers a new term: ‘transmedializatiori’ .8 However, in her 
opening introduction, we find a key-agenda paragraph which already suggests the 
danger of lapsing back into ‘translation’:
This study attempts to answer the question what it may mean if composers claim to be 
inspired by a poem or painting, a drama or a sculpture, to such a degree that they set out to 
transform the essence of this artwork’s features and message, including their personal reaction 
to it, into their own medium: the musical language.9
Thus, in this formulation the author sets out to show ‘what it may mean’ if a 
composer transforms ‘the essence o f  a visual or literary medium into a musical one. 
Accordingly, the author’s brief is to exemplify how musical works ‘transmedialize’ 
one medium into another. But although Bruhn’s careful use o f ‘essence’ implies that 
she is not countenancing the idea that one medium is translatable into another, it does 
point towards an abstraction from the medium itself, which suggests that the ‘essence’ 
of that original artwork is no longer bound up with the medium and may therefore 
exist somehow outside it. Thus, it seems as if its kernel is extracted and re-presented 
in the other medium.
7 Bruhn, Musical Ekphrasis: Composers Responding to Poetry and Painting, 8.
8 Ibid., 51.
This leads Bruhn to reveal relationships between particular pieces of music 
and their associated paintings as if they are just there waiting to be found by a suitably 
intelligent critic who can ‘translate’ them. For example, in her analysis of Respighi’s 
Trittico botticelliano she identifies certain musical motifs with figures in the Botticelli 
paintings. She argues, for instance, that in the movement ‘Nascita di Venere’ an 
unspecified flourish played by the clarinet ‘consisting of a concave curve (a lingering 
downbeat leading into a swift chromatic descent and re-ascent) followed by a varied 
sequence [...] is quite obviously intended to create a musical allusion to the breath 
with which Zephyr, who affects both Venus-centred scenes, blows the new-born 
goddess to her destiny’.10 Statements such as this clearly contradict her earlier 
circumspection regarding a match-for-match likeness between image and sound:
One option o f reading, which has a certain plausibility although I do not ultimately find it 
entirely persuasive, matches “figures” in Respighi’s composition with figures in Botticelli’s 
canvas. [...] Without wanting to dismiss out o f hand the basic validity of such a pairing of 
musical and visual elements, I would like to argue in favor o f a more subtle reading, one that I 
find more intriguing insofar as it explicitly addresses the question of transmedialization.11
This more ‘subtle’ reading consists of a discussion of Respighi’s allusion to 
spring through his use of material which resembles that of Vivaldi’s own ‘La 
primavera’ from Le quattro stagioni. While Bruhn’s literal reading identifying the 
clarinet’s flourish with Zephyr’s ‘breath’ and the secondary allusion to spring may at 
some level be plausible, what is needed is recognition of the self reflexivity and 
creativeness bound up in these types of conclusions. Nicholas Cook rightly observes 
that a theory of musical meaning needs to show ‘how music might support, or not
10 Ibid., 251.
11 Ibid., 237-38.
25
•  •  19support, the meanings ascribed to it’. In other words, we need to investigate how we 
come to attach certain readings or interpretations to the music. The problem, 
therefore, is not in Bruhn’s interpretations of the music itself but in not recognising 
her involvement in how that interpretation was arrived at.
There is obviously a tendency (and also a temptation) for us to naturalise any 
relationships between the music and the painting by way of a process resembling the 
familiar children’s game T spy’. We try to ‘fit’ aspects of the music to the painting or 
the painting to the music, searching for viable correspondences when we should really 
be focusing on the conditions which enable those critical interpretations in the first 
place. The music may be felt to be significant, just as a bodily gesture might be 
significant but lacks the ability to signify without recourse to the painting. 
Accordingly, our interest will lie in the assumption that this music is actively 
interpreted and framed in some way by the painting. For example, the selection of 
attributes that Bruhn makes in the music becomes effective because she has assigned 
them significance. It becomes one way of hearing the music amongst many other 
possible ways. The interpretation, then, shows us one way that the music can be 
heard, but only if there is a homology between the interpretation of the painting and 
the music. In other words, the interpretation has to be a ‘good fit’ with the painting.
In summary, then, Lockspeiser’s book usefully points towards the sharing of 
ideas between music and painting in a general sense and by adducing hitherto unseen 
connections between the arts, but he does not address the phenomenon of music 
explicitly composed after painting. And neither does he seem convinced by the idea of 
a representational function for music beyond symbolic and certain conventionalised 
strategies. Bruhn, on the other hand, does focus on these specific musical works but
12 Nicholas Cook, ‘Theorizing Musical Meaning’, Music Theory Spectrum, 23/2 (2001), 171.
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treats them as if they possess natural correspondences with the painting. It is a 
hermeneutic exercise, but more needs to be done to recognise how a listener might 
parse the music in light of the painting.
Musical meaning is a negotiated enterprise involving a delicate interplay 
between the music and the painting, where meaning is actively interpreted and 
emergent. Accordingly, the study here proposes to examine the mechanisms involved 
in the listener’s aesthetic response to such works, whilst showing, through the 
analyses, how certain musical attributes come to support aspects of the painting.
1.2 Between the Programmatic and the Absolute
There is no need to chart the historical lineage of programme music here as this has 
been attempted several times in the literature already.13 But it is important to 
acknowledge both the close relationship MaP shares with this broader category of 
music as well as its distinctiveness in relation to that category.
The general definition of programme music is music which contains some 
kind of narrative or descriptive component purporting to ‘represent extra-musical 
concepts without resort to sung words’.14 It usually incorporates a specific and 
definite plan or ‘programme’ of events and a causally-derived narrative structure that 
is linear in nature and part-literary in its presentation. Not restricted to any one 
musical style, it has featured extensively in instrumental music, both chamber and 
orchestral, and gained considerable popularity in the Romantic period, where 
examples abound, the most obvious being Berlioz’s Symphonie fantastique (1830).
13 See, for example, Carl Dahlhaus, Nineteenth Century Music, trans. J. B. Robinson (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1989).
14 For a trenchant summary of programme music and its definition, see Roger Scruton, ‘Programme 
Music’, Grove Music Online ed. L. Macy <http://www.grovemusic.com> [accessed 26 January 2007].
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Liszt defined the programme as ‘any preface in intelligible language added to 
a piece of instrumental music, by means of which the composer intends to guard the 
listener against a wrong poetical interpretation, and to direct his attention to the 
poetical idea of the whole or to a particular part of it’.15 This description points to the 
idea that musical representation is not inevitable or definite; rather, it needs a rubric 
set by the composer in some kind of ‘intelligible language’ to aid the listener’s 
involvement. In other words, our imaginative faculty is required to hear the music in a 
particular way through an interpretive framework.
Programme music includes not only examples with very detailed literary 
appendages, like the Berlioz example above, but also music that contains descriptive 
titles, such as those in Claude Debussy’s preludes for piano. However, as Roger 
Scruton has pointed out, the inclusion of mere titles broadens the term to be ‘so wide 
as to be virtually meaningless’.16 Hence he holds that only those works with a 
narrative or descriptive meaning should be considered programmatic.
MaP often makes its connection to the painting through the title, so can it 
therefore be considered a species of programme music? For sure, this music does not 
fall into Carl Dahlhaus’s definition of absolute music (what he later calls independent 
instrumental music) as expressing ‘the true nature of music by the very lack of 
concept, object, and purpose,’17 for the implication of having the painting in a musical 
title clearly offers a concept, object and purpose. But does it offer a narrative or 
descriptive component?
15 Cited in The New Oxford Companion to Music, s.v. ‘Programme music’.
16 Scruton, ‘Programme Music’, Grove Music Online. In contrast, Frederick Niecks argues that music is 
programmatic if the composer had a programme in mind whilst composing, whether or not he indicates 
this through a title or makes it known through some other means. See his Programme Music in the Last 
Four Centuries: a Contribution to the History o f  Musical Expression (London: Novello, 1906), 3.
17 Carl Dahlhaus, The Idea o f Absolute Music, trans. J. B. Robinson (Berkeley and London: University 
of California Press, 1989), 7.
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Figure 1.1: Francis Bacon, Blood on the Floor (1986)
There is a relationship here with descriptive titles, such as that of Debussy’s 
piano prelude Voiles (1909). Here the title evokes an image or an impression, though 
not one that is tied to a particular representation, such as a work of art. In some 
instances of MaP, the title itself is replete with its own imagery and concepts, 
regardless of the painting that is being referred to. The title of Mark-Anthony 
Tumage’s Blood on the Floor, for example, evokes certain ideas and imagery before 
we even hear a note of the music. The words of the title have both a literal, denotative 
meaning and a second-order, connotative meaning. Although, the title does not 
presuppose any particular narrative, it does seem to beg insertion into a larger 
narrative. Our imaginative faculties might, for example, alight upon a sinister reading, 
inferring a narrative that embellishes the information provided, such as that of a crime 
perpetrated. Moreover, such potential is in no way diminished should we be presented
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with Francis Bacon’s painting (fig. 1.1) or already know it -  indeed, the effect is 
probably strengthened.
The point in this case is that, unlike in Scruton’s definition of programme 
music, any narrative or even descriptive component in Tumage’s Blood on the Floor 
is one that we have read into the imagery of the painting and not one that is literally 
present. The narrative that we see or read into the painting might of course be the 
same one that the composer had in mind while composing. But we cannot know if it is 
the same one, for if the composer verbalises this narrative description and 
disseminates it to the listener then it becomes effectively another form of programme 
music.
Accordingly, if the narrative is ours, to describe the music as programmatic is 
spurious, for what and whose narrative is being followed here? Importantly, this 
qualification is not the same as saying that our experience of the music is not related 
to the painting in any way, for there may be definite correspondences to make 
between the two media; however, the job at hand will be to show how music may 
function within the context of the painting.
Significantly, programme music usually contains or implies a narrative 
component and one that is often based on an identifiable literary source containing a 
chain of events related to the progress of the music; and occasionally the narrative is 
written by the composer, as in Berlioz’s Symphonie fantastique. Composers may also 
append epigraphic inscriptions to various points in the score. Franz Liszt, for 
example, employs this technique in his symphonic poem Die Ideale (1857), where he 
inserts nine poetic fragments from Friedrich Schiller’s poem as prefaces to the
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•  •  I Dmusical sections. Similar practices are evident in Beethoven’s ‘Pastoral’ Symphony 
and Enrique Granados’s piano suite Goyescas. It is clear, though, that such a 
programme is only available to the performers or listeners that have access to the
19score.
As with the reversibility of the implied chronology of music ‘after’ painting, it 
is also the case that both composers and critics would sometimes impose a 
programme upon the music after it had been composed. Richard Strauss, for example, 
included the poem Alexander Ritter wrote after hearing the symphonic poem Tod und 
Verklarung on the flyleaf of the printed score. The musicologist Arnold Schering, in 
his controversial book Beethoven und die Dichtung: mit einer Einleitung zur 
Geschichte und Aesthetik der Beethovendeutung, asserts that some thirty-eight works 
by Beethoven are predicated upon poems by Homer, Goethe, Schiller and Cervantes, 
and he regards these as programmes that, once discerned, unlock the previously 
hidden musical logic.20 Similarly, Sir Donald Tovey and Susan McClary have both 
constructed imaginative programmatic interpretations of Beethoven’s Ninth 
Symphony which, as Nicholas Cook argues, provide a cogent way of hearing the 
work and its musical relations.21 However, although these ‘programmes’ have been 
imposed retrospectively, from a reception-orientated view it seems unlikely that their 
import is in any way diminished.
In his book Nineteenth-Century Music, Carl Dahlhaus discusses how Mahler 
used an ‘exterior’ programme to ‘signpost’ his listeners’ musical understanding. He
18 Vera Micznik discusses this point in ‘The Absolute Limitations of Programme Music: The Case of 
Liszt’s “Die Ideale”’, Music and Letters, 80 (1999) 207—40.
19 Both Granados and Beethoven have adorned their scores with literary descriptions. Beethoven, for 
example, famously assigns woodwind instruments to the musical depiction of birds at the end of the 
second movement o f his Pastoral symphony, and each movement is given a descriptive title.
20 See Alfred Einstein’s review of this book in Music & Letters, 18 (1937), 206-11.
21 See Nicholas Cook, ‘Theorizing Musical Meaning’, 170-95.
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quotes Mahler reflecting on the meaning of the titles proposed for his First and 
Second Symphonies:
Admittedly, I took my external stimulus from the well-known children’s painting [Des Jagers 
Leichenbegrabnis]. What the movement depicts, however, is irrelevant; the point is the mood 
it is trying to express. So it is at all events advisable at first, while my art still occasions 
confusion, for the listener to be given a few [programmatic] signposts and milestones on his 
journey [...] but that is the most this sort of explanation can offer.22
This provides an interesting example of what a composer purports to understand by 
the inclusion of a ‘programme’, in this case a children’s painting. Mahler’s 
explanation -  that the function of his programme is not to ‘depict’ but to signpost the 
mood of the piece to the listener -  leads Dahlhaus to consider this component 
ephemeral and not part of the music, ‘being no more than a scaffolding to be tom 
down as soon as the edifice it helped to erect is finished’. But surely the programme 
continues to direct our listening, even as a memory, long after we have read or been 
apprised of it, thereby still affecting our aesthetic response to the music? Of course, 
Mahler eventually withdrew his First Symphony’s designation ‘Titan’ and its 
descriptive movement titles, but from a reception point of view knowledge of the Jean 
Paul book on which it is based might still affect the listener’s aesthetic experience of 
the work.
Furthermore, Dahlhaus writes that Liszt believed one of the aims of 
programme music to be to ‘mediate between music and a traditional culture that was 
primarily literary and philosophical. An open mind -  naive, unreflective listening -  
was just what ought to be extirpated from the musical public’. And secondly, ‘it is a
22 Gustav Mahler writing to Max Marschalk, cited in Carl Dahlhaus, Nineteenth Century Music, 366.
23 Ibid.
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crude misunderstanding to think that a program is the meaning of a symphonic poem, 
that the programme could decode the music, as if it were a text in a cipher’. Dahlhaus 
continues,4To think that Liszt translated poems into music -  that he tried to say in 
another language the same thing as the original text -  is a mistake, but its absurdity 
never prevented its dissemination.’24
It is not, then, mere narration. Indeed, it would seem superfluous to reiterate 
what already exists in another medium. This is a point overlooked by Siglind Bruhn 
with her notion, discussed above, of 4transmedializing’ one medium into another. 
Dahlhaus explains that Liszt’s 4Faust’ Symphony is not about the content of Goethe’s 
Faust but merely adapts the principal characters of the play as its subject.4 And a 
subject is no model to be imitated but rather a sort of material that the composer 
elaborates.’ This subject4is newly minted by the musical themes and motives. 
Program music rests on the interdependence of its components [the literary and the 
musical]’ 25 What Dahlhaus is discussing here is the influence of literary-based 
constructions upon our aesthetic understanding of a piece of music. This connects 
with the notion that what is imagined by the listener in MaP is not the original 
painting, but newly elaborated material based on functional elements of the original.
Programme music rose to prominence in the nineteenth century, an era, as 
Dahlhaus writes,4 when experience was shaped by reading and when literature on a 
subject was scarcely less important than the subject itself. Moreover, criticism has 
always shared in the production of meaning: 'Consciousness of music is determined, 
to no small extent, by literature about music [...] Musical experience almost always 
involves memory-traces from reading. And the meaning accumulated by music in its
24 Dahlhaus, Esthetics o f Music, trans. William W. Austin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1982), 59.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., 60.
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secondary, literary mode of existence does not leave untouched its primary mode, the 
realm of composition.’27 For Dahlhaus, the effect of literature on the listener’s 
musical experience re-contextualises and re-composes the musical work; once the 
work is affected in this way, it is forever changed.
Debates have raged over whether a listener uninformed of the programme of a 
musical work may have an aesthetically impoverished experience as a result. Roger 
Scruton has argued that programme music can be understood sufficiently well without 
its accompanying programme -  ‘thoughts about a subject are never essential to the 
understanding of music’ -  thus rendering the extra-musical component largely 
unnecessary. We might ask, therefore, if the mark of ‘good’ programme music is that 
it survives as a satisfying aesthetic experience away from its programme, or that it 
does not. Peter Kivy, espousing a somewhat holistic position, writes that ‘Symphonie 
fantastique is a work of art, and its programmatic text is part of that work of art. So, if 
you are not aware of that part, you are not fully appreciating that work of art. 
Something in your appreciation is lacking.’ He explains that there are certain gaps, 
inconsistencies and anomalies in the symphony which are at odds with the tightly 
organised symphonies of Beethoven and Haydn, and do not make musical sense until 
you know the programme. Thus, Kivy writes, the ‘program is the major organizing 
principle of the symphony, as musical as it nevertheless is on its own.’29 In the view 
of an autonomist such as Scruton, meanwhile, a piece of programme music may 
‘redeem’ itself by functioning convincingly as absolute music.
MaP refers usually (and certainly in the case studies in Part II) to an existing 
work by a painter. But is it not possible for the painting to be seen as a kind of
27 Ibid., 62.
28 Roger Scruton, ‘Representation in Music’, in The Aesthetic Understanding (London: Methuen,
1983), 75. See also his Aesthetics o f Music (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 132-34.
29 Kivy, Introduction to a Philosophy o f Music (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 196-97.
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programme, directing and even prescribing a way of hearing the passage of musical 
events? If that were to be the case, the shared ground with programme music would 
have to be conceptual, and, as we have said, any narrative projected onto the painting 
is only an interpretation which the listener wittingly or unwittingly constructs. Any 
directing, then, would have to be in terms of an imagined programme read into the 
painting by the listener rather than by any explicit programme given by the composer.
Of course, this is not to say that the painting necessarily evokes a narrative, 
but at the very least, an informed listener is able to peruse the remembered painting 
for coincidences that may be applied to a musical hearing. Still further, in both 
instances (programme music or MaP), there is a title that offers a conceptual 
framework. And it is, of course, possible for a single word to unleash a large 
conceptual field. Even the word ‘sails’ in Debussy’s title, Voiles, mentioned above, 
provides access to a large and interconnected set of ideas -  breezes, movement, veils, 
mists, coverings, the texture of canvas and so on.
Whereas MaP is more often than not performed in the absence of the painting, 
in programme music the programme is often ‘present’ and available to the listener in 
some form or other. In the case of Berlioz’s Symphonie fantastique, the importance 
the composer bestowed upon this particular programme is evidenced by the multiple 
revisions he executed of it and by its provision in pamphlet form at performances. 
Indeed, Berlioz stated that the ‘distribution of the programme to the audiences at 
concerts where the symphony is to be performed is indispensable for a complete
30understanding of the dramatic outline of the work’.
But is this really the case? While Kivy, quoted above, argues that something in 
his appreciation of the work is lacking without knowledge of the programme, the
30 Cited in The New Grove Dictionary o f  Music and Musicians, 1980, s.v. ‘Programme Music’.
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work is clearly appreciated by many listeners who have no knowledge of the 
programme behind it. Moreover, demands for the distribution of the painting are rare 
at performances of MaP. It therefore seems reasonable to suggest that MaP functions, 
and is intended to function, independently of the material presence of the painting or a 
reproduction thereof. The reference to the painting, titular or otherwise, points to the 
aesthetic relevance of this connection, and, as we said in the Introduction, this 
relevance is not dependent on whether the image formed by the listener corresponds 
precisely with the original painting.
MaP rarely has any specific literary appendage other than the title of the 
painting -  and it may not even have that.31 In contrast to programme music, this music 
is trying to invoke and represent something in its absence using no more than a title.
A concert whose programme contains a piece of MaP hardly ever requires the 
physical presentation of the painting, and it would be highly unusual for a composer 
to demand it. We would not, for example, expect to attend a performance of 
Toteninsel (1909) by Sergei Rachmaninoff, after the eponymous painting by Arnold 
Bocklin, and find the painting hanging behind the orchestra or be faced by some kind 
of cinematic projection of it. It would be less unusual to have access to a reproduction 
of the painting in the programme, but would a listener choose to gaze at the 
reproduction throughout the duration of the performance? Were the painting to be 
brought into the concert hall, would listeners necessarily focus their attention 
exclusively on the original? Probably they would not.
There may be more than one reason for this. First, there is the seeming 
incompatibility of the timescales for the reception of painting and music. While there
31 A work of MaP may adapt a title different from that o f the painting after which it is composed. For 
example, Harrison Birtwistle’s Carmen Arcadiae Mechanicae Perpetuum is composed after Paul 
Klee’s Die Zwitschermaschine, while George Benjamin’s representation of Turner’s Norham Castle, 
Sunrise is entitled At First Light.
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is evidence to suggest that paintings are taken in by viewers less instantaneously than 
is often thought, music unfolds over a specified (and usually longer) span of time.
But, second, it suggests that imaginative projection, the very process of bringing to 
life in our imagination the suggested fictional space of the painting, is a vital 
component of the aesthetic experience. The ‘how’ of representation is as important as 
the ‘what’. Peter Kivy seems to be in concurrence with this view: ‘when one knows 
only what a musical composition might picture or represent, one doesn’t know so very 
much.’32 Indeed, perhaps a full aesthetic experience is possible (and even desirable) 
with recourse only to the listener’s memories of the painting. Thus, the painting may 
be thought of as setting off a chain of imaginings in the listener which do not require 
its actual presence during the performance. Accordingly, in the absence of the 
painting, most listeners do not seem to share Kivy’s concern regarding an 
impoverishment of his aesthetic experience of music in the absence of its programme.
MaP cannot be considered a form of multimedia experience, for it does not use 
more than one medium of expression -  it refers to but does not require the presence of 
the painting. By contrast, Swan Lake would be unthinkable without Tchaikovsky’s 
music, as would Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho without the accompanying Bernard 
Herrmann soundtrack. Since ballet and film are intended as audio and visual 
experiences with both components present, the absence of either would thwart our 
culturally derived expectations and fundamentally alter both the aesthetic intention of 
the composer and the aesthetic experience of the listener.
Jean-Jacques Nattiez, discussing Anthony Newcomb’s narrative approach to 
Schumann’s instrumental music, writes that a ‘narrative, strictly speaking, is not in 
the music, but in the plot imagined and constructed by the listeners from functional
32 Peter Kivy, Sound and Semblance: Reflections on Musical Representation (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1984), 216 (italics original).
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objects’. These functional elements are found in the musical structure and comprise 
tension and release analogous to that which we might find in a literary work. Nattiez 
continues: ‘Newcomb’s transposition in fact tells us that, for the listener, any 
“narrative” instrumental work is not in itself a. narrative, but the structural analysis in 
music o f an absent narrative.,33 That is to say, we listen to the music as if there is a 
narrative there in the music when in fact the only narrative is the one which we read 
and project upon the musical structure.
In MaP, we are perhaps dealing with something very similar. The question we 
must ask is whether this involves imposing an absent narrative or the reconstruction 
of an image that we re-make, more or less approximating to the painting. By virtue of 
the music’s title, we may have good reason to expect a representation of the painting, 
and we are therefore invited to construct a narrative by imagining subject-predicate 
relationships taking place within the music which pertain to the painting’s conceptual 
content. Kivy insists that the context, such as a programme or title, justifies a 
‘representational ascription’, although he adds that such an intention to represent is a 
‘necessary (though not sufficient) condition for representation’.34 With this context, it 
therefore makes sense for us to conduct a representational reading of MaP -  because 
the listener is so primed.
What we are dealing with here is a unique species of music. On the one hand it 
cannot strictly speaking be called programme music because it is without a literary 
programme, save perhaps for its title which, as we have said, is not necessarily a 
programme. On the other hand it cannot properly be thought of as part of a 
multimedia presentation, because it is not co-presented with the painting, as, say, 
incidental music is with a film or play. Still, it remains a species of music whose
33 Jean-Jacques Nattiez, ‘Can One Speak o f Narrativity in Music?’, Journal o f the Royal Musical 
Association, vol. 115/2 (1990), 249 (italics original).
34 Peter Kivy, Sound and Semblance: Reflections on Musical Representation, 215.
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significance seems to lie beyond the apparent emptiness of instrumental music, for it 
seems to be constantly reaching toward another experiential domain, the painting.
This reaching outwards may be thought of as an effort, on the listener’s part, to make 
sense of the music. We entertain a predisposition to understand this experience in 
terms of the painting and its attributes, which then exert a shaping influence on the 
aesthetic experience: ‘this music is about that painting’ or ‘the music describes and 
represents something about the painting’.
In a noteworthy experiment, Nattiez played 300 schoolchildren, aged 11 to 14, 
Paul Dukas’s symphonic poem L ’apprenti sorcier. Instead of giving them the title, he 
told them: ‘This music tells a story. What is it?’ He reports that the aim ‘was to see 
what narrative the pupils projected onto the music.’35 Nattiez found that, when asked 
to listen in this narrative mode, ‘the children made sense after the event of the 
succession of sound events by imagining subject-predicate relationships which, by 
itself, the music cannot make explicit’.36 In this way, the narrative that is imposed 
afterwards exists only as a potential: it is the perceiver who creates and establishes the 
narrative links. We might at this point invoke Roman Ingarden when he writes: ‘With 
regard to their [musical] properties they are ultimately dependent upon the opinions 
we [the listener] hold of them.’37 Thought of this way, it becomes a matter of what the 
listener does with the sounds, or, even, what we do to the sounds in respect of the 
projections and connections that are made.
From all of the children’s responses, Nattiez observed a narrative formula 
which may be described as ‘calm/chase/calm’. It is, he says, ‘the kinetic and dynamic 
aspects of musical substance’ which create this schema; and, semantically, this is an
35 Nattiez, ‘Can One Speak of Narrativity in Music?’, 246 (italics original).
36 Ibid., 248 (italics original).
37 Roman Ingarden, The Work o f Music and the Problem o f its Identity, ed. Jean G. Harrell, trans.
Adam Czemiawski (London: Macmillan, 1986), 155.
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‘image of the effect produced by the music on the listeners’.38 Based on this 
experiment, the musical structure has been distilled to a simple schema, reminiscent 
of the supra-structural idea given over by Peter Kivy’s ‘contour theory’39 whereby 
certain structural features of the music are analogous to the behaviours of human 
beings -  bodily gestures, vocal inflections, and so forth. Moreover, such a simple 
schema as this clearly fits (and has fitted) many different narrative projections from 
its listeners. Why is this? It surely relates back to the idea of there being a potential 
for the music to support a basic trajectory of action without specifying the actors: as 
Roland Barthes commented in his essay ‘The Grain of the Voice’,40 music tends to be 
accorded adjectives -  we might add, verbs or adverbs -  more than nouns.
But that none of the children in Nattiez’s experiment posited a narrative 
framework of, say, ‘chase/calm/chase’ suggests that the choice of narrative is 
necessarily constrained by the music’s kinetic and dynamic aspects. If narrative 
meaning is not universal, neither is it arbitrary. So what is important for our 
investigation of MaP is how musical attributes may fit or support a particular image or 
narrative; how, then, they become meaningful within a specific context. This is not to 
say that a programme is irrelevant, only that it need not be tied to one possibility.
Writing on Beethoven’s ‘Les Adieux’ Sonata, Nicholas Cook asks if it matters 
that it ‘was incorrectly interpreted by nineteenth-century critics as the parting and 
reunion of two lovers, instead of the departure and return of the Archduke Rudolph? I 
see no reason to think so.’41 Cook’s example concerns two scenarios that share the 
same emotional contour: separation and reunion. That it matters little who is separated
38 Ibid., 248 (italics original).
39 See Peter Kivy, Introduction to a Philosophy o f Music, 40-46. Kivy’s ‘contour theory’ was first 
expounded in his book The Corded Shell: Reflections on Musical Expression (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980).
40 In Image-Music-Text, trans. and ed. Stephen Heath (London: Fontana, 1977), 179-89.
41 Nicholas Cook, Music, Imagination, and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 171.
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and who is reunited seems to point to the fact that music can describe things generally 
if there is a coincidence between something in the music and something in the 
programme. Moreover, the kernel of our aesthetic pleasure may be the very freedom 
that is left over by a flexible music that supports either of these scenarios, for 
example. That this is true also of MaP is suggested by Nicholas Cook, who, 
describing the transfer of attributes from pictures on record sleeves to the musical 
recording they contain, suggests that the painting ‘sets out a way of hearing the music 
that is not only possible but also pertinent’.42 Accordingly, concepts must be imposed 
from the painting onto the listening experience which help us select and foreground 
particular musical attributes whilst leaving others in the background.
1.3 Medium and Message
This, then, is a project which encompasses the question of musical meaning: a study 
into how and what MaP means. By asking whether the painting may affect our 
response to the music, we are also inquiring into the nature of how music 
communicates with us. Some maintain that music is a purely formalistic medium that 
imparts whatever meaning it has exclusively through the structural relationships of its 
inner components (the autonomist position), while others believe meaning to lie 
outside of music (the heteronomist position).43
In his book The Composer’s Voice (1974), the musicologist Edward T. Cone 
has written succinctly: ‘No context, no content’. With this he not only suggests that 
meaning situates itself within the immanent formal context of the piece but, moreover,
42 Nicholas Cook, ‘The Domestic Gesamtkunstwerk, or Record Sleeves and Reception’ in Composition 
-  Performance — Reception: Studies in the Creative Process in Music, ed. Wyndham Thomas 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 111.
43 These positions have been called other things at different times, perhaps notably by Leonard B. 
Meyer, who uses the terms ‘absolutists’ and ‘referentialists’ in his book Emotion and Meaning in 
Music, 1. Moreover, it is acknowledged that these are extreme poles with many subtler positions in 
between.
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that ‘only within a context of wider human activity is its content revealed’.44 
Typically, in music with a text, ‘content emerges from the mutual relations of words 
and musical gestures, and from the light they throw on each other’.45 A very 
interesting observation, and one which may be expanded and developed for a different 
purpose here, is that the painting and it title are able to reveal aspects of the music 
hitherto and otherwise unavailable. We might substitute Cone’s ‘content’ for musical 
understanding and make the claim that it is this aspect which helps the listener 
complete the musical picture -  pun intended. Thus, just as in vocal music we are able 
to map concepts belonging to the sung text onto the musical structure, so, too, in the 
case of MaP we are able to project attributes of the painting onto the music.
Accordingly, in considering the conditions necessary for meaning to emerge, 
we must now assess what potential aesthetic functions a programme might afford for 
the listener. Cone writes:
A program, however, is merely an adjunct to the music with which it is associated. Words and 
music are not sounded together; and since they are not synchronized, it is fruitless even to try 
and imagine them sounding together. In fact, the exact words are o f little importance; the 
program consists of the ideas the words convey. A program, then, gives a composition a 
conceptual, not a verbal, context.46
For Cone, then, because the programme is not something normatively performed with 
the piece, it is a ‘conceptual’ addition that ‘can specify a general mood to be 
associated with the movement of the music, or it can follow -  or direct -  the course of 
the music more closely through the succession of sounds, actions, tensions and 
relaxations that its narrative suggests’. But, he adds, the programme’s effectiveness
44 Edward T. Cone, The Composer’s Voice (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1974), 165.
45 Ibid., 166.
46 Ibid., 168.
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depends ‘on the degree to which it is felt to be figuratively isomorphic with the form 
of the composition -  the extent to which the pattern of activity suggested by the 
program corresponds to the pattern of symbolic gestures created by the music’.47
Holding to this proposition, we might consider whether the aesthetic 
importance of a painting comes not from any verbal context but from the ideas it 
conveys. Further still, the concepts which encapsulate words do so from a shared 
cultural understanding of what words mean, and also from our own contextual 
experiences of those ideas contained therein; hence a word such as the French ‘voile’ 
has a different understanding for any two individuals (such as a yachtsman and a 
nun). Similarly, our recovery of the ideas contained in a painting is also subject to 
individual experiences combined with the possession of a shared cultural 
understanding of the conventions of a painting -  such as an experience of two- 
dimensional perspective, say.
The difference, though, between a painting and a programme possessing a 
verbal content lies in the fact that although a painting may be able to reveal aspects of 
the musical structure, the revelation is not as straightforward as one that occurs from a 
verbal text, for are we not being asked to interpret something which is intrinsically 
more ambiguous than a written-down text? Moreover, the painting here is 
conspicuously absent, meaning that whatever concepts the listener might map onto the 
musical experience may only occur through a memory or impression. This would 
appear to be something far less definite than the concepts imparted by a verbal 
accompaniment or programme. And this factuality is compounded when we consider 
music composed after a non-representational (abstract) painting, for the lack of a
47 Ibid., 167. Mahler makes a similar point about the programme’s importance in expressing the ‘mood’ 
of his piece. See pp. 12-13 above.
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discernible subject matter must limit the type of conceptual transference that we are 
talking about -  any such transfer must be of a second order.
1.4 Frames and Boundaries
To explore any possible relationships between music and painting requires that we 
consider where the limits of each artwork lie. Is an artwork limited solely to its own 
world, or can it extend beyond its own fictional space to other areas of experience, 
aesthetic or otherwise? Edward T. Cone, in his 1968 book Musical Form and Musical
A O
Performance, asks: ‘Where is the beginning of a piece of music? Where is the end?’. 
And, he wonders, does a composition begin with the first note and end with the last 
one: ‘Are periods of time before and after a composition ever parts of it?’ We might 
also regard the frame of a painting as an attempt to locate the limits of the subject, but 
Cone asserts that this is not necessarily the case: ‘we find that the edge of the picture 
demarcates that portion of a subject chosen for representation, but every depicted 
scene necessarily extends indefinitely outside its limiting boundaries. Even in the case 
of abstractions, one can usually imagine the pattern as continuing beyond the picture 
area.’49 This is an interesting way of defining what the art object is and where it stops, 
for the implication here is that it continues before and after its literal event -  that is, 
what we might regard as our phenomenal perception of its actual and physical 
presence. Often, before we experience an artwork, whether music or painting, we 
anticipate the experience in some way. Consequently, once we enter the art gallery or 
the concert hall, we have certain preconceived notions, issues of accuracy 
notwithstanding, of the sensory events ahead of us.
48 Edward T. Cone, Musical Form and Musical Performance (London: Norton, 1968), 12.
49 Ibid., 14.
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In a discussion of Kant and his three critiques, Jacques Derrida alights upon 
Kant’s word par ergon. He writes, ‘The par ergon inscribes something which comes as 
an extra, exterior to the proper field [...] but whose transcendent exteriority comes to 
play, abut onto, brush against, rub, press against the limit itself and intervene in the 
inside only to the extent that the inside is lacking. It is lacking in something and it is 
lacking from itself.’50 Thus in the field of a framed painting, the intrinsic ambiguity of 
Van Gogh’s Les souliers (1886) leads the viewer to supplant the ‘whole by the part 
which explodes the frame or makes us jump over i f 51 -  encouraging the viewer to 
pose external questions such as ‘whose shoes are these?’, ‘are they shoes from the 
same pair?’, and ‘why have they formed a subject for this painting?’. In relation to the 
parergon, Derrida asks: ‘Where does the frame take place. Does it take place. Where 
does it begin. Where does it end. What is its internal limit. Its external limit. And its 
surface between the two limits.’ He argues that to determine what is framed (the 
intrinsic text) we must ‘know what one is excluding as frame and outside-the- 
frame’.52 In the case of MaP, of course, we could argue that the frame of the music 
extends outwards encompassing the limits of the remembered painting; indeed, it may 
even demand this extension.
The French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari also have 
something to say about frames in respect of their theory that art resembles the animal 
kingdom through its carving out of a territory which then intersects with the territories 
of others: ‘But if nature is like art, this is always because it combines these two living 
elements in every way: House and Universe, Heimlich and Unheimlich, territory and 
deterritorialization, finite melodic compounds and the great infinite plane of
50 Jacques Derrida, The Truth in Painting, trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod (Chicago and 
London: University o f Chicago Press, 1987), 56 (italics original).
51 Ibid., 344.
52 Ibid., 63.
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composition, the small and large refrain.’ The fact that the frame captures and 
selects depends on what Deleuze and Guattari call a ‘counterpoint’ with the 
surrounding universe. And although the frame constitutes sensations and figures 
within its scope, ‘it still needs a vast plane of composition that carries out a kind of 
deframing following lines of flight that pass through the territory only in order to open 
it onto the universe’.54 Thus, it needs a contrasting reference point in order that it 
might establish its own territory: ‘The painter’s action never stays within the frame; it 
leaves the frame and does not begin with it.’55 And so it is with music too: a melody 
may be contrasted and set against another melody in the form of counterpoint so that 
each has its own territory but depends on the other for its own definition. To illustrate 
the idea of the openness of a ‘plane of composition’ compensating for its 
‘individuating closure’,56 Deleuze and Guattari invoke the example of sonata form 
where the first movement presents the exposition of the first theme, a transition, 
exposition of the second theme, developments on both themes, a recapitulation and 
then a coda. Accordingly, the themes cross into other areas of the composition, while 
also maintaining their own individual ‘territories’.
The idea of framing off or marking out territory from the real world also 
extends to the other arts. In literature, for example, the typography on a page alerts us 
to the limits of a poem, the space a sculpture or building occupies sets its own 
threshold, and the house curtain in the theatre or cinema announces the beginning and 
end of the play or film. However, in the case of musical works, Edward T. Cone 
writes:
53 In What is Philosophy?, trans. Graham Burchill and Hugh Tomlinson (London: Verso, 1994), 186.
54 Ibid., 187 (italics original).
55 Ibid., 188.
56 Ibid., 190.
46
We can now recognize an important way in which music differs from these other arts: it has 
no internal environment. A composition cannot be thought of as a delimited segment o f a 
longer line. It has no antecedents and no consequents. Whatever music may be about -  and I 
do not wish to raise that issue -  the “whatever” begins only when the music begins, and ends 
when the music ends.
While he concedes that certain music does have 4a kind of internal environment in the 
form of its abstract system -  be it tonal, atonal, or twelve-tonal -  which in a sense 
existed before and continues after the concrete composition,’57 this is rather like 
comparing musical syntax to grammar, ignoring the fact that grammar, unlike musical 
syntax, is ‘essentially timeless’. Music, on the other hand, Cone argues, exists and 
takes place in real time; accordingly, we need to ‘mark off musical time from the
fO
ordinary time before it and after it’. Naturally, the framing method used for this is 
silence. However, although silence must indeed effectively delimit the musical 
experience from where the real world leaves off, music does seem to possess its own 
time which is different to clock time. This would explain why, when listening to a 
musical performance, time might be said to drag or to go more quickly, depending on 
our subjective involvement with the music. But what is most interesting for our 
purposes is the notion of the artwork extending beyond its frame.
1.5 Successive and Simultaneous
There is no arguing with the fact that music takes time to unfold and reveal its entire 
structure, and it could not be otherwise in such a temporally bound medium. It is 
equally clear that, in stark contrast, a painting is potentially available to the senses 
immediately in its entirety. Any musical representation of a painting therefore has to
57 Cone, Musical Form and Musical Performance, 15.
58 Ibid., 16.
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extend itself over a particular length of time that would seem to be incommensurate 
with the painting’s immediacy of visual impact. However, studies in human 
perception have shown that when the eye perceives an object, it undergoes what 
perceptual psychologists call saccadic and micro-saccadic movements. Paintings are 
therefore not experienced in one perceptual hit, as it were, but instead the eyes range 
about the painting, focusing and refocusing over its subject matter in a nonlinear
 59manner.
That the experience of seeing a painting may have a temporal dimension 
analogous to other so-called temporal arts is paradoxical in view of the widely held 
notion that music is the temporal art par excellence in contrast to the spatial art of 
painting, whose meaning is recovered immediately as an instantaneous perceptual 
acquisition. John Dewey, in Art as Experience (1934), argues that the distinction 
between the spatial and temporal arts is misguided because both require perception -  
and perception is never instantaneous. Dewey writes that the viewer ‘must create his 
own experience and his experience must include relations comparable to those which 
the original producer underwent’. The recovery and re-creation of those events is 
essential to the object being ‘perceived as a work of art’.60 Accordingly, a spectator’s 
experience of, say, a painting is not merely passive and distanced but an active 
attempt to reconstitute the work’s genesis, albeit Actively and synthetically.
Edward T. Cone discusses the idea that the spatial arts are not fixed and 
unchanging and that we read them in a temporal manner just as we would a literary or 
musical work. He argues that, because we follow our own paths through a painting 
and work out its inner relationships and meanings for ourselves, we might say that we 
perform the work; and, because our eyes range about the picture’s details, ‘the
59 See Stanley Coren et al., Sensation and Perception, 4th edn (London: Harcourt Brace Publishers, 
1994), 528-31.
60 John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Perigee Books, 1980), 220.
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contemplation of a work of spatial art almost always involves not one but several 
performances -  or at least several partial performances’.61 And for contemplation of a 
musical performance, certainly a live one, it is not possible to revisit a passage played 
earlier, for even were it repeated, it must now be subject to a slightly different 
interpretation by the performer. The only way to alight upon any aspect of the musical 
performance other than the present one is through the memory of an earlier passage or 
the anticipation of a later one. We could say then that both music and painting invoke 
our capacity for memory, for it would seem logical to suggest that even though the 
picture is all present, part of what directs our reading of the image must in part be 
what we remember from an earlier gaze: our eyes move in a direction governed by the 
painting but also by this earlier perception. Our perception is not neutral, then, but 
controlled by our recent experience.
According with this view, Clement Greenberg, in discussing the paintings of 
Paul Klee, writes that ‘the eye does not make an instantaneous synthesis; with Klee 
design is, as it were, temporal or musical. We are conscious of elements that are to be 
felt in terms of succession as well as simultaneity. The all-important factor is line.’ 
Significantly, Greenberg continues, ‘[ajdjectives do not fit the case as well as verbs. 
Klee’s line indicates, directs, relates, connects’.62 Thus, the experience of Klee’s work 
balances action (movement) with immediacy.
Jerrold Levinson appears to take a different view when he writes:
If one tries to achieve an overall grasp o f a painting, the parts that need to be related and 
integrated into a total sign, as it were, are all o f them perceptually present, accessible to a 
visual contemplation of a sustained sort. But with a musical composition of any extent the
61 Cone, Musical Form and Musical Performance, 33.
62 ‘An Essay on Paul Klee’, in Clement Greenberg, The Collected Essays and Criticism, vol. 3: 
Affirmations and Refusals, 1950-56, ed. John O’Brian (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 7.
49
parts that call for such relation and integration are in the most part perceptually absent, and 
representable only through memories, whether o f a verbal or nonverbal type.63
Seen thus, painting allows its percipient to see the scope and extent of its boundaries, 
whereas music allows for only localised perception of its moment-to-moment 
unfolding. However, Levinson adds:
Of course one does not fully understand a painting in a single glance, any more than one does 
a musical piece in a single hearing, but the point is that you can have a synoptic perception, or 
beholding, o f the whole in the former case, but not, given its temporal extent, in the latter.64
Nonetheless, is it not also possible to have a synoptic impression, not in the 
sense of a formal ABA synopsis, say, but as an apprehension of the affects of a piece 
of music? If we are asked, for example, to recall Tchaikovsky’s Pathetique, do we 
play out in our heads the fifth movement’s heart-stirring themes in a time 
commensurate with the live performance or do we remember a synoptic impression 
much as we might from the effect of a particular painting? Similarly, an analogy 
could be made with the synoptic impression of the after-effects of seeing another kind 
of temporal medium, film. For example, we do not need to play out the scene of 
Aschenbach’s arrival into Venice set to the Adagietto from Mahler’s Fifth Symphony 
in Luchino Visconti’s film Death in Venice (1971) to summon up an affective 
synoptic impression after the event. Moreover, perhaps it is not too bold to suggest 
that it is through an artwork’s immediate after-effects that it ultimately becomes 
meaningful.
63 Jerrold Levinson, Music in the Moment (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 19-20.
64 Ibid. (italics original). Of course, it is important to mention that this statement comes from 
Levinson’s wider argument (expanded and developed from Edmund Gurney) that what is important for 
our aesthetic understanding o f music is gained from when we listen to it moment to moment (hence the 
title o f his book). This argument forms the basis o f the theory he calls ‘concatenationism’.
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The phenomenon of MaP provides an interesting turnaround, because now it is 
the less mutable element, the painting, that is absent, and therefore only available 
through the mechanisms of memory and imagination. In this way, the ontology of the 
absent painting, by default, could be said to resemble the way we recall the distant 
parts of the musical object: through memory. Accordingly, Levinson writes, ‘it seems 
that one cannot perceive the form of such a musical composition as a whole, one can 
only conceive it (or perhaps imagine it, in a nonperceptual way).’65 Thus, just as we 
can no longer perceptually perceive the absent painting, nor can we perceptually 
apprehend the musical whole; but we can imagine both.
Paul Klee believed that the parameter of rhythm, a term normally considered 
the sole preserve of the musical realm, can rightfully belong to visual art too.
Anything involving regularity or some kind of pattern can be plausibly defined as 
rhythm, and Klee notes in regard to ‘[rjhythms and rhythmic structures’ that ‘[w]e can 
perceive rhythm with three senses at once. First we can hear it, secondly see it, thirdly 
feel it in our muscles. This is what gives it such power over our organism’.66 Being 
time-based, rhythm, though hitherto considered metaphorical when applied to the 
visual world, can be applied to any time-dependent medium, including painting, 
which is of course created in time.
Explicit and visible traces of rhythm can be located in certain paintings, for 
example in ‘action painting’ (or gestural abstraction, as it is also known). Such 
painting records and preserves the artist’s presence and creative act in the drips, 
smears and splashes of paint that he or she makes, betraying the act of creation itself.
65 Ibid., 20 (italics original).
66 Paul Klee, Notebooks Volume I: The Thinking Eye, ed. Jiirg Spiller and trans. Ralph Manheim and 
Heinz Norden (New York: The Overlook Press, 1992), 267.
67 A term first coined by Harold Rosenberg in 1952 in his essay entitled ‘The American Action 
Painters’, first published in Art News 5 1 / Dec (1952), repr. in The Tradition o f the New (New York: 
Horizon Press, 1960; repr. Da Capo Press, 1994), 23-39.
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The prime exponent of action painting is of course Jackson Pollock (1912-56), but the 
style was also evident in earlier French tachisme, and is perhaps ultimately traceable 
to the thick, gestural brushstrokes of Van Gogh. This presence manifests itself in 
vestiges of movement; and of course any kind of regular succession of movement 
would be defined as rhythm. However, although Klee notes that ‘[t]he main
/TQ
characteristic of rhythm is repetition’ -  something the viewer feels strongly when 
staring at the repeated drips and splashes of colour in a Pollock -  it seems unlikely 
that he would have recognised this random ‘rhythm’ in the Abstract Expressionists in 
the same way that he prescribed a kind of genesic rhythm in his own paintings.
Movement in art was paramount for Klee, and he revealed much of his 
philosophy on this matter in his remarkable ‘Creative Credo’ of 1920.69 It is worth 
exploring some of those statements here in order to clarify links to the domain of 
music. He writes:
In the work of art, paths are laid out for the beholder’s eye, which gropes like a grazing beast 
(in music, as everyone knows, there are channels leading to the ear -  in drama we have both 
varieties). The pictorial work springs from movement, is itself fixated movement, and is 
grasped in movement (eye muscles).70
In evocative language, Klee is suggesting here that the paths that are constructed by 
the artist are necessary to anchor the eye, which would otherwise ‘grop[e] like a 
grazing beast’. The myopic overtone of this sentence demonstrates that, for Klee, 
without some guidance the eyes will range about the painting unchecked, whereas in 
music the composer can exclusively feed the ‘channels leading to the ear[s]’ with his 
already determined (composed) paths of sound.
68 Klee, Notebooks, vol. 1: The Thinking Eye, 302.
69 ‘Creative Credo’, in Klee, Notebooks, 76-80.
70 Ibid., 78.
Klee therefore raises the implication that music has an advantage over the 
plastic art of painting because of this rationing. In other words, although Klee 
accepted and perhaps even pioneered the temporal element in painting, his concern 
was with controlling this component: ‘truth demands that all elements be present at
71 •once.’ This idea helps qualify his assertion that ‘ [pjolyphonic painting is superior to 
music in that, here, the time element becomes a spatial element. The notion of
• 77simultaneity stands out even more richly.’ Notions of temporality in painting are 
immanent in much of the ‘Creative Credo’, and the art historian Andrew Kagan 
explains that Klee’s statement on polyphony means that ‘painting, in his ideal vision, 
has a better potential for dealing with and overcoming its temporality without denying 
i f .73
Anticipating the action painters by some thirty years, Klee remarks how ‘space 
itself is a temporal concept. When a point turns into movement and line -  that takes 
time.’ He asks: ‘Does a picture come into being all at once? No, it is built up piece by 
piece, the same as a house.’ He continues, ‘The work of art, too, is first of all genesis; 
it is never experienced purely as a result.’ Hence the ‘beholder’ does not see just the 
finished product, but sees evidence of the incipient stages of that work too. Klee adds 
that,
What the beholder does is temporal too. The eye is so organised that it conveys the parts 
successively into the crucible o f vision, and in order to adjust itself to a new fragment has to 
leave the old one. After a while the beholder, like the artist, stops and goes away. If it strikes 
him as worthwhile -  again like the artist -  he returns.74
71 Klee, The Diaries o f Paul Klee 1898-1918, ed. and with an introduction by Felix Klee, trans. B. 
Schneider, R. Y. Zachary and M. Knight (London: Peter Owen, 1965), 372.
72 Ibid., 374.
73 Kagan, Paul Klee: Art and Music, 46, 165 ff.
74 Klee, The Creative Credo, cited in Notebooks, vol. 1: The Thinking Eye, 78.
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The allusion to memory here is noteworthy and has definite analogies with the 
experience of listening to music. The experience of harmonic music does present 
simultaneous events (musical notes) all at once, but these are preconditioned, as it 
were, by that which has previously been heard. In this way, a chord in any given piece 
may be thought of as existing along a continuum: events before the chord in question 
help to contextualise it, just as the chord then contextualises and anticipates future 
musical happenings. Hence, the harmonic event does not exist independently of that 
which comes before and after it. In painting, too, synchronous events depend on that 
which delimits a particular moment; but, unlike music, these contextualising factors 
are always present in a painting. This is why, for Klee, polyphonic painting is 
superior, because ‘[t]he time element must be eliminated. Yesterday and today as 
simultaneous’.75 Klee felt that only in painting could this condition be achieved.
1.6 Time and Space
As we have said, we tend to define music as a temporally determined object, and 
painting as a spatially determined one. On the face of it, then, music would also be 
experienced as temporal and painting as non-temporal. But might these sharp 
distinctions be deconstructed so that music may also be about space and painting 
about time?
In a fascinating essay: ‘On Some Relationships between Music and 
Painting’,76 the philosopher Theodor W. Adorno suggests that:
75 Klee, Diaries, entry 1081, cited in Simon Shaw-Miller, Visible Deeds o f Music: Art and Music from 
Wagner to Cage (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002), 147.
76 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘On Some Relationships between Music and Painting’, trans. Susan Gillespie, 
The Musical Quarterly, 79 (1995), 66-79.
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The convergence of music and painting occurs at the expense of their merely natural 
differences on the strength o f the more powerful, form-giving processes that manifest 
themselves as an identical principle in the encounter with their materials.77
As result of a phenomenal encounter, then, with the physical traces of the artwork’s 
form arises convergence with the other medium; but it is not an epiphenomenon, for it 
is in some way causal to the experience of that medium. Radically for the possibility 
of representation in MaP, Adorno declares: ‘The moment one art imitates another, it 
becomes more distant from it by repudiating the constraint of its own material, and 
falls into syncretism, in the vague notion of an undialectical continuum of arts in
no
general.’ Accordingly, it must not try to disown the nature of its medium by 
attempting to be something else: ‘[music has] time as its problem’, and it must 
therefore ‘act upon time, not lose itself to it’. Similarly, he adds that painting entails a
70‘reworking of space’, meaning ‘its dynamization and negation’. It would appear that 
Klee, too, was thinking along these lines in his efforts to somehow capture time in a 
painting while preserving, simultaneously, all of its elements spatially.
Each medium, then, strains against its immanent structure: painting through its 
fixedness in space seems to be pushing outwards towards something temporally 
contingent, and music finds itself straining (spatially) against time to resolve itself and 
reach a particular harmonic goal. Thus, to quote Act I of Wagner’s Parsifal, ‘Zum 
Raum wird hier die Zeit’ (space becomes time and time becomes space). As we saw 
above, Klee was seemingly aware of this temporal component to painting and sought 
to exploit this parameter through balancing the idea of linear movement against 
simultaneity.
77 Ibid., 77.
78 Ibid., 67.
79 Ibid., 66.
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In examining the similarities between music and painting, Adorno observes 
that although everything in a painting is simultaneously present, elements of a 
painting may ‘seek to get away from each other’. This creates tension which ‘can in 
no way be conceived without the element of the temporal. For this reason, time is 
immanent in the painting, apart from the time that is spent on its production. To this 
extent, the objectivization and the balance of tensions in the painting are sedimented 
time.’ The viewer, in the act of looking, unlocks this time by seemg that elements of 
the painting are reaching outwards beyond their frame -  exploding the frame in the 
sense formulated by Derrida above. Similarly, because music is constructed from 
spatial relationships between notes, ‘this qualitative relationship of music to its visible 
insignia, without which it could neither possess nor construct out duration, points 
clearly to space as a condition of its objectification’.81 Thomas Clifton in his book 
Music as Heard: a Study in Applied Phenomenology observes something similar in 
the neumatic notation of Gregorian chant, stating that neumes not only ‘provid[e] a 
visual clue to the way the tones themselves are rhythmically grouped in performance, 
but also graphically demonstrate [e] that a certain passage through space is implicit in 
the notion of “interval”’.82 In other words, it is only through a spatial system that 
music comes to express its form at all. And thus each art form somehow articulates 
itself in the intrinsic language of the other.
Adorno refers to Bruckner’s orchestration, explaining that it embraces the 
listener through the ‘forest of tones that arches over the listener’,83 which reminds one 
of the painterly saturation of space that Edward T. Cone observes in music when he 
writes about how time in music ‘makes possible a kind of suspended saturation: the
80 Ibid., 69.
81 Ibid., 70.
82 Thomas Clifton, Music as Heard: a Study in Applied Phenomenology (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1983), 145.
83 Adorno, ‘On Some Relationships between Music and Painting’, 70.
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development of an idea which on first presentation may seem of insufficient moment, 
but which through its treatment grows in interest, its true purport being revealed only 
gradually’.84 Therefore, as the medium pursues its own materials, by default it 
converges towards the other medium. Painting, by bringing time into it through 
associations and, more importantly, from simply being perceived,4 ignite[s] the 
painting’s power’85 through the contradiction that this is a spatial medium. Precisely 
because it appears to negate time, it speaks of time. In this way time is no longer the 
preserve of music nor space that of painting. We speak of melodies in spatial terms, 
moving towards and away from, downwards and upwards, thickening and thinning 
and interweaving. Thomas Clifton regards this as a textural space, one that is only 
possible within a spatial world. And so it is with musical time, too, for music seems to 
bring with it its own time, effectively bracketing out clock time. This time unfolds and 
is driven within this same textural space.
In a related way, Adorno writes that 4[w]hat is alive is rather the paintings 
themselves, what is painted, not what has been painted’. Here, then, the vital 
component is the world that the paintings themselves construct, not any 
representational gesturing away from this painterly domain. Our perception of a 
painting involves bracketing off this experience from any outside interference so that 
we might better apprehend the painterly world. The notion of 4what is painted’ calls 
forth its corollary 4how it is painted’, and it is this aspect that involves our 
interpretation. The very act of perception becomes one of the active components of 
the painting. It is the process that is important: 4 It occurs in the speaking, not in what 
is said.’86 Adorno continues, 'Painting and music speak by virtue of the way they are
84 Edward T. Cone, Music: a View from Delft, ed. Robert P. Morgan (Chicago and London: University 
of Chicago Press, 1989), 16.
85 Adorno, ‘On Some Relationships between Music and Painting’, 70.
86 Ibid, 74.
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constructed, not by the act of representing themselves’, and it is their ‘immanent 
character, not the communication of something external to this complexion of the 
work’. Accordingly, he champions abstract painting as being ‘set free’ by our
517‘distraction away from its object-relatedness’. By turning our attention away from 
the ostensible subject, such as an encounter with an abstract painting, we come to see 
its true character. If the respective mediums of painting and music are to become 
expressive and converge toward each other, then they need to abstain from 
communicating outside their respective mediums: ‘Music and painting become 
writing through their renunciation of the communicative’.88 In short, they need to 
refrain from symbolic gesturing -  clearly a central tenet of modernism.
But where does such a theory leave MaP? Although Adomo seems to allow 
that music and painting possess similarities through our experiences of them, this 
takes place within a sealed frame: musical or painterly. He does not deny the role of 
the listener in creating musical meaning:
[M]usic no more belongs to subjective perception alone than to physics alone. It gains its objectivity by 
virtue o f the fact that these two poles are mutually mediated within it. Something of this kind must also 
be the case with painting.89
Hence, as we would expect, there is some kind of interaction between the physical 
properties of the art object and what we subjectively do with those attributes. But 
rather than, as it were, ‘accidentally’ referring to a painting, can MaP refer or 
represent a specific painting?
Max Paddison argues that for Adomo, who rejected ‘crude socio-economic 
determinism in his interpretation of Marx’, ‘art not only reflects society but also
87 Ibid., 71.
88 Ibid., 72.
89 Ibid., 76.
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opposes it, not only converges with society but diverges from it and develops its own 
dynamic’.90 For Adomo this was part of pursuing ‘further the interpenetration of the 
subjective and the objective’. And, in the process, he ‘found concepts which enabled 
him to discuss in both “material” and psychological terms, ways in which the outside 
world is refracted by the Subject and ways in which “inner subjectivity” is able to 
engage with the “objectivity” of the outside world through the processes of 
sublimation, repression, mimetic adaptation and rationalization’.91 Accordingly, 
music may come to reflect the outside world by following its own inner principles. 
Thus, by maintaining a critical distance and not being determined by any particular 
system, music is able to reflect and oppose this outside world. And perhaps this is also 
the case with MaP: by following its own principles music may reflect but also diverge 
from the original artwork.
Adomo ascribes to both media the attribute he calls ‘writing’. He seems to 
mean by this their communication of expression using their own respective materials, 
a ‘flashing forth’ that also has a ‘temporal quality’. Once they are writing, they ‘divest 
themselves of their “thingness”; here the heterogeneous media are at one’. In this
09way, ‘painting and music do converge as construction’. It is not a matter of one art 
form imitating another; it is, rather, through their very difference that they converge 
and become like each other, through a focus on their unavoidable mediation of the 
other.
In an equally modernist vein, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari observe that 
the formation of the artwork takes place on a ‘plane of composition’ which can be 
further subdivided into an ‘aesthetic plane of composition’ (which concerns the 
sensations) and a ‘technical plane of composition’ (the material of the artwork). In the
90 Max Paddison, Adorno’s Aesthetics o f  Music (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 128.
91 Ibid.
92 Adomo, ‘On Some Relationships between Music and Painting’, 77.
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first instance,4 sensation realizes itself in the material and does not exist outside this 
realization’. Painting adopts the form and organization of representational, 
perspectival art that already contains within it schemata that structure it. In music, 
such schemata are found in tonal compositions whose conventional structure 
organises the sonic material. And in literature, it is similarly the standard modes of 
storytelling which absorb these sensations. In the second instance, where it is instead 
the ‘ material that passes into sensation\ sensation does not exist outside the object, 
but ‘now it might be said that it ascends into the aesthetic plane of composition’.93 
They explain that, rather than sensation being projected onto this absorbent surface, 
‘the material rises up’94 into a plane or field of forces. Thus, the thickness of paint, the 
timbre of musical sounds and rhythms, and the syntax and semantic meanings in 
literature all gather up to create an aesthetic plane.
Deleuze, Guattari and Adomo, however, are all concerned with a specific 
period of modernist art whose agenda is with the materials themselves, together with 
an obvious acknowledgement that the medium, to paraphrase Marshall McLuhan, is 
not transparent to its message but is the message. Accordingly, painting, music and 
literature converge in their sharing of conventional forms which result in there finally 
being
only a single plane in the sense that art includes no other plane than that of aesthetic 
composition: in fact, the technical plane is necessarily covered up or absorbed by the aesthetic 
plane of composition. It is on this condition that matter becomes expressive: either the 
compound of sensation is realized in the material, or the material passes into the compound, 
but always in such a way as to be situated on a specifically aesthetic plane of composition.95
93 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 193 (italics original).
94 Ibid, 194.
95 Ibid, 196.
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In this way, the aesthetic plane of composition constitutes a universe. And for our 
present concerns, might we not regard the intersecting territories of MaP as 
constituting a universe resulting in a single unified plane? The musical material 
effects sensations -  a correspondent facture between the painted and musical surfaces, 
perhaps -  and the aesthetic plane absorbs a memory of the painted material as a frame 
of reference.
The idea of the material rising up into a plane of forces and representing itself 
shares much with the modernist perspective of art. Meanwhile, the idea of the subject 
interacting with the physical properties (Adomo), and a similar projection of sensation 
onto the material (Deleuze and Guattari), points towards the idea that the aesthetic 
experience involves subjective mediation of the physical. This is contrary to the 
notion of the artwork representing anything external to itself, pointing to or 
symbolising things away from its own materials. Rather, it is our perceptual 
engagement with the work alone that enables its meaningful expression. In this way, 
we can see that the modernist agenda seems directed towards a phenomenal 
experience of the artwork. Accordingly, in the next chapter we will take a closer look 
at phenomenology as a philosophical system applied to music and, especially, MaP.
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CHAPTER 2: Between the Embodied and the Ideated
2.1.1 Perception as Embodied Experience
In this chapter, we will examine how well MaP fits into a phenomenological 
perspective and whether it is sufficient to account for the painting as part of that 
phenomenal experience. Section 2.2 will consider some of the principles of reader- 
response theory to explore the idea of there being an aesthetic response to MaP that 
involves the mediation of the painting as a conceptual and thus reflective addition to 
our purely phenomenal experience of the medium.
Phenomenological theory is one which is monistic: that is, it denies the duality 
of mind and matter, subject and object, and is therefore in some accordance with the 
subjective stance espoused by Descartes’ famous Cogito, ergo sum. To arrive at this 
method of existential doubt, Descartes called into question the very existence of the 
world without its subject:
What about thinking? Here I make my discovery: thought exists; it alone cannot be separated 
from me. I am; I exist -  this is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking; for 
perhaps I could come to pass that if I were to cease all thinking I would then utterly cease to 
exist. At this time I admit nothing that is not necessarily true. I am therefore precisely nothing 
but a thinking thing; that is, a mind, or intellect, or understanding, or reason -  words of whose 
meanings I was previously ignorant. Yes I am a true thing and am truly existing; but what 
kind of thing? I have said it already: a thinking thing.1
His position, that all we can really be sure of is how things appear to us immediately 
in our consciousness, points to the belief that we actively constitute or intend the 
world we experience. The duality of mind (consciousness) and matter that Descartes
1 See Ren6 Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Donald A. Cress, 3rd edn (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1998), 28.
62
posits was a starting point for the phenomenologists. But they took it further, 
believing that there is no such thing as a self-contained thought; all conscious thought 
must be directed at an object -  or must intend an object. It must follow, then, that all 
matter and objects experienced are similarly both subsumed and constituted within 
our subjective mind, and the phenomenon becomes unified within us. The 
phenomenal experience, then, constructs and constitutes my lived experience. 
Consequently, phenomenology has often been described as the new Cartesianism: by 
focusing on the experiential, we become closer to a more reliable knowledge of the 
way things really are. The focus of this discipline, however, is on the conditions that 
enable knowledge of our world to emerge.
Phenomenology’s primary representatives are Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-61), Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-80), Martin Heidegger 
(1889-1976) and Emmanuel Levinas (1905-95). Its influence is felt in a number of 
other disciplines, in particular reader-response criticism, which will be discussed at 
greater length in the next section. Phenomenology’s main principles orbit about the 
idea of explaining experience as it really is before the mind engages in its abstract 
conceptualising. Therein lies one of the theory’s central claims: abstract or reflective 
experience is just that -  removed from the thing itself -  and so is unable to describe 
the pure essence of the experience. Thus, we might reasonably ask, are we here 
discussing a theoretical system which is at odds with an experience that requires 
imagining an absent painting? The reason we are taking this excursus is primarily to 
explore a system which will posit the importance of the phenomenal object to 
perception.
In Phenomenologie de la perception (1945), Merleau-Ponty argues that bodily 
experience or perspective is our primary way of understanding the world:
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My body is the fabric into which all objects are woven, and it is, at least in relation to the 
perceived world, the general instrument o f my ‘comprehension’. [...] It is my body which 
gives significance not only to the natural object, but also to cultural objects like words.2
He goes on to explain how words like warm and hard ‘[bjefore becoming the 
indication of a concept’ are ‘first of all an event which grips my body, and this 
circumscribes the area of significance to which it has reference’.3 Thus, a visceral 
experience takes place which affects and has import for any subsequent cognitions. 
Countering traditional philosophy, Merleau-Ponty posits that abstract thought and 
reason are not the essential ways of understanding our world, but direct perception is: 
‘the perceived world is the always presupposed foundation of all rationality, all value, 
and all existence.’4
One of phenomenology’s main goals is to describe experience before 
reflective thought is engaged and thus provide a more authentic description or account 
of what that experience is. Its focus is on the process of that experience and 
perception itself. In this way, it rejects positivism and objectivism as theoretical 
systems which deny the real essences of experience. The music philosopher Wayne D. 
Bowman has written succinctly that ‘ [t]o perceive something is to live in it; to think 
about something, to hold it at a distance. Perception is attached, reflection detached’.5 
Accordingly, phenomenology is only interested in lived experiences, that is, 
perceptual ones.
2 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology o f Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 2002), 273.
3 Ibid., 273-4.
4 Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy o f  Perception and Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the 
Philosophy o f Art History, and Politics, ed. James M. Edie, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1964), 13, cited in Wayne D. Bowman, Philosophical Perspectives on Music (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press), 261.
5 Wayne D. Bowman, Philosophical Perspectives on Music, 261.
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2.1.2 Music as Lived Experience
Discussing the phenomenology of the musical experience in the only significant 
treatise on the subject, Thomas Clifton writes that ‘we Westerners, being largely the 
beneficiaries of empiricism, often have confused the sign of music by what is 
signified by music’.6 The signified, then, is the musical effect and is different to the 
sign. In the same way that we cannot know the real experience of swimming without 
actually getting in the water and moving our arms, legs and body, we cannot know 
music without immersing ourselves in it and examining the experience from that 
particular vantage point -  its immediate effects, in other words. To discuss swimming 
in ways that are removed from the direct experience of it is not to discuss swimming 
but some abstracted observation of it. And so it is with music, too. Clifton refers to 
this first-order experience as Erlebnis (the German word for the experience of living 
through some event), and anything outside this immediacy is a second-order act of 
reflection.
A phenomenological perspective emphasizes the fact that MaP posits 
analogies not between painting and musical notation, but between painting and actual 
sounds, for the reason that those sounds contain physical qualities that exist, however 
briefly, in the physical world as do the painted brushstrokes on a canvas. To obtain 
the necessary identification with music as it is, it is not enough to simply look at a 
musical score. Clifton writes, ‘to inhabit the world of music, it is necessary to be able 
to identify that world and refer to //, not its representative [the score]. And the only 
way to refer to it is by reflecting on it as a phenomenal object which one’s faculties 
recognize to be expressive.’8 It is, therefore, what music does to us and what we do to
6 Thomas Clifton, Music as Heard: A Study in Applied Phenomenology (London and New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1983), 298.
7 Ibid., 7, 66.
8 Ibid., 298.
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it that constitutes the music in the first place -  not the act of reading the musical score. 
Moreover, in defence of this subjective position, Clifton argues that any notion of 
objectivity is ultimately misguided, because the study of an object always involves 
selection, and that selection is performed by a human subject using a language 
formulated by humans.9
In a related way, Carolyn Abbate, in a recent article ‘Music: Drastic or 
Gnostic?’,10 invokes Vladimir Jankelevitch’s injunction to return to the ‘material’, 
acoustic phenomenon of the music rather than enact a metaphysical retreat from it. 
Abbate explains that such a retreat necessitates a displacement of the musical 
experience itself. When we focus on referential meanings or an analytical dissection 
of the work, we are always moving away from the experience the actual physical 
performance engenders in us. This has an obvious connection to the 
phenomenological standpoint discussed. There is no ‘away’ from the musical 
experience. For music to occur at all we must be attached bodily to it through the 
oneness of mind and object. There are no phenomena and noumena (Kant) or noema 
and noetic (Husserl).
Clifton explains that a phenomenological attitude entails ‘uttering meaningful 
statements which are objective in the sense that they attempt to describe the musical 
object adequately, and subjective in the sense that they issue from a subject to whom 
an object has some meaning. But subjective in this sense does not necessarily mean 
mere opinion: it means reciprocity.’11 This last sentence shows how Clifton’s 
phenomenological stance relates to that of reader response theorists: reciprocity 
speaks of a two-way process whereby we are not merely passive observers of a 
phenomenon, but active contributors to the experience. When we listen to music we
9 See Music as Heard, viii.
10 Carolyn Abbate, ‘Music: Drastic or Gnostic?’, Critical Inquiry 30/3 (2004), 505-36.
11 Clifton, Music as Heard, ix.
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are attached bodily to it. It is not some abstract object that is away from us; it is only 
through us that it is able to express at all.
Because of this attachment, the body, too, becomes a fundamental part of the
conscious intentionality of a phenomenon. Indeed, Descartes observes: ‘What about
sensing? Surely this too does not take place without a body, and I seemed to have
1 0sensed in my dreams many things that I later realized I did not sense.’ In other 
words, sensory experience is something we do with our bodies. It is the body that 
enables us to posit space because it is the body that experiences and occupies space in 
the first place. To put it another way, we intend our experiences bodily. We shall 
return to this point below.
Intentionality is one of the main themes of Husserl and Sartre. Husserl calls it 
Intentionalitat, whose German usage differs from the English ‘intention’ (what is 
willed or its purpose), and instead derives from the Latin ‘intentio’, which refers to 
representations that are formed in the mind -  an important idea for this present study. 
In short, the oneness of the mind and object can be explained by Husserl’s concerns 
over the intentionality of all experience: consciousness is always consciousness of 
something, and therefore the so-called mutual exclusivity of the cogitating subjective 
mind and an object that is ‘out there’, represented by Kant’s ‘phenomena’ and 
‘noumena’ respectively, can only ever be a fallacy. There simply is no phenomenon 
without a consciousness.13
12 Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, 28.
13 See Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy, Book 1: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, trans. F. Kerston (The Hague and 
London: Nijhoff, 1982), 10.
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2.1.3 Multi-Sensory, Trans-Sensual Experience
More pertinent still to MaP is the idea proposed by Mikel Dufrenne of the ‘quasi- 
subject’, where the object, in our case the composition, comes to have a world of its 
own. The music does not occur in space and time: these qualities are in the music 
itself. He explains ‘they are internal to the [aesthetic] object and assumed by it. It is 
they that make it a quasi-subject capable of a world which it expresses’. This occurs 
because the experience consists of ‘a sort of communion between the object and 
myself, a oneness, in other words. He claims that music presents itself in a ‘gradual 
unfolding of the sensuous -  the sensuous being the means and the end of the work, its 
matter and its final result’14 -  which point is strikingly reminiscent of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s planes of composition that were discussed in Chapter 1, where sensation 
realizes itself in the material or the material realizes itself in sensation.
The time dimension is also one that occupies Thomas Clifton, who, like 
Dufrenne, maintains that an aesthetic experience like music does not occur in an 
objective time but carries its own time with it. The corollary is that whilst 
experiencing the music we, too, become part of this complete world: ‘It is events, as 
lived through by people, which define time.’15 In apparent agreement with this 
position, the musicologist Barbara Barry writes, ‘it would seem that when listening to 
music in an involved, concentrated way, those visual rhythms -  including one’s “rule 
of thumb” feel for clock time -  are suspended or “blocked out” by the network of 
musical rhythms.’16 In other words, the music forges its own world, as Clifton and
14 Mikel Dufrenne, The Phenomenology o f Aesthetic Experience, trans. and with an introduction by 
Edward S. Casey et al. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), cited in Wayne D. 
Bowman, Philosophical Perspectives on Music, 265.
15 Clifton, Music as Heard, 55.
16 Barbara R. Barry, Musical Time: the Sense o f Order (Stuyvesant, NY: Pendragon Press, 1990), 7. 
The idea of clock time as a state qualitatively different to musical time was first expounded upon by 
Henri Bergson in Essai sur les donnees immediates de la conscience (1889). Bergson discusses how 
the successive strokes o f a ticking clock ‘melted into one another’ creating a qualitative perception 
which ‘made a kind o f musical phrase out o f it’. In this way, he argues, we should distinguish between
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Dufrenne seem to think, through the musical rhythms that unfold. Barry continues that 
if musical time can ‘be described as the interaction between two distinct components, 
one being the innate organization of the work -  its style, harmonic characteristics, 
internal subdivisions and so on -  then the other is the responsive part played by the
1 7individual in the perception of time’. Therefore, the individual becomes complicit in 
the experience of musical time, or the music's time, because their perception is 
constructed upon these experiential foundations.
Another aspect of phenomenology that Clifton writes about is the related 
dimension of space. He writes that for music to be meaningful as music or anything at 
all it must first be ‘something through which we live, something which, in a certain 
sense, we become. The piece, therefore, has value because I possess it, and it 
possesses me’. Accordingly, ‘musical space has significance because a person finds 
himself there, as a place to take up temporary habitation’.19 As part of his reader 
response theory, Wolfgang Iser observes this point too in the way we might take up 
residence in the reading of a novel. He cites a critic who upon reading Charlotte
7fiBronte’s Jane Eyre feels that it is they who have married Mr Rochester. We are 
immersed in the story because we become the character vicariously.
Furthermore, Clifton asks, how does music ‘speak to us of space? We are all 
familiar with the term “texture,” but space is what texture is all about. I will regard 
texture as both object and process, and will include tone quality within its domain’.
time as a duration which presents itself to immediate consciousness as a ‘quality’ and time as 
something that has become ‘materialized’ as a ‘quantity’ by being set out successively ‘in space’. See 
the English translation Time and Free Will: an Essay on the Immediate Data o f Consciousness, trans. 
F. L. Pogson (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1910), 127-28. Suzanne Langer makes a similar point 
when she writes that the order of music does not involve real time, but ‘virtual’ time. See Feeling and 
Form: a Theory o f Art Developed from ‘Philosophy in a New Key ’ (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1953), 108.
17 Ibid., 12.
18 Clifton, Music as Heard, 273.
19 Ibid., 141.
20 See The Implied Reader: Patterns o f  Communication in Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett 
(Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1974), 291.
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He continues: ‘Texture -  or space -  is what we experience when we hear durations,
-y i
registers, intensities, and tone qualities.’ These parameters of music, then, 
simultaneously occur in and create the space and texture which unfolds in the musical 
time world. Our sensual experience of texture, the feeling of something rough or 
smooth, is of course something that normally takes place in space. The fact that an 
instrumental line can embody motions of up and down, moving away from and 
towards, thickening and thinning, and moving across and interweaving with other 
lines means that we hear it as existing in a space. Moreover, Clifton writes, ‘[t]here is 
a sense, too, in which a musical texture has a tactile quality [...] a flute or violin is 
sometimes heard as velvety, while a piano (especially when used in the performance 
of baroque music) can be “rubbery.”’22 In this way, both time and space could be said 
to exist on a continuum for Clifton, with space, and therefore texture, actively 
affecting the body through the time that is exclusive to music and which it carries 
with it.
Griselda Pollock writes that phenomenology might usefully be applied to the 
experience of space in a painting:
Instead of pictorial space functioning as a notional box into which objects are placed in a 
rational and abstract relationship, space is represented according to the way it is experienced 
by a combination of touch, texture, as well as sight. Thus objects are patterned according to 
subjective hierarchies o f value for the producer. Phenomenological space is not orchestrated 
for sight alone but by means of visual cues refers to other sensations and relations of bodies 
and objects in a lived world. As experiential space this kind of representation becomes
21 Clifton, Music as Heard, 68-69.
22 Ibid., 70.
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susceptible to different ideological, historical as well as purely contingent, subjective
inflections.23
For Pollock, then, that phenomenological space is related at least in part to the bodily 
and the sensual -  through touch, texture and sight -  accords with Clifton’s 
observation above that in music ‘space is what texture is all about’ and Dufrenne’s 
assertion that music is the ‘gradual unfolding of the sensuous -  the sensuous being the 
means and the end of the work, its matter and its final result’. Our senses, then, seem 
to be subject to a crossed modality where one sensual experience implies or may be 
experienced by the memory or excitement of another. Applying this suggestive line of 
thought to painting, we might first consider the ‘visual cues’ which refer to these 
‘other sensations’. The heavy brushwork, a recurrent feature of much of Van Gogh’s 
oeuvre, for example, is in abundance in La nuit etoilee discussed in Part II. In Van 
Gogh’s work there is a tactile quality created by this blend of brushwork, and it serves 
to give his paintings a three-dimensional effect too. There is also an animate quality 
about his work, in the sense that whilst the paintings are clearly very stylized they also 
seem to convey a lifelike quality. Pollock’s assertion, however, that such spatial 
representation is sensitive to subjective and ideological ‘inflections’ points to her 
departure from Clifton’s non-reflective, Husserlian phenomenology, for it seems to 
allow for a cognitive component that would hold the phenomenal object at a reflective 
distance.
Similarly, the French filmmaker and theorist Michel Chion argues that the 
visual and auditory senses are not restricted to experiencing or perceiving only sight- 
and-sound-based phenomena respectively. In his words:
23 Griselda Pollock, ‘Modernity and the Spaces o f Femininity’, in Art in Modern Culture: An Anthology 
o f Critical Texts, ed. Francis Frascina and Jonathan Harris (London: Phaidon, 1992), 128.
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The eye carries information and sensations only some of which can be considered specifically 
and irreducibly visual (e.g. colour); most others are transsensory. Likewise, the ear serves as a 
vehicle for information and sensations only some of which are specifically auditive (e.g., pitch 
and intervallic relations), the others being, as in the case of the eye, not specific to this sense.24
Chion maintains throughout this work that there is interdependence between these 
senses. And, of course, one obvious manifestation of this idea is the eye perceiving 
sights which imply a sounding event: for example, a picture of the sea arguably 
evokes our memories of what the sea sounds like. Conversely, the sound of the sea or 
sea-like sounds may conjure our memories of visual images of the sea. Moreover, 
descriptions of music, both analytical and poetic, have tended to invoke visual 
metaphors in their discourse. Perhaps, then, these descriptions might be regarded as 
actually ‘perceptual’ in the multi-sensory field to which they give access, rather than 
merely metaphorical, explaining the seeming ‘rightness’ of describing certain musical 
experiences in this way. Thus, music is not a purely auditory experience but a 
synaesthetic one; spatial relations are not intrinsic properties of a musical object but 
fields of action in which we participate.
Essentially, we find in Clifton’s approach a radical departure from other 
explanations of musical meaning in his avoidance of characterizing music as 
symbolic, associative or representational: ‘Music is presentative rather than 
denotative’.25 Instead he wants music to speak for itself, that is, the meaning does not 
lie elsewhere, extra-musically, in a painting, for example, but in ‘lived musical 
experiences’. His account is one of pluralism and, because of this, dangerously close 
to charges of relativism. Clifton’s argument is about the singularity of musical
24 Michel Chion, Audio-Vision: Sounds on Screen, ed. and trans. Claudia Gorbman with a foreword by 
W. Murch (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 137.
25 Clifton, Music as Heard, 1.
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expression: ‘What the music says is what it is.’ How, then, music ‘speaks’ becomes 
paramount to the essence of what the musical experience is. And we can see how 
close this line of thought is to the modernist agenda set forth by Adorno, Deleuze and 
Guattari in their emphases on the materiality of how something is being said 
musically. Moreover, they also seem to share the notion that a synaesthetic perception 
is an essential background to the experience of music and painting.
Discussing the perceived qualities o f ‘grace’, ‘drama’ and ‘agony’ in the 
music of Mozart, Mahler and Coltrane respectively, Clifton asserts that ‘ [i]t is not 
even accurate enough to say that these constituents are what the music is about: rather 
they are the music’.26 So, rather than being depicted or represented by the music or 
being contingent aspects of it, these elements are immanent within it: the music 
actually is these things, but only through the complicity of the experiencing perceiver 
who makes these connections to the unfolding musical sounds. Therefore, although 
Clifton maintains that musical meaning is indwelling, it only becomes available 
through the lived musical experience, and this is dependent upon the experiences, 
predominantly bodily and carnal, that we might bring to it. The reason these qualities 
of grace, drama, and agony are the music is that they are what the music describes 
and utters to us through our lived experience of it. In other words, he is saying that the 
musical experience -  or what we understand as music -  is its process or how it 
articulates itself to us. There is therefore no point looking anywhere else for the 
music, because it occurs only in this process.
Clifton’s position, then, suggests an immanent musical experience that is 
completely impervious to any outside influence, such as the ‘imagination’ of an 
absent stimulus, like a painting. In this way, ‘perception’ is the listener’s immediate
26 Ibid., 19 (italics original).
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field of consciousness at the point of their encounter with the musical object; it is a 
sensory and not an abstract process -  if the painting is out of sight, it is out of mind. It 
is, therefore, contingent upon our bodily experience of the music -  how we respond 
synaesthetically -  and the body is therefore a ‘synergetic system which responds to a 
musical situation addressed to tactile and visual, as well as auditory, functions’.
In discussing extra-musical association, Clifton maintains that ‘music has the 
power to evoke certain extramusical memories, feelings, and fantasies’. But he 
continues: ‘This is not the problem. The problem lies in the persistent use of the term 
extramusical.’ At first sight, this statement seems to veer in the opposite direction 
from his previous immanentist position. However, this is not quite what Clifton 
means: he is saying that music does not represent things, it does not point to those 
things, it simply is those things in the process of becoming music -  just as we saw in 
the example above regarding the qualities o f ‘grace’, ‘drama’ and ‘agony’. The 
problem with so-called extra-musical association, according to Clifton, is the fact that 
these memories and feelings are not extra to music at all, they are the music. He 
explains, ‘Debussy’s conception of the ocean is not “outside o f’ La Mer; the essence 
of the ocean shares in the essence of the music. It is not music which is adulterated by 
exposure to other natural or cultural phenomena, it is these phenomena which have 
become musicalized.’29 Which point reminds us of how Siglind Bruhn asserts that 
musical works ‘transmedialize’ their subject. Significantly, though, Clifton differs 
here by stating that the music becomes the sea through its lived experience and not by 
abstracting its ‘essence’ in some passive, yet to be discovered, manner.
As laudably fresh an approach as this is, it is assuming a lot. First, Clifton is 
unquestioning in his assumption that La mer is really about the sea; but what if the
27 Clifton, Music as Heard, 137.
28 Ibid., 227.
29 Ibid.
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music is not really about the sea and the title is just incidental? Second, whether it is 
about the sea or not, before it can become ‘musicalized’ as the sea it surely has to 
undergo some kind of reflection or mediation, that is, a judgement and therefore an 
interpretation; and that interpretation is at odds with phenomenology’s seeming 
insistence on the immanence of musical meaning. The third aspect concerns the 
representation. Even if the sea somehow becomes ‘musicalized’, does that restrict the 
music’s field of reference in any binding or permanent manner? In other words, could 
not the music’s kinetic and gestural qualities be ascribed to some other extra-musical 
object such as the wind in the trees, for example?
It is not difficult to imagine one being able to obtain inter-subjective 
agreement on there being sea-like qualities in the music of La mer -  the ebb and flow 
of the dynamics, for example -  but these aspects are generic and require the 
imaginative facility of the listener to interpret them in this sea-like manner. Moreover, 
these generic qualities refer to our experiences of the sea, and they therefore cast the 
music as symbolic, a status that Clifton vehemently resists for it. And the symbolic 
nature of these qualities requires our mediation and therefore also our memories and 
unique perspective of the sea, again something Clifton’s phenomenology seems to 
prohibit. In short, ‘oneness’ between the subject and object of consciousness presents 
a problem when dealing with the generic qualities of compositions such as La mer. In 
addition, it is true that an eradication of the boundary between the listener and the 
musical object carries the danger of a lapse into solipsism, denying the objectivity we 
are aiming at.
However, this epistemological issue is not necessarily a problem for Clifton; 
as we saw above, he claims that his approach is objective precisely because it purports 
to describe the musical object adequately, that is, as we experience it. We are, then,
75
always in the process of responding to our or someone else’s actualization or 
concretization of a musical text and not the thing itself. In accordance with 
phenomenology and reader-response theories, then, meaning is not something that can 
be isolated but is an effect to be experienced, and we must therefore attend to the 
conditions of this meaning’s emergence. Citing Merleau-Ponty’s assertion that one’s 
body is present wherever there is ‘something to be done’, Clifton argues on this basis 
that music is something we make, and we hear it as music because we make it. This 
echoes Roger Scruton’s theory of music as a ‘tertiary’ quality, which will be 
examined in the next chapter.
2.1.4 The Imaginative Supplementation of Musical Meaning
Clifton’s phenomenology sees music as more than just the object of passive listening: 
it is ‘perceiving, interpreting, judging, and feeling’, and ‘the musically behaving 
person experiences musical significance’. This significance is not associative, 
symbolic or denotative; rather, it is ‘presented in and by the sounds’. He continues: 
‘Music, whatever else it is, is not factually in the world the way trees and mountains 
are.’31 It is as much about what we do with it that distinguishes it from other sounds 
that we would classify as non-music, such as the sounds made by a thunderstorm or in 
a noisy restaurant.
Clifton gives an excellent example of this phenomenological approach when 
he provides us with ‘four meanings' that may arise from an equilateral triangle:
30 See Clifton, Music as Heard, 66.
31 Ibid., 3.
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(1) an arrow pointing in any o f three directions; (2) a figure pointing in three directions at 
once; (3) a spatial figure of a point in a background growing into a plane surface whose edge 
is visible in the foreground; and (4) the same planar figure receding into a point.
He explains that whilst he is free to interpret the triangle in many other ways, this 
freedom is not total and one is not likely to interpret it as right-pointing arrow, for 
example: ‘In fact, I am free to perceive this figure in any of several ways only because
99my freedom is circumscribed by my past experiences and acquisitions of the world.’
A phenomenon is therefore something that can mean many things, but its meanings 
are delimited by our social, educational and cultural backgrounds. So, from this 
example and from Clifton’s statement above regarding music’s evocation of certain 
extra-musical memories, we can see that his approach allows for his listener’s 
response to posit what is meant by or significant about a phenomenon. Clearly, then, 
there is scope here for that response to be affected by a painting.
The first-order Erlebnis is not a blind and purely passive perception, but one 
that demands further processing as a ‘phenomenological reflection’ on the original 
perception. Clifton argues that a reflective orientation is necessary if the thought in 
the perception itself is to emerge: ‘The perceptive act is too full of meaning for the 
meaning to be completely grasped during the act itself. For this reason, reflection is 
not only necessary, but its task is never ending.’ But, much as this might appear to 
open the floodgates to reflective, second-order acts of perception, even here the 
Husserlian, phenomenological stamp is never very far away, for it is still about the 
properties of an object as experienced by a person located in a particular time and 
place -  as we saw above in the triangle example. Moreover, this phenomenological 
‘take’ on reflection assumes that a first-order phenomenal encounter itself elicits an
32 Ibid., 11 (italics original).
33 Ibid., 37.
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actively reflective stance in the listener, rather than it being an abstract and passive 
one resulting from some external supplementation from the listener.
In his posthumously published Philosophical Investigations (1953), Ludwig 
Wittgenstein also adduces an example of a triangle to furnish his argument concerning 
interpretation and imagination.34 This time, however, it is a scalene triangle:
Wittgenstein writes,
The triangle can be seen as a triangular hole, as a solid, as a geometrical drawing, as standing 
on its base, as hanging from its apex; as a mountain, as a wedge, as an arrow or pointer, as an 
overturned object which is meant to stand on the shorter side o f the right angle, as a half 
parellogram, and as various other things. [...] But how is it possible to see an object according 
to an interpretation? The question represents it as a queer fact; as if something were being 
forced into a form it did not really fit. But no squeezing, no forcing took place here.35
These possible interpretations of the triangle, then, are so readily available to us that 
their existence seems natural; there is no difficulty in accepting the interpretations that 
both he and Clifton present. It is an important example of how interpretation is not 
objective but subjectively led, and how perception can be guided. Wittgenstein
34 It is interesting that both philosophers have used the triangle for similar examples. It would seem 
likely that Clifton would have been aware o f the earlier example by Wittgenstein but he makes no 
mention of it. Clifton’s book was also published posthumously, which may explain this omission.
35 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations II (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 171 (italics 
original).
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continues: ‘The aspects of the triangle: it is as if an image came into contact, and for a 
time remained in contact, with the visual impression.’36 Thus, it is as if we become 
one with the image.
Wittgenstein appears to be taking a stance similar to Clifton’s phenomenology 
in that the phenomenal experience demands that the two poles of consciousness and 
object become one through the visual impression. But Wittgenstein goes further by 
arguing that to see the triangle in any of the ways described above ‘demands 
imagination’, for we are obviously drawing on memories of experiences that are 
absent. We supplement the perception of the triangle with an image from our memory 
against which the triangle makes sense. And, so it is with music composed after 
painting: to hear the sounds presented as aligned with the painting in any aspect 
demands our imagination of the absent stimulus.
If we can view the triangle or the musical work as a set of conditions for the 
emergence of meaning, these conditions, writes Clifton, ‘may not be able to tell us 
what lies ahead, [but] the person cannot help intending a future content of some 
kind’. This takes us neatly to one of the most important aspects of a phenomenal 
theory of music, and one to which reader-response criticism is also indebted. Hearing 
music is not a passive response to a collection of sounds; rather, it is something that 
we do actively and responsively. Music is something to be made. This is not to 
suggest that those meanings are arbitrary, for it is the ‘mutual contributions made by 
the experiencing subject and the musical object being experienced’40 that govern the 
production of the music. That is, the musical object has a potential similarity with its 
intended content, out of which a particular interpretation can arise:
36 Ibid., 176 (italics original).
37 Ibid., 177 (italics original).
38 Wolfang Iser calls these conditions ‘instructions’ in respect of a literary text.
39 Clifton, Music as Heard, 63 (italics original).
40 Ibid., 70.
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The unifying bond between melody and me is not a physical proximity, but a meaning which 
is constituted in me by the melody. The melody provides the meaning, not consciousness. It is 
the business of consciousness to embrace musical meaning, not impose it onto the musical 
object. This is why a particular musical meaning itself is a criterion forjudging the suitability 
of a verbal, and sometimes metaphorical, description. Otherwise it wouldn’t be as difficult as 
it is to talk about music. It is not the vagueness o f musical meaning that we are trying to catch: 
it is its precision.41
In other words, our descriptions of music are contingent on the musical meaning of 
the melody in the first instance, and the meaning would be clear were we only able to 
find it a suitable description.
2.1.5 The Percept and the Image
Clifton asserts that the fundamental difference between percepts and an image (as in 
an imaginative act), is that ‘the former contributes to knowledge, while the latter 
requires knowledge. Following Merleau-Ponty, we can therefore distinguish the sense 
of a perceived object as a content of consciousness from the sense of an imagined 
object as an operation of consciousness.’42 But is this correct? Can something enter 
our consciousness unadulterated by our subjectivity -  as an ‘immaculate 
perception’?43 Whereas for Clifton there is such a thing as ‘pure’ perception, we 
would argue that both percepts and imagining are implicated in our dialogue with the 
musical object. The music presents itself as a percept, content, but what we do with it 
thereafter is governed by our imaginative operations.
Clifton asserts that phenomenology bases the ‘possible on the real’:
41 Ibid., 47 (italics original).
42 Ibid., 48.
43 The term ‘Immaculate Perception’ was used notably by Friedrich Nietzsche for the title of Chapter 
37 in the second part o f his book, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (London: Penguin, 1969), 144.
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The expression “logic o f experience” then indicates that there are certain logical aspects of 
experience which are irreducible, not because o f what or how I think, but because of the 
requirements o f experience itself. And it is within the contingency of particular experiences 
that this logic expresses itself. If I listen to a composition and inquire about the purely logical 
necessities which make it possible to appear, I must consult the composition itself, rather than 
an intellectual scheme of my own design. To the question, What is necessary for the being of 
music? One can provide such essential constituents as musical time and space, as well as the 
human acts of feeling and intuitive understanding which flesh out the pure formality o f these 
constituents.44
The ‘real’, then, in our case is the composition itself, and Clifton seems to suggest that 
the musical work itself must direct a particular experience. Accordingly, it would 
seem that there is something fundamental about the phenomenological attitude which 
can be retained in our explorations here, and that something is how we believe music 
to possess those qualities that we ascribe to it. Further still, in a related way, the 
phenomenological attitude suggests how we become one with the lived musical 
experience. The music’s function is not to refer outwards to this or that painting (or 
extra-musical object), but is instead bound up in its physical encounter with the 
listener.
However, the physical absence of the painting seems to present a problem for 
phenomenological perception, unless we hold that Clifton’s notion of a perception 
governed by our ‘past experiences and acquisitions of the world’ enables a role for the 
absent painting. The issue phenomenology raises for MaP is therefore its repudiation 
of the absent ‘image’ as integral to the experience of the phenomenal object. Clifton 
argues that,
44 Ibid., 50.
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With the best will in the world, it is still deceptively easy to confuse a phenomenological 
description of music with the poetic rambling o f nineteenth-century music criticism, and to 
criticize it as anthropomorphic [...] [F]or these critics, the World is a Newtonian machine, a 
neutral zone for our projections, associations, and transferences. A “peaceful meadow” is 
meaningless, because, for them, the “human world” is meaningless. But then it is incumbent 
upon these critics to point to the “objective world.” Where is that? In the very act o f pointing, 
the world becomes a human possession.
We saw earlier that in making selections of attributes, even as scientists, we 
present a bias that is subjective; it is imbued with a human interest and therefore non­
objective. Clifton asks: ‘Is a phenomenon a mental construct?’ If it is, he says, then 
‘attached to the notion of constructs is the implication that a perceptual judgement is a 
one-way street, that it consists of conferring meanings onto the raw material of the 
world which supposedly can mean anything we want it to mean’. However, Clifton 
argues against this constructivist view by positing the idea that a percept contributes 
to knowledge whereas an image requires knowledge. Hence the world cannot be 
entirely constructed, for it presents things into our consciousness:
The appearance of a phenomenon entails the recognition that the object perceived and the 
operation of perceiving are distinct but related poles o f an ongoing dialogue. To assume that 
phenomena are nothing but mental constructs places too much weight on the operation of 
consciousness, and approaches an ideology which makes conscious operations the efficient 
cause o f the conscious content.45
In his view, a perceptual judgement is an interactive proposition involving what Jean- 
Jacques Nattiez would call the ‘neutral’ or material trace and its esthesic reception.46 
Phenomena like music are not exclusively mental constructions and neither do
45 Ibid., 48.
46 See my Introduction for a more detailed discussion o f this component.
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conscious operations cause the phenomenal content -  the percept -  alone. It is from 
the collaborative forces of these two poles that the musical perception emerges.
Clifton adds that musical meaning has the capacity to be both phenomenal and 
metaphorical. However, ‘the problem becomes one of distinguishing the levels on 
which the phenomenon and metaphor reside.’47 When music is described as ‘lively’ it 
is a term most would call metaphorical since it refers to living beings, and music 
cannot be alive. He continues,
If we get beneath this presupposition, we find that “lively” is not an invented relation between 
musical and bodily pace, but rather an experienced unity. The meaning that we find in “lively” 
is not primordially a meaning of similarity but rather one o f necessity. That is, “lively” 
expresses an essential aspect of the piece’s character, and one which is immanent in the piece 
itself.
The use o f such terms as lively as an integral part o f the musical score reveals a mode 
of conduct preceding any separation of thinking, perceiving, and bodily gesture, -  and 
although I will not press it -  any assignment o f thinking as an activity belonging exclusively 
to the brain.48
His problem with metaphorical description, then, is that these descriptions are not 
figurative, they really are the phenomenal object in the lived experience. In describing 
music as ‘lively’ he explains that he is ‘not necessarily using the body as a physical 
referent; rather, the body itself is interpreted as meaning. The body is not only what 
we have, it is what we are, and it is in the latter sense that the body, as origin of 
music, is regarded.’49 Hence, the musical experience is in us, or is us; made, as it is, 
from within and by our bodies. Musical meaning is something to be embraced and not
47 Clifton, Music as Heard, 44.
48 Ibid., 47 (italics original).
49 Ibid., 45 (italics original).
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imposed externally onto the musical object. As such, our bodily identification with the 
work may be so complete that any boundaries between it and us disappear.
2.1.6 Musical Affordance and the Listener’s Subject-Position
It is remarkable how closely this formulation overlaps with Eric Clarke’s ecological 
approach to musical listening, presented in his book Ways o f Listening and based on J. 
J. Gibson’s ecological model of perception, which assumes that structure is already 
inherent in the environment and is not, therefore, a mental construction imposed 
retroactively. Applying this model to musical meaning, Clarke identifies certain 
musical attributes as ‘affording’ certain meanings -  ‘affordance’ being another term 
derived from Gibson. Thus, in discussing the interaction between musical structure 
(the environment) and musical perception, Clarke focuses in on the ‘subject-position’ 
of the listener. He writes that ‘perception must be understood as a relationship 
between environmentally available information and the capacities, sensitivities, and 
interests of a perceiver’.50 And it is the relationship between the music and the listener 
which defines a particular aesthetic orientation. The ‘subject-position’ -  a term 
borrowed from film theory -  of the listener results from the intrinsic musical structure 
causing the listener to adopt a particular attitude towards it; and thus, as Clifton says 
above, if we hear the music as ‘lively’ it is because it possesses this characteristic 
essentially and even ‘demands’ to be heard this way. In this way, there are limits to 
what music can mean -  or, more accurately, limits to the orientations we might take 
while listening to it.
Once again, in light of MaP, this would seem to suggest that the integrated 
multi-sensory perception required to perceive any similarity or relation to the painting
50 Eric Clarke, Ways o f Listening: an Ecological Approach to the Perception o f Musical Meaning 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 91.
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is ruled out if the painting is absent. But as we have said, Clifton does seem to leave at 
least two possibilities open for the role of the painting: the music may trigger, 
synaesthetically, extra-musical memories of our past experience of the painting, or 
our previous encounter with the painting may itself affect our combined interpretation 
of what is meant or significant about the music in the lived experience. All of this 
refers back to the phenomenological view that perception is attached and reflection 
detached; that is, the more we distance ourselves from music through constructive or 
imaginative acts, such as metaphorical description, truly the less we are able to 
describe the musical object as we experience it.
As a philosophical basis for our phenomenal experience of music, 
phenomenology has much to recommend it, for it has restored the idea of music being 
something that we experience consciously and not from a distance, and also 
something that we become attached to through our bodies -  hence the use of spatial 
orientation terms to describe music. And the purity of this notion is supported by 
Clifton’s constant return to the musical object as the anchor for any meanings which 
are phenomenally presented. The most controversial point for our purposes, though, is 
the claim that music actually is what it describes, that the qualities ascribed to it are 
immanent in the music. Accordingly, the next section will further develop the view 
that musical meaning is something made and not given. While MaP remains 
contingent on our immediate experience of the musical object itself, it will 
nonetheless be argued that it may acquire additional import from the listener’s access 
to and recollection of the experiential domain of the painting.
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2.2.1 Reader-Response Theory: from Perception to Reflection
Thus far, we have considered the possible convergences between the spatial and 
temporal arts through discussing the phenomenal and trans-sensual encounter with the 
musical object itself. This system was brought in because it allows for the immediate, 
physical response to the artwork before we engage in any secondary reflections about 
it -  a focus on the phenomenal effects of the artwork itself. However, as we said 
earlier, this system presents a problem if we wish to examine the role of an absent 
painting in the aesthetic experience of our musical case studies in Part II. This is 
because the painting’s absence invites an imaginative response -  what Thomas 
Clifton calls an ‘image’ -  and that involves the operations of consciousness and 
‘hearing as’ to supplement the musical experience with a background against which 
the music might fit. Where a percept involves the phenomenal perception of the actual 
object, in our case the music, the image involves the operations of our consciousness 
-  imagination.
Accordingly, phenomenologists argue that such a state is reflective, holding 
the experience at a distance so that we are no longer describing the art object in a pure 
way but in a way that is now ‘contaminated’ by our subjective mediations. Moreover, 
any such imagining suggests that the encounter with the object is being supplemented 
by something external. But since this project posits the theory that our aesthetic 
response to MaP requires both the phenomenal perception of the music and imagery 
extending from the absent painting, we will here discuss the possibilities of extending 
Wolfgang Iser’s reader-response theory to MaP in order to account for this process of 
supplementation.
One of the major criticisms of phenomenology has been its ‘bracketing out’ or 
‘reduction’ of all preconceptions, assumptions and beliefs that might intervene in the
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‘pure’ perception of the object. This process is called epoche and means the ‘setting 
aside of all historical and natural assumptions and factual knowledge in order to be 
able to apprehend more readily the phenomena and the subject’s consciousness of 
them’.51 The fact that this Husserlian phenomenology is not interested in history and 
cultural meaning presents a problem for our investigation of MaP, for if we are to 
think of the situation as involving three parties -  the music, the painting and the 
interpreter -  the phenomenal field broadens and is opened to new culturally and 
historically determined meanings. So now, as well as responding in a bodily manner 
to the musical object, we are also being invited to imagine or construct a context from 
the painting to make sense of what we are hearing. The painting therefore provides a 
framework and opens a mental conduit to all of our preconceptions about paintings 
and, of course, their phenomenological worlds too. The fact that the painting is 
invoked in absentia may allow a greater amount of interpretative freedom than would 
be feasible if the artwork was staring us in the face. It allows the music to dominate 
and present its phenomenal world, albeit one that is tempered and constrained by the 
idea of the painting. It seems appropriate, then, to turn now towards a theory which 
will allow for the listener’s role in creating the meaning and experience of MaP.
Reader-response theory emerged from an opposition to the disciplines of 
formalism and New Criticism, which both focus on the text itself, its form and 
content, and not on the authorial creation (‘intentional fallacy’) or reception of a work 
(‘affective fallacy’).52 But clearly, in an inquiry into MaP, reception and intention
51 Oxford English Dictionary, online edition, s.v. ‘epochs’ [accessed 10 June 2007].
52 It was William K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley in their 1946 essay ‘The Intentional Fallacy’ 
who coined the term ‘intentional fallacy’ to counter the discussion o f any authorial intention, and who 
also offered the term ‘affective fallacy’ to highlight their opposition to an interest in the reader’s 
reaction to a text. Critical interest, they argued, should focus on the text itself. For the 1954 revised 
version o f the essay, see W. K. Wimsatt, The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning o f Poetry, with two 
preliminary essays written in collaboration with Monroe C. Beardsley (Lexington, KY: University o f  
Kentucky Press, 1954), 3-18
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must be paramount if the absent painting is to hold any aesthetic sway over the 
listener’s musical experience. Therefore, if we extend its principles from its native 
field of literature, reader-response theory allows for a model whereby we can 
formulate ideas from the image background of the painting and the phenomenal 
encounter with the musical object.
The vanguard of culturally oriented musicologists of the 1990s was inspired 
by Joseph Kerman’s book Contemplating Music (1985), which championed a shift 
away from formalism and towards a more pluralistic view of musical meaning.53 This 
position opened a dialogue that purported to place the critical interpretation of music 
within a cultural framework, rather than focus solely upon the music’s structural 
components as the main source of musical meaning. It therefore shares a great deal 
with the reader-response theory derived from literary theorists such as Stanley Fish 
and Wolfgang Iser,54 both of whom placed a new emphasis on the importance of the 
reader’s involvement in creating the literary experience. Roland Barthes observed 
something similar when he wrote that ‘the goal of literary work (of literature as work) 
is to make the reader no longer a consumer, but a producer of the text’.55
Fish and Iser’s theories are not mutually exclusive and could be said to exist 
along the same continuum: their ideas, like those of the phenomenologists, meet in the 
conviction that works of art do not exist independently of a lived experience. The 
work of art, whether it be a book, a painting or music, becomes an aesthetic object in 
the process of being experienced. It is we who produce the aesthetic object in
53 Joseph Kerman, Contemplating Music: Challenges to Musicology (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard 
University Press, 1985) -  the British title was simply Musicology (London: Fontana, 1985).
54 One of the major criticisms of Iser’s form of reader-response theory has been what Dagmar Bamouw 
has described as the disappearing text and reader within the very ‘act of reading’. But it will not be my 
purpose here to discuss these limitations, for I am using aspects of Iser’s theory to explore the idea that 
musical meaning is an interactive process and one which is ultimately grounded in the perceptual 
experience o f the work. For a good overview o f this area see Dagmar Bamouw’s review article ‘The 
Act o f Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response; The Implied Reader: Patterns of Communication in 
Prose Fiction from Bunyan to Beckett’, Modern Language Notes, 94/5 (1979), 1207-14.
55 Roland Barthes, S/Z, 2nd edn, trans. Richard Miller (London: Jonathan Cape, 1975), 4.
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conjunction with the work itself. Whilst it seems rather obvious that books are read by 
readers and music is heard by listeners, previous approaches to both literature and to 
musical analysis have all too often focused exclusively on the printed page. Terry 
Eagleton explains that this move towards reception theory in literature came from the 
conviction of its proponents that ‘[ljiterary texts do not exist on bookshelves: they are 
processes of signification materialized only in the practice of reading. For literature, 
the reader is quite as vital as the author.’56 The focus, then, is as much on what the 
text does to the reader as on the text itself -  a phenomenon illustrated well by the 
provocatively titled book by Stanley Fish Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority 
o f Interpretative Communities57 -  the obvious inference being that there is no text 
without the reader.
Reader-response theory is, of course, heavily indebted to phenomenology, and 
this position is evident in Stanley Fish’s preface to his book Surprised by Sin: The 
Reader in Paradise Lost:
Meaning is an event, something that happens not on the page, where we are accustomed to 
look for it, but in the interaction between the flow of print (or sound) and the active mediating 
of the reader-hearer.58
Accordingly, meaning is something which happens in the lived experience through an 
interaction between the object and the interpreter.
In his book The Act o f Reading (1978) Wolfgang Iser similarly explains that 
the ‘aesthetic response is set in motion through the reading process; such an analysis, 
however, provides a framework which enables us to assess individual realizations and
56 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: an Introduction. 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 64-65.
57 Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority o f Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1980).
58 Stanley Fish, Surprised by Sin: the Reader in Paradise Lost (London: Macmillan, 1967).
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interpretations of a text in relation to the conditions that have governed them’.59 These 
conditions are, of course, the text’s instructions. For Iser, then, traditional modes of 
interpretation which purport to extract meaning from the text, like an archaeologist 
unearthing an artefact, are simply not viable; meaning is not there for the taking, it is a 
dynamic process. Referring to literary criticism of the nineteenth century, Iser writes, 
Tt seems only natural to the critic that meaning, as a buried secret, should be 
accessible to and reducible by the tools of referential analysis.’ The problem of trying 
to extract its referential meaning is that once the text (or the music) has provided its 
referent, it is all used up and can be discarded. But clearly that is not our aesthetic 
experience of reading a book or listening to music; we seem to live through both and 
they remain with us long after our direct experience of them -  meaning is not, 
therefore, ‘transparent’ to the medium which bears it.
For Iser, the central error in traditional referential analysis is its supposition 
that the critic should search for the truth hidden somewhere in the text like a piece of 
buried treasure, perhaps behind or underneath the text, and that it is always there as an 
authoritative or ‘true’ meaning, waiting for extraction by an authoritative and suitably 
intelligent critic. He argues that Henry James’s short story The Figure in the Carpet 
(1896) unmasks this error because it shows how ‘appearances are no longer the veil 
concealing the substance of a meaning; now they are the means to bring into the 
world something which has never existed at any other time or place before’.60 The 
story’s title, The Figure in the Carpet, is obviously figurative, highlighting the fallacy 
that a fixed and hidden meaning exists in the carpet (the text). Thus, the text does not 
reveal a transparent signified, but instead enables the reader to produce multiple 
readings conditioned by that text.
59 Wolfgang Iser, The Act o f Reading: a Theory o f Aesthetic Response (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1978), x.
60 Ibid., 6.
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The very appearance of the text, then, affords a set of directions actualized by 
the reader. Of course, this is what metaphor is capable of too: relating imagery already 
functioning in one field to a new field or situation enables it to describe new 
situations. It would seem, though, that for both Iser and the phenomenologists 
meaning cannot ultimately be textualized. For Iser, the meaning of a text is not 
indeterminate but it has to be completed or configured in the reader. And for 
phenomenologists, too, meaning is not indeterminate but nor is it language dependent: 
it is part of the physical, phenomenal encounter with the work.
Iser argues that if meaning is ‘imagistic in nature’ it cannot be identified by 
the critic, who requires a frame of reference to parse what is occurring in the 
narrative, for the text ‘represents a pattern, a structured indicator to guide the 
imagination of the reader; and so the meaning can only be grasped as an image’. He 
continues:
Such a meaning must clearly be the product o f an interaction between the textual signals and 
the reader’s acts o f comprehension. And, equally clearly, the reader cannot detach himself 
from such an interaction; on the contrary, the activity stimulated in him will link him to the 
text and induce him to create the conditions necessary for the effectiveness of that text. As text 
and reader thus merge into a single situation, the division between subject and object no 
longer applies, and it therefore follows that meaning is no longer an object to be defined, but 
is an effect to be experienced.61
It is once again a matter of what the text does to us rather than what it ‘means’. The 
reader, the subject, has therefore become as important as the object itself; and in this 
way ‘the conveyer [the text] cannot be identical to what is conveyed’62 -  according 
with Nattiez’s discussions regarding the poietic and esthesic levels. It is for this
61 Ibid., 9-10.
62 Ibid., 54.
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reason that for Iser, communication -  how the art object communicates -  is the 
primary model for an aesthetic response, not meaning. It is a functional approach:
‘The focal point now is the interaction between the text and, on the one hand, the 
social and historical norms of its environment and, on the other, the potential 
disposition of the reader’.
In his insistence that divisions between the subject (reader) and object (text) 
no longer apply, Iser’s demonstrates his indebtedness to the monism espoused by the 
phenomenologists. Thus, meaning involves a tripartite process which feeds back in all 
directions along its triangular geometry. At this point, it seems appropriate to apply 
this to MaP -  for Iser himself happily navigates between visual art and literature -  and 
ask what produces the conditions that are necessary for its effectiveness and 
reception. Here, though, the triangle involves the music, the painting and the listener. 
In this way, we might say that the frame of reference provided by the absent painting 
supplies a set of conditions for experiencing the music, and vice versa.
Iser goes on to discuss the emergence of New Criticism, which rejects the 
classical norm of the work or object containing a hidden, true meaning, and instead 
turns its attention towards the functions operating within the work. But Iser states that 
whilst this is a progressive move, it falls down in its reliance on defining these 
functions through the ‘same norms of interpretation that were used in uncovering 
representative meanings. A function is not a meaning -  it brings about an effect, and 
this effect cannot be measured by the same criteria as are used in evaluating the 
appearance of truth.’64 So, we must ask, is Iser rejecting the notion of meaning 
entirely if meaning lies in the shadow of functionality and hence effect?
63 Ibid., 14.
64 Ibid., 15-16.
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This point brings us back to the notion of the aesthetic response that Iser 
writes about in the beginning of The Act o f Reading, a notion which leads him to posit 
the metaphor that the reader is like a ‘traveller in a stagecoach’ and has, therefore, a 
‘moving viewpoint’. However, he still tries to ‘grasp the work as a single unit’.65 It is 
this synoptic act, the subjective interpretation which the reader imposes upon the 
work, which constitutes the actualization of the potential meaning, and in this way the 
meaning cannot be fixed and nor is it intrinsic to the text; there is no ‘true’ meaning, 
for it may be ‘grasped’ at any changing moment. And for Iser, that it refuses to 
acknowledge this subjective reduction of a text, via the critic, to a single unit, has 
been the fundamental error of classical literary criticism:
Perception and comprehension are not qualities inherent in the objects themselves, and so the 
world must be translated into something it is not, if it is to be perceived and understood. But if 
symbols enable us to perceive the existing world and yet are independent of the visible, they 
must also in principle enable us to see a non-existent world.66
Accordingly, for either the existing world or the non-existent world to be perceived, it 
must be translated into something which it is not. And, unlike Husserl, Iser allows for 
the use of symbols here. It follows, then, that because these symbols are independent 
of the visible world, they can also enable us to see something absent, such as a 
painting.
65 Ibid., 16-17.
66 Ibid., 64.
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2.2.2 Actualizing Latent Textual Meaning
Nicholas Cook gives a similar account of musical meaning in his essay ‘Theorizing 
Musical Meaning’.67 Whilst this is not a purely reception-based account, it does draw 
heavily on Iserian concepts by arguing that music comes to mean something through 
having the ‘potential’ for certain meanings to arise, and how, in this case, these can 
become realised through the listener. Critical interpretations applied to music cause 
these meanings to become what he calls ‘actualized’: ‘the critical and analytical
z o
discourse that surrounds music is engaged in the very act of creating meaning’. In 
fact, this argument is clearly predicated on the twentieth-century’s linguistic 
revolution, from Saussure to Wittgenstein, which recognised that language does not 
reflect or express meaning but actually produces it. To illustrate his argument, Cook 
invokes Susan McClary’s famous, sexual interpretation of Beethoven’s Ninth 
Symphony, and explains that what ‘assures its fit’ as a metaphor for the music is the 
‘ notion of homology’:
At the most obvious level, McClary’s interpretations involve equating the frustration and 
achievement o f musical goals with sexual ones; at a more subtle level, they depend on an 
equation between conformance to or subversion of normative patterns in music on the one 
hand and society or ideology on the other. Take away the homology and the interpretation 
loses its plausibility as an interpretation o f  the music rather than one imposed on it; it 
becomes, in a word, arbitrary.69
Overlaying McClary’s interpretation upon the music works as a metaphor, 
therefore, because technical aspects of the music, namely the ‘subversion of
67 See his ‘Theorizing Musical Meaning’, Music Theory Spectrum 23 (2001), 170-95, and his books 
Music, Imagination, and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) and Analysing Musical Multimedia 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
68 Cook, ‘Theorizing Musical Meaning’, 184.
69 Ibid., 172 (italics original).
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normative patterns in music’, equates with a similar sexual subversion in ‘society or 
ideology’ -  both infringe established conventions. It is this correspondence which 
enables McClary’s interpretation to stand and not to be mere imposition. Cook claims 
that the blend of music and (sexual) image
[RJesults in a new, which is to say emergent, meaning; there could hardly be a clearer 
illustration o f the way in which the critical and analytical discourse that surrounds music is 
engaged in the very act of creating meaning. We shall never be able to shake our experience 
free from this powerful interpretation -  that is, until the next one comes along.70
Thus, for Cook, interpretation means transforming the music’s potential meaning into 
actualized meaning. He argues that there is a ‘kind of sleight of hand’ in the 
impression Donald Tovey and Susan McClary give of ‘simply describing how the 
music is, when in reality they are in the business of proposing interpretations and so
71constructing actualized meaning’. This is illustrative of the overarching theory that 
Cook hopes will ‘outline a way in which we can understand at least some of the 
meaning ascribed to music as at the same time as irreducibly cultural and intimately 
related to its structural properties’.72 Meaning, in other words, is not found or located 
by a critic, it is something that he or she has brought to bear on the musical structure 
to help it make a sense.
Cook, like Iser, is keen to show that meaning is not arbitrary but is contingent 
on the text’s immanent structure. That meaning, however, is neither solely immanent 
in the text nor does it reside entirely with the listener. In essence, the person who 
ascribes a particular meaning to a piece of music is offering it up against the musical 
structure to see if it ‘fits’. What is significant here is how Beethoven’s Ninth manages
70 Ibid., 183-84.
71 Ibid., 188.
72 Ibid., 173-74.
to represent and support McClary’s sexual interpretation -  something which is clearly 
external to the music’s world -  through its own musical materials. But obviously, as 
Peter Kivy observes, ‘one needs to know that one is listening to illustrative music in 
order to identify the object of the illustration’.73 Once again, we can see how the 
critical interpretation itself is involved in the very act of creating meaning; at the very 
least it capitalizes on the music’s potential.
Invoking Daniel Miller’s analysis of material culture, Cook writes, ‘any pot or 
picture has an indefinite, though not infinite, number of physical attributes, and each 
society makes its own selection from and interpretation of those attributes.’74 
Therefore we select aspects of an object which seem pertinent to us, perhaps through 
a programme, and they are socially conditioned or constrained by the particular 
culture in which they are received. Moreover, the particular sets of these attributes are 
reified through perpetuation within that society through, for example, a critical 
interpretation such as McClary’s above. In this way, the music may be said to contain 
an ‘enabling similarity’ with some field of meaning outside itself. Cook maintains that 
‘while meaning is socially constructed, it is both enabled and constrained by the 
available attributes of the object’.75 Again, it is ultimately about how the music 
speaks. Qualities or attributes of the musical object have the potential for certain 
meanings to arise in tandem with the perceiver, and these meanings are ‘enabled’ 
through them having some similarity between the ascribed meaning (in our case, the 
painting) and the musical sounds.
73 In Sound and Semblance, Reflections on Musical Representation (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1984), 33 (italics original).
74 Cook, ‘Theorizing Musical Meaning’, 178.
75 Ibid., 179.
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Cook writes that music is never ‘alone’ (Peter Kivy’s term from his 1990 book 
Music Alone):76 ‘it is always received in a discursive context, and [...] it is through 
the interaction of music and interpreter, text and context, that meaning is
77 . •constructed’. This, of course, is also the tenor of Iser’s statements. In this way, the 
music, continuously negotiated through these mediations, has the potential for certain 
meanings to emerge. And as Cook puts it, musical works, regarded as ‘agents of 
meaning’, are ‘unstable aggregates of potential signification’. This, he says, is at odds 
with musicology’s prevalent view, which considers musical works to be ‘relatively 
stable, hierarchically structured, culturally privileged -  in a word, authorized 
wholes’.78
Finally, faced with a mistrust of the ability of words to describe the actual 
experience of music -  ‘music depends for its meaning on critical interpretation but is 
at the same time ineffable’ -  Cook urges that the aim of musical analysis ‘should not 
be to translate meaning into words, but rather to attend to the conditions of its 
emergence’.79 Again, this is exactly what Iser advocates when he emphasizes the need
O A
to lay bare the functions and conditions governing a work’s reception. If we are to 
achieve this, we need to show how the critical interpretations of MaP are grounded in 
its structure and musical attributes, and that these in turn either create meaning or not, 
depending on the extent of their similarity or fit to the painting. In this way, we create 
a novel situation where we are actively engaged with the creation of a critical 
interpretation rather than being passively attendant to it, performing a kind of self­
reflexive analysis. This is entirely reminiscent of Thomas Clifton’s drive for music
76 Peter Kivy, Music Alone: Philosophical Reflections on the Purely Musical Experience (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1990).
77 Cook, Theorizing Musical Meaning, 180.
78 Ibid., 188 (italics original).
79 Ibid., 190.
80 See Iser, The Act o/Reading, 14, n. 29.
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theory to embrace phenomenology, by which he means not only observing the music, 
but also observing the act of the ‘self observing the music’.81 
Iser explains that,
The phenomenological theory o f art lays full stress on the idea that, in considering a literary 
work, one must take into account not only the actual text but also, and in equal measure, the 
actions involved in responding to that text. Thus Roman Ingarden confronts the structure of 
the literary text with the ways in which it can be konkretisiert (realized). The text as such 
offers different “schematized views” through which the subject matter can come to light, but 
the actual bringing to light is an action o f Konkretisation. If this is so, then the literary work 
has two poles, which we might call the artistic and the esthetic: the artistic refers to the text 
created by the author, and the esthetic to the realization accomplished by the reader.82
It follows, then, that the literary work cannot be completely identical to the text, or 
with the realization of that text, but in fact must lie somewhere between these two 
poles. The actual ‘work’ is therefore more than the text, for the text only takes on life 
when it is realized by the reader, and, furthermore, ‘the realization is by no means 
independent of the individual disposition of the reader -  though this in turn is acted 
upon by the different patterns of the text’. Accordingly, it is the convergence of the 
reader and the literary work that brings the work into being. But this convergence can 
never be precisely pinpointed; it always remains virtual because ‘it is not to be 
identified either with the reality of the text or with the individual disposition of the 
reader’.83 And it is this virtuality that for Iser gives rise to the dynamic nature of the 
reading experience. It is the aesthetic experience. Good evidence for this creative 
process and the indeterminacy of the readers’ position arises from the fact that
81 Clifton, Music as Heard, 37.
82 Iser, The Implied Reader, 21A (italics original). It is noteworthy that these terms are, o f course, 
remarkably similar to Nattiez’s poietic and esthesic processes respectively.
83 Ibid., 274-75.
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different readers can be uniquely affected by a literary text. Interpretations of the 
same text are, Iser argues, conditional upon the reader’s social and cultural 
experiences of other texts and works of arts; hence, no two readers will concretize the 
text in the same way.
Iser holds that a functional account of meaning should ask what an art object 
does and not what it means -  how, not what it means. This injunction is compelling 
for several reasons, for it seeks to explain meaning as a process of aesthetic response. 
It is of course what a book does to us -  makes us feel in the process of actualizing it -  
that makes us read it in the first place, not mechanisms of signification alone. The 
aesthetic pleasure is in the experience of reading because the text cannot mean 
anything without a reader, just as the aesthetic significance of a piece of music is in 
the effect it has upon us (how and what it makes us feel) rather than what it means. 
Iser asserts that the words themselves do not point to a signified object, but instead 
designate a set of instructions for the production of the signified in the mind of the 
reader. The reader, then, produces the aesthetic object from the ‘instructions’ in the 
text, and it is this which constitutes the aesthetic response.
2.2.3 Construction and Ideation
Accordingly, applying this model to MaP we might consider the music, its title, and 
our image of the painting as an attempt to designate similar ‘instructions’ in the 
production of a suitable aesthetic response. This is an attempt to ‘ideate’ (to borrow 
Iser’s term), to evoke the presence of something which is not given. Iser writes that 
‘we must distinguish between perception and ideation as two different means of 
access to the world: perception requires the actual presence of the object, whereas
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ideation depends upon its absence or non-existence’.84 In other words, our 
imagination is engaged to supplement the presence of something absent. This point 
was raised in our discussion of phenomenology above, where Clifton posits the view 
that percepts contribute to knowledge but the image requires the operations of 
consciousness, and is thus detached. And it is clear that this is where phenomenology 
and reader-response theory part company, for the former theory does not seem to 
allow for ideation and imagining as aspects integral to a ‘pure’ perception.
Iser, on the other hand, sees these components as essentially forming the 
aesthetic response required to actualize the ‘text’ in the first place. Seen thus, there is 
no virtue in assigning the levels first-order (Erlebnis) or second-order (reflective) to 
acts of perception, for there is no ‘work’ unless these acts are performed and therefore 
there can be no perception either. Significantly, then, for an aesthetic response 
involving an absent painting in MaP, Iser’s model reconciles these separate but 
related parts of the communication chain.
Jean-Paul Sartre notes something similar when he writes,
In order to imagine, it is enough that consciousness can surpass the real and constitute it as a 
world, since the nihilation [s/c] o f the real is always implied by its constitution as a world. But 
this surpassing cannot be effected in just any way and the freedom of consciousness should 
not be confused with arbitrariness. For an image is not purely and simply the world denied, 
but is always the world denied from a certain point o f view, precisely that which allows the 
positing o f the absence or non-existence of the object presentified [s/c] ‘as imaged’.85
Hence, by imagining, we are in the process of world-making. And this process is not 
arbitrary, but always takes place from a particular point of view, which, in the case of
84 Iser, Act o f Reading, 137.
85 Jean-Paul Sartre, The Imaginary: a Phenomenological Psychology o f the Imagination, trans.
Jonathan Webber (London: Taylor and Francis, 1948), 184-85 (italics original).
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MaP, is produced by the instructions given by the music and the imagined painting, 
and by allowing for the ideation and expectation of the absent object -  what Iser 
would call the signified. This can also be thought as the projection of a world, 
instructed by the art objects and mediated by the listener.
In a related way, E. H. Gombrich holds that perception ‘is a constructive 
process, not a passive one’; it is the beholder’s job ‘to bring the picture alive’.86 Based 
on his experiences in WWII monitoring barely audible radio broadcasts for the British 
Broadcasting Corporation’s Monitoring Service, he writes that,
It was then we learned to what an extent our knowledge and expectations influence our 
hearing. You had to know what might be said in order to hear what was said. More exactly, 
you selected from your knowledge o f possibilities certain word combinations and tried 
projecting them into the noises heard.
The effect of this suggestion was so powerful, he continues, ‘that we made it a 
practice never to tell a colleague of our own interpretation if we wanted them to test 
it. Expectation created illusion’.87 What this suggests is that any interpretation of a 
piece of art is likewise coloured by our own unique selection process. Gombrich 
writes that this process is so automatic that we might easily lose sight of our 
configurative contribution: ‘In the reading of images, as in the hearing of speech, it is 
always hard to distinguish what is given to us from what we supplement in the 
process of projection which is triggered off by recognition.’ Moreover, ‘it is the guess
86 ‘The Evidence of Images’, in Interpretation Theory and Practice, ed. Charles S. Singleton 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1969), 71-72.
87 Gombrich, Art and Illusion: a Study in the Psychology o f Pictorial 
Representation. 5th edn (London: Phaidon, 1992), 171.
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of the beholder that tests the medley of forms and colours for coherent meaning, 
crystallizing it into shape when a consistent interpretation has been found’.88
Therefore, applying this to MaP, we can see that each listener has had their 
own experience of the absent painting, and it is this which helps to construct a 
configurative meaning out of the instructions given over by the phenomenal encounter 
with the musical object. Iser shares Gombrich’s view, writing that ‘comprehension is 
inseparable from the reader’s expectations, and where we have expectations, there too 
we have one of the most potent weapons in the writer’s armoury -  illusion’.89 
Accordingly, we might argue that the circumstances surrounding the experience of 
MaP -  that is, our memories of the absent painting -  generate expectations that lead to 
an effective illusion which creates the sense of a musically elaborated version of the 
original painting. It is clear that analytical interpretations are similarly prone to 
illusion: the music could mean other things if it were to stand in relation to a different 
meaning-bearer -  another painting, for example. But it could not mean anything. 
Instead, it is an aesthetic response which is partly presented and partly constituted by 
our efforts in intending the painting as having a relational frame with the music.
This frame therefore has the potential to foreground certain musical attributes 
while casting others into the background. The very process of selection inevitably 
creates a background-foreground relationship, leaving the chosen element in the 
foreground. Thus, we might say that the listener’s image of the painting establishes a 
frame of reference in the form of a thought or ideational system from which the 
musical attributes may be selected. Iser observes that this ‘principle of selection 
exploits a basic condition for all forms of comprehension and experience, for the as 
yet unknown meaning would be incomprehensible were it not for the familiarity of
88 Ibid., 204.
89 Iser, Implied Reader, 284.
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the background it is set against’.90 For our purposes, then, we may think of the 
listener’s memory of the painting as forming that background or framework.
Although Iser’s work is predicated upon the philosophical tenets of 
phenomenology, and particularly those of Roman Ingarden, he takes leave from 
Ingarden in his rejection of the stabilities and determinacy that condition the reader of 
a novel to concretize the work within a set system of norms and schemata. The 
difference between these two writers is subtle, suffice it to say for our purposes that 
Ingarden posits the existence of true and false concretizations of a work based on 
places of indeterminacy. In this way, the work can be finalized. Iser, however, 
disagrees with this position and argues that the concretization of a work cannot be 
‘subjected to criteria of adequacy or inadequacy’.91 For him, the work is always a 
two-way interaction and therefore cannot be definitively concretized; the text provides 
guidelines, but it is how we respond to those instructions individually which 
constitutes the aesthetic object. It is the text’s very indeterminacy which drives us to 
work out a configurative meaning.
While Iser asserts that the text prevents our aesthetic response from being 
arbitrary, he argues that there is ‘no frame of reference to offer criteria of right or 
wrong’.92 In the case of MaP, though, the ideational system provided by our image of 
the painting constructs a frame of reference that enables us to posit interpretations and 
makes selections subject to that criterion. Naturally we are always faced with the 
epistemological problem of discussing our own concretization of the music, but it is 
this act which constitutes the musical elaboration of the painting. It is the continual 
selection process of the aesthetic experience and the search for a configurative 
meaning which constructs our musical representation.
90 Iser, Act o f Reading, 93.
91 Ibid., 171.
92 Ibid., 230.
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Although, as we saw in the last chapter, phenomenology is able to account for 
the mechanism of reciprocity and how we stand in a subjective relation to the object, 
it is not able to account for any reflective or conceptual mediation. Both 
phenomenology and reader-response theory share the view that our experience of an 
art form involves reciprocity -  the two-way process involving the artwork affecting us 
and us affecting it -  yet it is only reader-response theory that allows for the possible 
worlds created by our intellectual as well as our bodily engagements with the 
aesthetic object. Both theories share the view that the aesthetic object emerges from 
the lived experience, but it is the model offered by Iser which, by accommodating the 
listener’s cognitive involvement, turns out to be fundamental to discussing the effect 
of the painting in absentia. If the painting is to affect the selection of musical 
attributes, and hopefully the case studies in Part II will illustrate this, then we are 
clearly dealing with external facts impinging on our aesthetic experience of the music. 
It is these external facts which are bracketed out by phenomenology due to their 
cognitive demands and imaginative construction.
What Clifton’s phenomenology wishes to prevent is the kind of relativist 
construct whereby meaning can be imposed onto a musical object such that it comes 
to mean anything we want it to mean. Moreover, he wants the music to speak for 
itself. The reciprocity to which Clifton’s phenomenology makes reference involves 
our attached bodily presence, not vicarious experience through another medium. For 
Iser’s reader-response theory, the oneness of mind and object combined into a single 
unified field is not at odds with phenomenology. However, allowing this oneness to 
be formed from an interaction between acts of comprehension and ‘instructions’ from 
another experiential domain -  the painting -  transgresses the Husserlian principle of 
epoche. Accordingly, because acts of comprehension come from a whole nexus of
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interpretative fields -  social, cultural and conceptual -  we may take the frame of 
reference of the painting to instigate a significant part of this process.
Iser regards perception and comprehension not as qualities inherent in the 
objects themselves but as something we do to the object -  it is we that comprehend 
and perceive the musical object, after all. Accordingly, it is how the object 
communicates itself to us, how it functions and brings about an effect, which forms a 
response model to the aesthetic object. The artwork, in Iser’s view, asks something of 
its percipient; it is not passively given to us, and it is the nature of this solicitation that 
forms the conditions for the artwork to complete itself. For Clifton’s phenomenology 
this activity stops at the conscious body, but for Iser it takes us off into other domains 
of experience.
In addition, for Iser’s reader of a literary text, it is the very ambiguity, the gaps 
and indeterminacies, which drive our dyadic interpretation with a text, our need to 
concretize it by bombarding it with projections. But as the blanks give way to the 
reader’s projection, the text becomes increasingly fixed, and it follows that the asked- 
for interaction can only come about through changes in the reader’s projections -  
hence Iser’s reader metaphorically travelling in a stagecoach with a moving 
viewpoint. Applying this to MaP, the shifting viewpoint induced by the musical object 
and the image of the painting invites a readjustment of the listener’s projections, 
allowing them to experience something previously not within their experience. It 
follows, then, that any musical indeterminacy cannot be filled in by the musical 
system, so it must be filled in by another system: our conceptual comprehension. And 
that comprehension must be informed by the relational frame of the painting. Thus, 
the gaps stimulate in us a process of ideation according to terms and conditions set by 
the musical object, the instructions of which invite us to imagine the presence of
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something not given. In this way, the musical object changes its significance through 
the interaction of our changing projections onto it. Meaning is not fixed: rather, it is 
always being renewed in the act of creation within this dynamic.
In MaP, then, the ambiguous musical object drives us to fill in its 
indeterminacies using the relational frame of the painting; but such an interpretation 
will always be subject to tests of adequacy and inadequacy posed by the music itself -  
how well, musically, does something fit a particular projection or ideation? If we are 
to consider perception and ideation as two different but essential means of access to 
MaP -  perception requiring the actual presence of the musical object, and ideation 
depending on the absence of the painting -  it seems appropriate to compare this 
situation to the mechanisms involved in metaphor, the understanding of one domain 
of experience in terms of another. To make a bridge between the musical object and 
the absent painting must accordingly require both perception and ideation -  
something concrete and something imagined (music and the painting respectively) -  
and this is why it has been so important to hang onto the phenomenological model 
alongside an aesthetic response theory.
It has already been argued that the musical object itself will constrain the 
interpretation that we may give to it, but in MaP this constraint occurs through an 
experience which is phenomenological and conceptual along some kind of feedback 
loop between the two domains -  music and painting. The percept encourages us to 
conceptualise, to fill in the gaps, and the concept affects the experience. Accordingly, 
it follows that the concept sanctions certain actions and perceptions and structures our 
experience. Thus we might say that the concept emanating from the painting 
structures our experience of the music -  rather in the way that Nattiez views narrative
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music for the listener as being the structural analysis of an absent narrative.93 Iser 
writes that comprehension is inseparable from the reader’s expectations, so we might 
also contend that the way we intend the painting in our experience of the music 
shapes our musical understanding. To hear the musical attributes in relation to the 
painting must to some extent change their function and, therefore, communication, for 
now they have the potential to be mediated by concepts emanating from this other 
domain. It is in the setting of boundaries that these functions may take effect. Once 
again a phenomenological orientation seems both necessary and instrumental, for the 
very notion of imposing a boundary invokes the body: for example, something is held 
close or at a distance, inside or outside, behind or in front of, or on top of or 
underneath.
In the analytical interpretations of Part II, we shall see how the relational 
frame of the painting prompts the selection of musical attributes: focusing attention on 
one set of properties shifts our attention away from others. But although a subjective 
approach is inescapable if we wish to speak of a musical representation emerging 
through the selection of certain musical attributes, it is in revealing this mechanism 
that we may come to gain an objective understanding of how MaP may be 
experienced. Put this way, the metaphor ‘music is a painting’ shapes our perception so 
that the stream of sounds that we hear is selected according to this other, external 
domain. The metaphor potentiates a particular hearing because we look for 
significance in relation to the painting.
In this way, we can see how our understanding of the musical object 
comprises both a phenomenological attitude and a conceptual framework. The 
concept provided by the painting enables us to apply predicates from this experiential
93 See Chapter 1, p.38.
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domain onto the musical experience. It is a way of bringing dissimilar areas together 
and giving them a relation where previously there was none. The aesthetic importance 
of this concerns the new experience of the music which this transfer makes possible. 
Thus we respond to the music in a different way. As we said in the Introduction, the 
music can never become the painting. However, in allowing predicates to be applied 
in this metaphorical manner to the musical domain, we change its aspect and so allow 
it to actually have these properties. Simply put, we respond to the musical domain in 
terms of the absent painting, but it is this absence which ensures our imaginative 
involvement and thus the supplementation of our physical encounter with the musical 
object, an encounter in which the body has a central relation.
It is, then, an interaction between the real (the perceived sonic stimuli) and the 
imagined (the ideated conceptual structure), which creates the new experience in us. 
The invited association between the painting and the music enables the projection of 
the painting’s concepts onto our musical experience, but only if the musical structure 
can support these interpretations. Accordingly, in the next chapter, we will examine 
more closely this idea of conceptual listening.
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CHAPTER 3: Conceptual Listening and the Mechanism of Metaphor
3.1 Representation
The previous chapter considered how a theory of aesthetic response to the experience 
of MaP must involve some kind of interaction between the phenomenal object and the 
conceptual mediation induced by the intentional association of the music with a 
painting. We shall now turn towards the mechanism of metaphor to explore more 
deeply how ideas emanating from the image and memory of the absent painting might 
be transferred by the listener to the phenomenal experience of the music. In doing so, 
we will inevitably re-encounter questions concerning the representational qualities of 
MaP.
Roger Scruton has asserted that ‘ [music] is an abstract art, with no power to 
represent the world. Representation, as I understand it, is a property that does not 
belong to music.’1 He enumerates five criteria that music must fulfil if it is to be 
regarded as representational:
• The observer must have some awareness of the representation and then it 
becomes ‘aesthetically relevant’
• Representation requires a medium and is understood only when the distinction 
between subject and medium has been recognized
• Representation exacts an interest in its subject matter
• The representation must convey some thought or idea about its subject (a 
commentary)
• The representation must be convincing
1 Roger Scruton, ‘Representation in Music’, Philosophy, 51 (1976), 273.
2 Ibid.
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For Scruton representation is essentially propositional; it must be able to say 
something about its subject that is open to proof or disproof. Moreover, it must 
embody a subject and predicate logic, that is, it must assert something about the 
subject of this proposition. He states that music is unable to meet these criteria and is 
therefore non-representational. However, Peter Kivy in his book Sound and 
Semblance (1984) deals with each of the above criteria and rebuts Scruton’s charge 
that music cannot meet these requirements. For Kivy, music, too, can be 
propositional:
I will not claim, however, that musical representation ever gets much beyond the bare 
minimum in respect of what Scruton construes in painting as propositional content. But it does 
not fall below it, which is all I need to claim for my own purposes. Indeed, it cannot fall below 
it, since, really, all the minimal claim to propositional content amounts to is what all 
representation possesses: a verbally expressible subject.3
And we could argue that once the piece of music has been given a title indicating the 
subject, the piece has, at least, the potential to be described verbally and, therefore, 
conforms to Kivy’s ‘minimal claim to propositional content’.
Similarly, Kendall Walton argues that music can be said to prescribe instances 
of human actions, although not the human agent themselves. He claims that it does 
this through its programme, and that ‘[m]ere titles suffice to make music patently 
representational; indeed I cannot imagine music that an appropriate title could not 
render representational. Music stands ready to take on an explicit representational 
function at the slightest provocation.’4 Walton impressively demonstrates our
3 Peter Kivy, Sound and Semblance: Reflections on Musical Representation (Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 1984), 158.
4 Kendall Walton, ‘Listening with Imagination’, in Introduction to Music and Meaning, ed. Jenefer 
Robinson (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 58.
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imaginative involvement with music through what he calls the construction of 
‘fictional worlds’. These worlds belong normatively to literary and pictorial 
representations, but, he says, also to music because they are Tike nonfigurative 
paintings that present fictional worlds populated by features of the paintings 
themselves, as when it is fictional that one rectangular shape lies in front of another’.5 
Moreover, he states that the prevalence of so many metaphors used in the description 
of the musical experience attests to the variety of imaginings of the fictional kind. 
These fictional worlds, then, are like a representational artifice, a means of engaging 
the subject imaginatively with the world of make-believe.
But even so-called representational art is not simply a mirror of reality. In 
providing a representation of objects, people, and things, the painter applies paints 
and other materials to a canvas base. It is the artist’s particular use of the paints which 
provides a new perspective upon worldly objects. For example, the thickness, texture, 
colour and opacity of the paint used will render its subject in a unique way, and often 
in a way that bears little resemblance to reality. As much as representational painting 
might attempt to render its medium transparent in the manner of everyday language, 
we are nonetheless able to attend to the physical properties of painting and music for 
their own sake.
This raises very interesting questions about the nature of composing music 
after non-figurative works. On the one hand, music composed after something that 
possesses no tangible or concrete representational subject matter creates the obvious 
problem of determining what the music in its turn is representing: can music represent 
the non-representational? And on the other hand, this kind of composition might 
illuminate something fundamental about musical representation itself: searching for
5 Ibid., 61.
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explicit correspondence between the paintings and the music is only one of the ways 
and conditions for a musical representation to occur.
The case studies in Part II set out to examine whether the works in question 
have successfully rendered a representation of their chosen painting and, if so, how 
this has been achieved. The first question posed by such an inquiry is that of what is 
meant by the term ‘representation’. A depiction of a tulip, say, is a representation that 
we recognise by means of certain representational conventions, which enable us to 
isolate the plant’s component features -  a brightly coloured cup-shaped flower at the 
head of a single vertical stem with long, pointed leaves emerging from its base. This 
distinctive ensemble of components may enable the identification of the flower, 
however lacking in verisimilar aspects -  proportion, perspective, foreshortening -  the 
representation might otherwise be. But how do these conditions of representation 
transfer to music? For sure, music is able to imitate other music and things which 
make sounds -  ‘isosonorously’, as discussed in the Introduction -  but does the use of 
resemblant sound constitute true representation? Resemblance, as Nelson Goodman 
put it in his seminal book Languages o f Art (1968), ‘is no sufficient condition for 
representation’.6 Goodman is not denying that representation may involve 
resemblance, but he wants to drive home the message that representation involves 
more than just isomorphism, for anything may be said to resemble anything else in 
some manner: rather, he suggests ‘denotation is the core of representation and is 
independent of resemblance’.
However, we must not detain ourselves with Goodmanian accounts of 
representation save to say that signification and convention are aspects of 
representation that we should keep hold of. For example, by convention, certain
6 Nelson Goodman, Languages ofArt: an Approach to a Theory o f Symbols (Brighton: Harvester,
1981), 4.
7 Ibid., 5.
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instruments and instrumental techniques will already possess representational abilities 
in certain contexts, and through reference (signification) the music may come to stand 
for aspects of the painting, not only directly but also indirectly as well. Getting back 
to the example of the painted tulip, we can see that there are aspects of such a painting 
-  whether colour, proportion or figural elements -  that are likely to resemble the real 
flower. Even if certain aspects lack verisimilitude -  colour, for instance, in a fauvist 
image -  the representation as a whole contains enough similarity to support our 
conviction that we are looking at a representation of a tulip. But could the same be 
said of music? Can music become representational if it describes only certain aspects 
of a painting, metonymically, or a viewer’s reactions to that painting?
Representation, then, is not the same as pointing to something in an indexical 
manner: it is about description. Van Gogh’s Sunflowers (1889) do not simply point to 
the flowers as a subject, they also describe them through the way the paint has been 
applied and the light rendered. Thus, a representational painting does not passively 
delineate its subject, but conveys thoughts and ideas about that subject, and these 
thoughts can then be converted into words. The imaginative aspect is therefore 
evident because those thoughts are ours -  or at least the thoughts the work gives rise 
to.
3.2 Aspect Perception: Seeing and Hearing As
Ludwig Wittgenstein writes about the aspectual difference in seeing a face and 
noticing its likeness to another: T see that it has not changed; yet I see it differently. I 
call this experience “noticing an aspect”.’ Adducing the example of a three- 
dimensional oblong box drawn with simple lines and placed as a diagram in a 
textbook, he argues that it is the accompanying text which supplies the interpretation
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of the illustration: ‘But we can also see the illustration now as one thing now as 
another. So we interpret it, and see it as we interpret it.’8 This is an important 
observation and one which we might apply to MaP if we substitute hearing with 
seeing, for is not the ideation supplied by the painting able to make us hear some new 
aspect hitherto unavailable?
Similarly, citing Joseph Jastrow’s famous duck-rabbit figure (fig. 3.1) -  in 
which it possible only to see either the duck or the rabbit at any one time -  he writes 
that seeing the figure as, say, the duck is ‘continuous seeing’ of an aspect, but 
suddenly seeing it as a rabbit is what he calls ‘the dawning of an aspect’.9 
Wittgenstein argues that there are two uses of the word ‘see’: ‘seeing’ and ‘seeing as’. 
The former concerns literal seeing, ‘I see this’, and the latter concerns ‘seeing 
something as something’.10 Thus I can be persuaded or instructed to see or hear 
something in a particular way -  to see or hear an aspect -  but only i f  it is there for us 
to perceive it in the first place. The point is that perception is not passive and not just 
a product of the stimulus, but it is also affected by our expectations (Gombrich) and 
the way we are primed to see and hear something as something.
Figure 3.1: Joseph Jastrow’s duck-rabbit figure (1899)
8 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations II (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 165 (italics 
original).
9 Ibid., 166.
10 Ibid., 182.
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However, even though MaP can still exist as a musical experience of one kind 
or another without reference to its source painting, does it require this component to 
make full musical sense and to be a complete aesthetic experience in the sense given 
by Kivy in Chapter 1 ? As we have said already, the music may be said to unfold or 
‘move’ according to a certain logic that is unlocked through access to the painting-as- 
image -  its frame of reference.
Figure 3.2: J. M. W. Turner, Sun Setting over a Lake (1840)11
Theorising the power and influence of a title and how it may lead us to ‘see in’ 
a particular representation in a painting, Peter Kivy adduces J. M. W. Turner’s Sun 
Setting over a Lake (fig. 3.2, ca. 1840) as an instance of a painting becoming 
representational through the viewer’s expectation induced by a title. Kivy asks 
whether, if the painting were shown amongst a group of abstract paintings, without a
11 Oil on canvas, 10.7 x 13.8 x 14.5 cm, Tate Britain, London.
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title and without Turner’s name, it would be recognised as the sun setting over a lake. 
‘Would it not rather be taken for a non-representational painting?’12
On the other hand a painting such as Van Gogh’s Sunflowers seems to need no 
such title to direct us towards the deciphering of the image. In this way, there are 
aided and unaided pictorial representations. Intuitively, it would seem to be the same 
case in music. Kivy makes the distinction between two types of representation in 
music: ‘pictorial’ and ‘representational’,13 the former being a representation that is 
recognised without the need for a title and the latter one that is only recognisable with 
the aid of a title. Once again, this raises the interesting question of the role of our 
expectations in shaping and even constructing our perceptions, in this case on the 
basis of a title. And perhaps something of this sort is happening with programme 
music and MaP too. The mediation by the painting becomes effective, in part, because 
we expect it to be.
Why, we might ask, does a composer bother with trying to be representational 
when the music can stand effectively as ‘music alone’, to borrow Kivy’s own 
expression, and therefore be enjoyed on its own terms and in its own (musical) 
‘language’? Many listeners are probably not even aware of the representational 
aspects of much instrumental music. Indeed, Roger Scruton has argued that since 
programme music or representational music can be ‘fully’ appreciated without the 
narrative contained within the programme or knowledge of what it is supposed to be 
representing, then it cannot really be described as either narrative or representational 
at all because truly representational art -  say Van Gogh’s Sunflowers -  would not 
make sense and could not be fully understood and appreciated without knowing what 
it represented. Kivy rebuts this claim from Scruton, arguing that he is wrong to
12 Peter Kivy, Sound and Semblance, 34.
13 Ibid., 21.
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suggest that music can be ‘fully’ understood in the absence of its programme or 
representational reference. For Kivy, as we have already mentioned, Berlioz’s 
Symphonie fantastique does not make full musical sense until it makes narrative 
sense, in terms of the intended programme.
The philosopher Jenefer Robinson states that, save for a handful of examples, 
we cannot ‘hear in’ a piece of music what is being represented as we can see, for 
example, the woman in Thomas Gainsborough’s painting Mrs Siddons. If we can hear 
a representation in the music it is more likely to be an imitation of another sound or of 
a piece of music and not something extra-musical. In such instances of ‘isosonorous’ 
representation, the music has a tendency to collapse into the sounds represented, 
becoming transparent to its subject, and therefore not a representation but an 
imitation.14 However, Turner’s painting is obviously closer to abstract art than 
Gainsborough’s, and is aided by its title in order to become a representation of the 
sunset depicted. So, if near-abstract paintings may become representational, perhaps 
music too might achieve such a condition through the help of a title?
In this view, an effective representation is not dependent purely on 
resemblance. Goodman sees all art as performing a symbolic function that is 
essentially propositional and subject to certain rules and conventions. Representation 
is denotation within a particular system, and ‘no degree of resemblance is sufficient to 
establish the requisite relationship of representation’.15 Extending this notion to 
music, we might aver that resemblance in our music is also unnecessary for it to 
represent the painting; instead, its particular symbolic system may characterise this 
other domain or ascribe new qualities to it. Robinson accords with this view and
14 Kivy, Scruton and Robinson have all made this point at various times.
15 Goodman, 5.
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writes that it is the attributes of the picture itself which ‘tell us how something is’,16 
but the title of a picture serves as a subject term that tells us what is being described. 
Thus, in Goodmanian terms, the representation is governed by something analogous 
to the mechanism involved in a sentence structure containing a subject and a 
predicate. The title tells us what the subject is and the painting describes it or tells us 
how it is. This immediately provides us with a useful mode of avoiding the difficulty 
associated with the resemblance theory of representation in both music and abstract 
painting: the requirement that something must look like or sound like the thing it 
represents, that is, iconicity.
To avoid the representation collapsing into the thing it represents, Richard 
Wollheim, in his Art and its Objects, argues that ‘seeing in’ a painting consists of 
being aware at one and the same time of the painted surface and the representation 
that lies behind it (a la Scruton).17 The viewer, then, chooses to see something in 
amongst the surface details despite their possible (and probable) artificiality vis-a-vis 
the thing or object represented; they accept the fiction whilst being cognizant of its 
construction.
Roger Scruton makes similar points in his Art and Imagination, holding that 
the purpose of representation is ‘to guide the imagination’ so that the thoughts 
engendered ‘may be essentially bound up with the perception of an aesthetic object, in 
the manner of “seeing as’” .18 But, finding fault with Goodman’s semantic theory of 
the symbolic nature of art, Scruton sees this as reducing it down to mere ‘semaphor
16 Jenefer Robinson, ‘Music as a Representational Art’, in What is Music? An Introduction to the 
Philosophy o f Music, ed. Philip Alperson (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 
170 (italics original).
17 See Richard Wollheim, Art and its Objects, 2nd edn with six supplementary essays (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1980), 212-13.
18 Scruton, Art and Imagination: a Study in the Philosophy o f Mind (London: Methuen, 1974), 190.
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[s/c] signals’.19 Instead, Scruton argues that for a painting to represent, it is necessary 
to understand the ‘artist’s intention’.
This intention reveals itself in the painterly conventions and traditions that the 
artist chooses to use. Moreover, a written indication in the form of the painting’s title 
provides ‘some instruction as to how [it] should be seen’.20 And so it is with music: 
the title might be thought of as providing some direction to how the music should be 
heard and thus helps us hear in the music the representation of the painting (the 
composer’s intention), while the musical attributes that the composer presents may 
steer our imagination in this direction by characterising something about the painting. 
Terry Eagleton, describing the theory of the American hermeneuticist E. D. Hirsch Jr, 
writes that ‘[a]n author’s intention is itself a complex “text”, which can be debated, 
translated and variously interpreted just like any other’.21 Nonetheless, Scruton asserts 
that,
representation in literature is like representation in painting in that it is partly dependent on the 
author’s intentions. Since the intentions are realized, if at all, in language, and since the 
language o f literature is, in general, the language o f the readers o f literature, it might seem that 
there should be little discrepancy between the intention and the final result. But once again, 
we must remember that what is represented in literature is not only the gross outlines of 
human life, but also the fine details -  shades o f behaviour, and complexities of motive. 
Awareness o f an author’s intention can be an important guide in our thought of these elusive 
things.22
This quotation illuminates an important and subtle aspect of a representation, that of 
the determinacy of meaning. Scruton alludes here to the fact that the text could be
19 Ibid., 196.
20 Ibid., 199.
21 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory, an Introduction. 2nd edn (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 60.
22 Scruton, Art and Imagination, 206.
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interpreted in multiple ways, and the finer details are only revealed through this extra 
or ‘meta’ text that we are calling authorial intention -  it is this which directs us. So, in 
a novel, for example, the aggregate of a character’s motives helps us make sense of all 
of the various strands of that particular narrative.
Applying this to musical representation, Scruton sees no reason to believe that 
music should not represent in the same manner as painting; however, the resulting 
comprehension is different. In Debussy’s La Mer, he argues, the title enables us to 
hear ‘enormous power and tension in the musical line, comparable to the invisible 
straining of a quiet sea. But what is represented is something inaudible. Can we say, 
then, that we hear the music as the slow swell of the sea?’ In other words, it is we that 
are imaginatively ascribing qualities to our experience of a fictional sea in the music; 
hearing such forces in the musical line is an imaginative act involving the transference 
of properties from one domain to another, as in metaphor. Scruton explains that there 
‘is no absurdity in supposing that I could hear the tension in the musical line while 
being unaware that it represents the sea. Representation does not determine our 
understanding of music in the way that it determines our understanding of painting or 
prose.’ However, it seems that he contradicts his earlier postulations regarding 
intentionality -  the idea that once we know the author’s intention we can appreciate 
and detect subtleties of a text or painting that were hitherto hidden. For here, those 
subtleties, in the form of energies that we perceive in the musical line, are at least in 
part determined thus by the authorial intention, provided by the title, of wishing the 
listener to hear the sea.
Elsewhere, Scruton writes that,
23 Ibid., 210 (italics original).
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A passage o f music may seem to carry some reference to grief, say, or to a flight o f birds, or to 
something one knows not what. Characteristic o f such reference is the frequent difficulty one 
has in putting the ‘thoughts’ conveyed by the music into words. A man may feel that 
something is being said by the music, but be quite unable to say what it is. But this inability is 
in no way a sign that he has not understood the music. Here we may wish to speak not of 
representation but rather o f expression. Characteristic o f expression is the presence of 
‘reference’ without predication. Sadness is expressed by the music but nothing is said about 
the sadness, or the flight o f birds is made ‘present’ in the music, but is not described there.24
But, that music can only refer and not predicate seems intuitively wrong. For surely 
this is where music excels best: if music expresses something, must it not be 
characterised or described in a musical way? Reference to extra-musical things 
presents music with the greatest challenge, and this is in part the job of the title of a 
piece. Scruton’s says that ‘nothing is said about the sadness’, but surely the sadness 
would have characteristics that we could discuss, such as its depth or seriousness? 
Many pieces of music are referred to as sad, and their musical ‘descriptions’ of this 
sadness are often wildly different. For example, the sadness described by Ravel’s 
piano piece Pavane une infante defunte seems markedly different to that described by 
the fourth movement of Tchaikovsky’s Pathetique Symphony, yet it would be 
acceptable to call both pieces ‘sad’.
Following Nelson Goodman, Robinson writes that when a piece of music 
represents something, ‘it seems to characterize, “describe” or attribute qualities to it, 
rather than copy or resemble it. Just as pictures describe the world, and get us to see it 
in new and interesting ways, so too does some music’. In this way, the musical 
representation could be said to have both cognitive and aesthetic value because it 
affects the way we experience it. The music by itself cannot point to a particular
24 Scruton, ‘Representation in Music’, Philosophy, 51 (1976), 281 (italics original).
25 Robinson, ‘Music as a Representational Art’, 179.
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individual or thing, but once we become apprised of the subject of the music through 
the title, passages of music are able to represent in similar ways to pictures ‘as 
predicates in schemes of predication’.26 A painting, for example, describes its subject 
through its execution or facture: the thickness and opacity of paint in one of Claude 
Monet’s water-lily paintings provides an inimitable impressionistic sensuality.
Accordingly, the title provides a subject and the music says something about 
the subject that is open to proof or disproof: its characterisation is up for measuring 
against a standard that we set from the sum total of all our experiences. This claim 
counters Scruton’s assertion above that music is not propositional, and qualifies it for 
representational status. Moreover, it would seem logical to surmise that part of our 
aesthetic understanding of a piece of so-called representational music rests on how 
well the music ‘fits’ its title or programme.
3.3 Projection
There is, of course, no definitive way of tying our perceptions to a single conception. 
The writer cannot guarantee the imaginations enacted by his reader any more than the 
composer can through his musical and textual cues. They can, however, encourage a 
particular selection, or privilege a certain viewpoint. It is not the fact that we misread 
the textual or programmatic instructions, but the result of the unique imaginings that 
listeners undergo in the face of any stimuli that means that each set of guidelines will 
be interpreted in a particular way. Moreover, this is not the same as saying that all 
meaning is relativistic and subject to the whims of the listener; there must be certain 
ways of anchoring a general perception. In this way, we might consider the idea of 
projection.
26 Ibid., 180.
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E. H. Gombrich, in his book Art and Illusion (1960), writes about the idea of 
concepts affecting our perception:
[T]he postulate o f an unbiased eye demands the impossible. It is the business o f the living 
organism to organize, for where there is life there is not only hope, as the proverb says, but 
also fears, guesses, expectations which sort and model the incoming messages, testing and 
transforming and testing again. The innocent eye is a myth.27
In other words, if we think of the world which is available to any one of our senses -  
or, indeed, combinations thereof -  the cognitive psychologists long ago demonstrated 
that perception involves selective attention. It is obviously not possible to consciously 
attend to all of the incoming stimuli which bombard us in our daily lives. Instead, we 
must decide what is important in our immediate perceptual fields and leave 
unattended those stimuli deemed to be unnecessary to an effective perceptual 
experience. Of course, in order to parse the stimuli in this way, all of the stimuli must 
be attended to at some level, such as their physical characteristics.
The British psychologist Colin Cherry demonstrated this effectively in his 
‘cocktail party’ problem in 1953,28 whereby we can suddenly switch attention to a 
conversation across a noisy room if we hear our name, suggesting that we have been 
attending all along to all of the conversations at some level. But the mechanism of 
selective attention has allowed only our name to pass through its filter into conscious 
attention. Accordingly, the very act of selective attention suggests some kind of 
interpretative strategy; even at a base level, a set of criteria exist which allow us to 
attend to some stimuli whilst attenuating others.
27 E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: a Study in the Psychology o f Pictorial Representation, 5th edn 
(London: Phaidon, 1992), 251.
28 Cited in Michael W. Eysenck and Mark T. Keane, Cognitive Psychology: a Student’s Handbook, 5th 
edn (Hove: Psychology Press, 2005), 142-43.
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In the third part of his book, Gombrich writes about the beholder’s input in the 
perception of images, and he calls this ‘illusion’ (hence the title of his book). The first 
examples he provides involve the phenomenon of seeing faces in the clouds and the 
Rorschach test. He uses these to demonstrate ‘our, the beholder’s, share in the 
reading of the artist’s image’ and how ‘[w]hat we read into these accidental shapes [of 
clouds and inkblots] depends on our capacity to recognize in them things or images 
we find stored in our minds’. In this way, we also see images, or illusions, in both 
pointillist and impressionist paintings too, for the former is constructed from myriad 
tiny dots of colour, while impressionist works are characterised by hazy or indistinct 
textures. Perhaps, through the analogous mechanism of processing clouds into faces, 
what we have here is a similar ‘reading-in’ of an image, through the projection of 
schemata and imagery already available to us.
Part of this process is described effectively by the Gestalt psychologists, 
whereby we perceive an organised whole as more than the sum of its individual parts, 
as evidenced by the reification that takes place in the face-in-the-cloud phenomenon. 
Such materialization can only occur through what the Gestalt theorists call the law of 
Pragnanz, a principle of organization by which perceived or experienced forms tend 
towards meaningful wholes that are increasingly better defined, stable, simpler and 
more coherent.31 Accordingly, Gombrich argues that the perception of art occurs 
through the world of illusion; that is, we see or read in images coherent shapes and 
realities that are not ‘there’ in any objectively given sense.
29 Designed and developed by the Swiss psychiatrist Hermann Rorschach (1884-1922), it is a 
personality test in which a standard set o f inkblots are presented to the subject who is asked to describe 
what they suggest or resemble. OED online, s.v. ‘Rorschach’ [accessed 21 January 2008].
30 Gombrich, Art and Illusion, 155.
31 Paraphrased from Arthur S. Reber, The Dictionary o f Psychology (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), 
301, 564.
124
Although Gombrich’s exposition on this subject focuses on the visual world 
alone, it seems to me that the mechanism and process of illusion is also valid for our 
purposes in the exploration of MaP, for some of the terms he uses seem relevant to 
this music too. For example, he writes about the ‘test of consistency’, which he 
describes as the ‘possibility of classifying the whole of an image within a possible 
category of experience’. This involves ‘reading’ an image based on any situational 
clues that may inform us of its meaning, and testing the consistency of these against 
any subsequent expectations that these interpretations yield. It therefore becomes 
propositional -  subject to proof or disproof. He elsewhere describes this process of 
‘reading’ an image as ‘testing it for its potentialities, trying out what fits’,33 which 
point reminds us of the inherent ambiguity of all perception. So, in our case, if the 
music fits the context of the remembered painting, then the representation becomes 
tenable.
Gombrich asserts that,
All representation relies to some extent on what we have called ‘guided projection’. When we 
say that the blots and brushstrokes of the impressionist landscapes ‘suddenly come to life’, we 
mean we have been led to project a landscape into these dabs o f pigment.34
These notions are of course based on the principle that perception is always 
interpretative: we are always trying to make sense of our perceptions from the best 
guess predicated on our experiences. From this vantage point we can project ourselves
32 Gombrich, Art and Illusion, 200.
33 Ibid., 190-91.
34 Ibid., 170.
125
imaginatively into the artwork, and the resulting perception would be described as the 
‘good gestalt’, or the ‘pattern that supersedes all others’.35
In a related way, Roger Scruton has written that ‘ [m]uch of music criticism 
consists of the deliberate construction of an intentional object from the infinitely 
ambiguous instructions implicit in a sequence of sounds’. This notion of an 
‘intentional object’ is taken from Husserl and Sartre’s phenomenological formulations 
about the directedness of our consciousness and is here used by Scruton to refer to the 
selective attention of our musical perception when we choose to hear sound as
T7music. This also has similarities with the Russian Formalists’ term ‘foregrounding’, 
which refers to the way our acts of perception ‘foreground’ or privilege some aspects 
of the object and ‘background’ or suppress others. Scruton argues that whilst for 
representational art, the ‘intentional characteristic’ of a painting and the meaning of a
o
sentence are ‘publicly recognised facts’, these ‘facts’ are not available in the 
musical realm. However, it would seem likely that Gombrich would take exception to 
the idea of ‘publicly recognised facts’ in a painting, as he makes strenuous efforts to 
exemplify the ambiguities inherent in works of art and naturally occurring 
phenomena, such as the clouds discussed above. Notwithstanding these perceptual 
ambiguities in visual art, most perceivers would collectively recognise certain 
actualisations other than the ones they have individually ‘read in’ or projected.
35 David Macey, The Penguin Dictionary o f Critical Theory (London: Penguin, 2000), s.v. ‘Gestalt’, 
160.
36 Scruton, The Aesthetic Understanding: Essays in the Philosophy o f Art and Culture (London: 
Methuen, 1983), 88.
37 Scruton, The Aesthetics o f Music (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 78.
38 Scruton, The Aesthetic Understanding, 67.
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3.4 Music as Metaphor
The mechanism of metaphor extends concepts beyond their field of literal application 
to a new referential field, and thus describes that new sphere. This convention is so 
ingrained in our language about music that we seldom notice it. Scruton argues that 
‘our ways of hearing sound that we consider to be ways of hearing music are based in 
concepts extended by metaphorical transference’. By this he means that the spatial 
metaphors we use to talk about music -  such as tones having movement, melodies 
having certain characteristics such as up and down or moving away from and towards, 
and simultaneous groups of pitches sounding full or hollow -  are all figurative. An 
intentional understanding, he maintains, considers the world as an ‘intentional object’, 
-  a Husserlian Lebenswelt. The connections and observations we make in our 
perceptions of the world are therefore already implicit in the concepts that we use.
The idea of an ‘intentional object’ offers a way, Naomi Cumming argues, of 
‘describing how the understanding of a perceiver is implicated in the content ascribed
, 40to a percept.
In Scruton’s words:
It seems then that in our most basic apprehension o f music there lies a complex system of 
metaphor, which is the true description of no material fact. And the metaphor cannot be 
eliminated from the description of music, because it is integral to the intentional object of 
musical experience. Take this metaphor away and you cease to describe the experience of
• 41music.
For Scruton, the fact that this intentional object is also conceptual leads to the very 
essence of what music is. Accordingly, there is a distinction to be made between the
39 Ibid., 78.
40 Naomi Cumming, ‘Metaphor in Roger Scruton’s Aesthetics of Music’, in Theory, Analysis and 
Meaning in Music, ed. Anthony Pople (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 4.
41 Roger Scruton, The Aesthetic Understanding, 85.
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actual and the metaphorical sounds caused by the intentional object. Somehow, we 
hear sounds differently that have been conceptualised in this metaphorical manner, 
otherwise all we would hear is a series of unconnected sounds that do not possess the 
gravitational attraction that we typically ascribe to them: ‘to talk of tones is already to 
talk at the sophisticated level of musical phenomenology.’42
That music ‘belongs uniquely to the intentional sphere, and not to the material 
realm’43 means, for Scruton, that we cannot eliminate metaphor from our descriptions 
of music. And this is what makes the distinction between sound and music: our 
musical understanding is governed by concepts in response to the unfolding musical 
object. Significantly, though, Scruton is here conflating the idea of ‘concept’ with a 
phenomenological perception of music -  the idea of musical space is, as we have said 
previously, not merely an abstract, geometrical one, but one that is grounded in the 
body and available to us from our own activities in the world. Evidently, this position 
accords with his view of music as something which is non-representational and 
unaffected by such things as a programme. Moreover, this is obviously not the whole 
story, for music itself can provide a certain imaginative context woven from within 
this intentional sphere that we construct. Thus, a given chord in a particular harmonic 
progression will sound markedly different depending on its musical context; it might 
sound doleful in one piece and purposeful in another, for example. However, 
consistent with the metaphoric transference that Scruton bestows upon our bodily 
engagement with the phenomenological perception of music (Clifton, of course, 
would deny that it was metaphorical), what we are proposing here is that the image of
42 Ibid., 83.
43 Ibid., 93.
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the painting may also be regarded as a conceptual field: the listener conceives ideas 
from within that image and projects these onto the musical experience.44
Scruton has written that ‘[representation is not like ostension, to represent an 
object is to convey a thought about it’.45 Extending a concept borrowed from Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Scruton writes about ‘transitive’ and ‘intransitive’ forms of expression, 
the former referring to a direct object, and the latter having no such object.46 Hence, a 
piece of music may be said to be expressive of sadness, and we find inter-subjective 
agreement for this expression, but sad about what or whom? Accordingly, music 
remains intransitive, without a proper object or person onto which this sadness can be 
ascribed -  until, that is, such an object is provided in the shape of a programme or 
title. As Goodman writes, ‘Reference to an object is a necessary condition for 
depiction or description of it, but no degree of resemblance is a necessary or sufficient 
condition for either.’47 Thus in MaP it would seem that we need the image of the 
painting and its attendant concepts to instantiate any possible ‘facts’ in the first place. 
The transference of concepts from one working field to another involves the ideation 
engendered by the painting providing a way of ‘hearing in’ the musical sphere. 
Through this mediation, the new field provides a conceptual framework to describe 
and understand the musical experience.
44 It is important to mention here that Naomi Cumming and Michael Spitzer have both criticised 
Scruton’s theory of metaphor in music. Cumming has addressed the fact that Scruton’s ascription of 
spatial and motional terms to music are not genuine metaphors, for they contain a material foundation 
in the sounds themselves, casting his notion of an ‘intentional object’ into question. Michael Spitzer 
argues that the listener has no choice in hearing the tone in this way. Moreover, the ineluctability of 
space and motion terms in describing the music as it is perceived rules out the possibility of choice and 
hence o f an active interpretation. Thus, it seems that judging how much a listener’s perception is under 
their volitional control is open to question. See Cumming, ‘Metaphor in Roger Scruton’s aesthetics of 
music’, 3-28; and Michael Spitzer, Metaphor and Musical Thought (Chicago and London: University 
of Chicago Press, 2004), 83-85. Although their discussions suggest that spatial and motional terms 
have a more literal application than Scruton’s account of metaphor allows, it will not be my intention to 
explore these any further here, for it was only my goal to demonstrate the idea that music may be seen 
as something we ‘intend’, and something we live through the Lebenswelt.
45 Ibid., 65.
46 See Scruton, The Aesthetic Understanding, 53.
47 Nelson Goodman, Languages o f Art, 40.
129
So far, then, we have discussed processes where the intention of a composer, 
critic or listener may affect the listening experience. This intention manifests itself 
generally in the musical title or in any writing about the music, whether it is from the 
composer or by a critic, and such intention is evident in the ways we listen. Hence, in 
the music under scrutiny here, that intention can be neatly summed up as intending 
the painting in some way. We have also examined how expectation generated by, for 
example, a title encourages us to hear in the piece a representation or other extra­
musical world, leading Roger Scruton to the observation, already quoted, that 
criticism consists in the ‘deliberate construction of an intentional object from the
A O
infinitely ambiguous instructions implicit in a sequence of sounds’. The listener, 
then, forms a musical impression of the imagined painting from a premeditated 
selection of musical attributes; he or she has become, circumstantially, preconditioned 
to perform such an act.
Nicholas Cook makes a similar, but more oblique point in his book Music, 
Imagination and Culture (1990) when he writes: ‘One might even maintain that 
whereas critical interpretation is or can be intrinsic to the literary experience, the 
meaning that a critic discovers in a piece of music arises not from the music 
experience as such, but from the critical reflection about it; that is, the meaning is not 
musical but musicological.’49 For Scruton, something is made from the ambiguous 
sounds by the listener -  a configurative construction -  and for Cook, meaning is made 
at the point of effect for the listener, as we saw for Wolfgang Iser’s reader in the last 
chapter. Accordingly, this continues the theme that meaning is not something to be 
found in the music: it is something that is made by the musical experience itself and
48 Scruton, The Aesthetic Understanding, 88.
49 Nicholas Cook, Music, Imagination and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 173 (italics 
original).
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our critical reflections about it -  meditations, of course, which would be denied by 
phenomenologists.
Marion A. Guck, in her essay ‘Two Types of Metaphoric Transfer’,50 
identifies two modes of analogical thinking which she classifies as comparative 
metaphor: the ‘direct comparison of single features in two different conceptual 
domains’ and ascriptive metaphor, defined as an ‘interpretation of a complex of 
features in one domain as similar to the structure of such a complex in a second 
domain’. She argues that ‘if music is expressive of other experience, it is because of 
similarity of conceptual structure’.51 Perhaps, though, it would be more accurate to 
say that music has the potential to share in the structural similarity (once the 
conceptual frame has been extended to its domain through the music’s title) rather 
than that it possesses conceptual structure immanently. A piece of music cannot be a 
concept like ‘dog’ or ‘chair’, say, until it has that concept applied to it through a title; 
it can then absorb the complex of features which the title conceptualises -  in our case, 
drawn from the painting. Like Scruton before her, Guck explains how even the 
technical language surrounding music is embedded in the use of spatial metaphors:
[I]f we wish to speak of music, we must speak in spatial terms. Thus, in tonal music lines rise 
and fall in registral space, and the root identifies a chord with a pitch at the bottom of its third 
stack. Though these notions are thought literally true o f music, their sources are metaphoric; 
and the remnants o f those sources are still discernible: such terms are music-literal.52
Adducing the metaphorical example of an arching line stretching over 
Chopin’s Prelude in B minor, Opus 28, she argues that it becomes a viable way of
50 Marion A. Guck, ‘Two Types of Metaphoric Transfer’, in Metaphor: a Musical Dimension, ed. 
Jamie C. Kassler (Sydney: Currency Press, 1991), 1-12.
51 Ibid., 1.
52 Ibid., 2 (italics original).
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hearing the piece and that, although the notion of an arch is a ‘plain, even dull, image 
[...] once suggested, notions of arches worked their way into my hearing of the 
Prelude, began to proliferate and to direct my attention to more and more refined 
details of the music, while gathering those details into their conceptual nets’.53 
Accordingly, the critical intention of the arch enables the hearing of previously 
unheard aspects. Hence, recognisable features of the arch image in both domains are 
correlated; of course, one of those domains involves us correlating the audible with 
the visible -  that is, the printed score. Guck explains that such a comparative 
metaphor is more straightforward in ‘delimiting the relevant features of an analogy 
and, thus, implying, relatively clearly, its extension’. On the other hand, treating the 
arch as an ascriptive metaphor is less clearly limited but therefore ‘promises a greater 
wealth of transference’.54 As it involves a complex of features, however, rather than 
ones which are moment to moment, it does require greater powers of imagination to 
conjoin the metaphorical image with the music.
What all of this amounts to is to demonstrate the potentially creative and 
performative act of listening to music. Here we are provided with the concept of an 
arch -  the kind of integrative gestural understanding often employed in music 
pedagogy -  and it provides a way of playing, hearing, analysing and understanding 
the music in various arch-conceived ways. Our musical experience, then, is 
assimilated under this image, whether it is through direct comparison (comparative 
metaphor) or through sharing complexes of features (ascriptive metaphor). We will 
see in the case studies which comprise Part II of this dissertation that many of the 
analyses also involve both these levels of metaphor -  what we might also refer to as 
first and second order aspects respectively.
53 Ibid., 7.
54 Ibid., 9.
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Amy Bauer, like Scruton and Guck before her, argues that to hear sounds as 
music goes beyond parsing a musical work’s self-referential details, such as the 
musical relations, ‘but relies on the necessary mediation of metaphor’. For Scruton, 
music is an intentional experience and ‘to describe it we must have recourse to 
metaphor, not because music resides in an analogy, but because the metaphor 
describes exactly what we hear, when we hear sounds as music’.56 We are therefore 
always dealing with a critical and conceptual interpretation of music in the first 
instance in discussing something that is figurative, albeit generated in collaboration 
with the object’s sonic properties. It would seem, then, that imagination is 
fundamental to this experience we call ‘music’, enabling listeners to entertain the 
possible but not yet realised or actualised experiences.
3.5 Cross-Domain Mapping and MaP
In discussing the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur’s ideas on metaphor, Leonard 
Lawlor writes: ‘That referents can be described implies, for Ricoeur, that the 
referential field can extend beyond things which are directly accessible. In other 
words, we can describe what we cannot normally see.’ And the fundamental reason 
why we are invoking the mechanism of metaphor here is because we cannot see the 
painting in its absence. The painting’s status, then, is figurative rather than literal, yet 
it is still able to exert its influence because it has become metaphorically attached to 
the music. Ricoeur himself argues that,
55 Amy Bauer, ‘Tone-Color, Movement, Changing Harmonic Planes: Cognition, Constraints and 
Conceptual Blends in Modernist Music’, in The Pleasure o f Modernist Music: Intention, Meaning, and 
the Compositional Avant-Garde, ed. Arved Ashby (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 
2004), 122. See also Lawrence M. Zbikowski, Conceptualizing Music: Cognitive Structure, Theory, 
and Analysis (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), for a metaphorical 
understanding o f musical meaning.
56 Scruton, The Aesthetics o f Music, 96 (italics original).
57 Leonard Lawlor, Imagination and Chance: the Difference Between the Thought o f Ricoeur and 
Derrida (New York: State University of New York Press, 1992), 31.
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Metaphorical discourse exploits this possibility by working in two fields. In metaphorical 
discourse, ordinary discourse’s same twofold aim fulfils itself by transferring predicates 
already functioning in one familiar field to a new referential field which it then tries to 
describe. In other words, metaphor uses sedimented predicates to describe new experiences, 
experiences o f new “things.”58
In this way, metaphor augments experience. Thus, if the title and the painting are 
considered as an existing referential field with sedimented predicates, perhaps they 
can be seen as describing this new experience of music, for metaphor too is based on 
signifiers that are not attached to the thing they describe -  they are only attached 
imaginatively. Ricoeur explains that the ‘new field’ exerts an attraction or 
‘gravitational pull’ on the ‘sedimented’ predicates, which is possible because meaning 
or the sense of a word is itself dynamic, evidenced by the fact that a metaphor can 
transform itself and describe these new referential fields. Lawlor asserts that, for 
Ricoeur, ‘[t]he new combination (or synthesis) of the metaphor’s predicative structure 
induces an image in which the pertinent characteristics of the subject and predicate 
(that is, their categories) merge to disclose something new’ and hence ‘the 
metaphorical event is an advent of meaning: it is a live metaphor’.59
Accordingly, a newly emergent meaning in MaP becomes available by 
transferring predicates already functioning in the field of the painting to the new 
referential field of the music. Lawrence E. Marks writes regarding the functioning of 
metaphor: ‘[the secret] lies in the fact that once an analogy is made between A and B, 
a whole gamut of associated meanings also becomes available. Not only is B like A in 
a certain way, but any and all of A’s properties now become fair game to be absorbed
58 Paul Ricoeur, The Rule o f Metaphor, trans. Robert Czerny (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1978), 296-97.
59 Lawlor, Imagination and Chance, 68-69.
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into B.’60 So the very fact of making an analogy between the painting and music 
enables other, perhaps less ‘well-fitting’ attributes to make the choppy crossing across 
the straits from the visual to the auditory domain. This is a good way of understanding 
why, from a reception-orientated standpoint, it does not matter whether a painting’s 
title is borrowed retrospectively for a composition: the listener will create the 
associations if the relevant attributes are there.
Nicholas Cook writes that this transference of similarities can only occur by 
virtue of an ‘enabling similarity’. In clarifying his position he cites George Lakoff and 
Mark Johnson’s metaphor ‘love is war’ taken from their seminal book Metaphors We 
Live By, explaining that this metaphor becomes meaningful because love and war 
have attributes in common; therefore love possesses a ‘potential for change’ that 
enables a new meaning to emerge.61 In this sphere, metaphorical transference is said 
to function only when the two subjects possess or have a potential for similarity. And 
for Cook this is only the first step; he writes: ‘it is only by virtue of what is 
“commensurable” -  that is, enabling similarity -  that signification can be drawn out of 
heterogeneity, and only by virtue of the “divergence” of media that there is anything 
for the similarity to enable.’62 Thus, commonalities that love and war share -  ‘he is 
gaining ground with her’, ‘she resisted his advances’ -  make any further divergence 
credible.
Accordingly, metaphors are not a mere adjunct to language, a poetic or 
rhetorical device, they are actually integral to the way we think, perceive, act and live. 
This, of course, is what Scruton is really driving at too: understanding sound using 
spatial metaphors actually helps construct the musical experience in the first place.
60 Unity o f the Senses: Interrelations Among the Modalities (New York: Academic Press, 1978), 252- 
53, quoted in Cook, Analysing Musical Multimedia, 69-70.
61 See Cook, Analysing Musical Multimedia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 70.
62 Ibid., 81.
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Lakoff and Johnson write that the essence of metaphor is 4 understanding and 
experiencing one kind o f thing in terms o f another’. Thus, the metaphor concept 
‘argument is war’ structures what we do and how we understand our actions when 
engaged in an argument: we attack positions, we win or lose an argument, we see a 
position that is indefensible, it has weak defences, we can try a new line of attack and 
gain ground, we can advance or retreat, and so on. Hence, metaphor is not just in the 
words we use but in our very concept of argument and the way we perform during 
such an event; ‘human thought processes are largely metaphorical’,64 they write.
The notion of a conceptual framework via the painting (and ‘hearing as’) can 
also be enriched through the work on conceptual metaphor by Lakoff and Johnson. 
The authors argue that through metaphor we are able to understand one conceptual 
domain in terms of another. That is, we have a source domain from which we draw 
metaphorical expressions and a target domain which we are trying to understand. 
Mapping occurs from the source to the target domain, hence the term ‘cross-domain 
mapping’, and in the process characteristics belonging to one domain are projected 
onto another. It is clear, therefore, that metaphor provides a new way of understanding 
and experiencing a target domain. Thus, if we generate the metaphor ‘music is 
painting’ then the music becomes the target domain in need of comprehension, and 
painting is the source domain from which we draw concepts and experience in order 
to accomplish that understanding. In this way, we can say the music is comprehended 
after the painting.
Through the spatial operation of many of our most enduring metaphors, which 
centralise our bodies in the experiences that they afford, we may also be able to 
reconcile these ideas with the bodily foundations of our knowledge, as posited by
63 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 
1980), 5 (italics original).
64 Ibid., 5-7 (italics original).
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Thomas Clifton’s phenomenology. Lakoff and Johnson note that the meaning of a 
sentence is given in terms of a conceptual structure, and that most of the conceptual 
structure of a natural language is metaphorical in nature. This conceptual structure, 
they argue,
is grounded in physical and cultural experience, as are the conventional metaphors. Meaning, 
therefore, is never disembodied or objective and is always grounded in the acquisition and use 
of a conceptual system.65
The fact that such things as happiness, status and control are orientated by spatial 
concepts such as up and down -  ‘he is on the up’ or ‘she has climbed the corporate 
ladder quickly’ -  demonstrate the bodily orientation within them. Similarly, as we 
saw previously, time is often thought of in spatial metaphorical terms: ‘time is a 
moving object’ (it travels through space) and ‘time is money’66 (it is an amount). 
Scruton holds that, in the ‘acousmatic experience’ -  the detachment of the sound from 
its circumstances of production -  ‘temporal order is dissolved and reconstituted as a 
phenomenal space \ 67 Thus, the spatial comprehension of music elicits a particular 
experience of time, and one grounded in our bodily orientations. In this way, Mark
/'O
Johnson, in his book The Body in the Mind, puts forward the idea that ‘image 
schemas’ emerge from our bodily interactions with the world around us and are 
therefore pre-linguistic. Johnson argues that these embodied patterns structure our 
experience and make possible conceptual metaphor mappings.
It is also in the act of comprehending a metaphor that something new is 
potentially created, what Ricoeur, in The Rule o f Metaphor, calls a ‘live metaphor’. In
65 Ibid., 197.
66 Ibid., 118.
67 Scruton, The Aesthetics o f Music, 75 (italics original).
68 Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind: the Bodily Basis o f  Meaning, Imagination, and Reason 
(Chicago and London: University o f Chicago Press, 1987).
this formulation, metaphor is not merely a rhetorical or tropical device but actually 
generates meaning. Lakoff and Johnson cite the example of a chemical metaphor -  
‘the solution to my problems’ -  given to them by a student that interpreted this as a 
large volume of bubbling liquid which dissolved some problems while precipitating 
out others.69 The authors ‘see this as a clear case of the power of metaphor to create a 
reality rather than simply to give us a way of conceptualizing a pre-existing reality’.70 
The chemical metaphor is not simply a way of thinking abstractly about a problem, 
but, by means of its concept, it reveals a new way of actually processing a difficulty. 
The words alone do not change reality, but the ensuing changes which take place in 
our conceptual system do change what we experience and perceive and how we act 
upon those perceptions.
Lakoff and Johnson argue that ‘truth’ is relative to understanding, and our 
understanding of situations occurs from interactions with our conceptual systems; 
therefore truth is a function of our conceptual systems. And because metaphors are 
conceptual, they are seen as essential to our understanding of the world and its objects 
and for creating new meanings which did not exist before. Viewed this way, we may 
apply propositions to MaP which are subject to proof or disproof. This ‘truth’, then, is 
relative to the ‘subject position’ interpellated by the metaphor ‘music is this painting’. 
In this model, there cannot be objective meanings lying inherently in the music 
waiting to be uncovered in a one-way direction, since the mechanism of metaphorical 
communication demands that we are always engaged in a reciprocal relationship with 
the other experiential domain -  the painting.
One of the key aspects of Lakoff and Johnson’s work is the idea of an 
entailment relationship from a metaphor. Thus, the metaphor ‘time is money’ entails
69 See Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, 143.
70 Ibid., 144.
that time is a limited resource, which in turn entails that time is valuable -  the very 
model that capitalism seems to be founded upon. These entailments are identified by 
Guck in her projection of the arch metaphor we saw above: ‘The interaction of image 
and musical structure at each level illuminates immediate and compelling features of 
the piece, and the interactions among the different arch interpretations and their 
analyses yield both a dynamic analysis of the Prelude and a wealth of information
71about the imagery of musical description.’ Her reference is to the features entailed 
by the initially very simple image of an arch and their subsequent relations to one 
another mediated through this ascriptive metaphor. Furthermore, the ensuing dynamic 
analysis is agreeably redolent with the dynamic interaction that we observed Iser 
writing about in the previous chapter -  that is, we are reciprocally relating to the 
music through the image of the arch.
Guck writes that,
The role o f the perceiver-promoter of a visual image like the arch shape is that of observer of 
an external object. Directly observable features of the image are correlated with directly 
observable features of the musical work. Each feature may undergo metaphoric 
reinterpretation as even music-literal terms [spatial notions o f up and down] do, but each is 
directly perceivable in both domains.72
The imaginative act of seeing and hearing the arch metaphor highlights something 
crucial to our discussion of MaP: namely, that something extra-musical, and visual, is 
able to shape our perceptions of the music. And so it is with our case studies in Part 
II: the painting, as an external object, contains both metaphoric and literal visual 
images that we use to parse the musical object. It is precisely this mechanism that
71 Guck, ‘Two Types of Metaphoric Transfer’, 4.
72 Ibid., 7.
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occupies Scruton’s spatial metaphors and also Lakoff and Johnson’s view of the 
metaphoric structuring of our experience. For Scruton this is objectively what music 
is: ‘an intentional object of an experience that only rational beings can have, and only 
through the exercise of the imagination.’ Roman Ingarden also posits this view 
when he writes that ‘a musical work is not a real but a purely intentional object and, 
strictly speaking, one of a higher order’.74 Scruton’s explanation that music is an 
intentional object is based on the idea that to hear tones instead of mere sounds we 
have to organise and order them as music: ‘What is to count as music depends upon
•J C
our decision; and it is a decision made with a purpose in mind.’ In this way, we may 
consider the listening experience of MaP to have both decision and purpose in a 
suitably primed listener.
This line of thinking is similar to the one asserted by Thomas Clifton that 
‘music is not a fact or thing in the world, but a meaning constituted by human 
beings’.76 It also gives support to Clifton’s claim that his is an objective account of 
musical experience, since it purports to describe the musical object adequately: how 
we subjectively experience it and how it becomes meaningful to us. Therefore, the 
ontological status of a sounding event, such as sound or music, is something which we 
ascribe to it. In other words, we intend that group of sounds to be a musical 
experience rather than random sounds emanating from an environment. Evidence for 
this presents itself in, for example, the car horn used in the song ‘Country Honk’ by 
the Rolling Stones from their 1969 album Let it Bleed. Hearing this car horn in the 
context of the rhythmic steel guitars makes of it the sort of aesthetic experience that is 
not created by hearing the same horn on our daily walk to work. The sound produced
73 Scruton, The Aesthetics o f Music, 96.
74 Roman Ingarden, The Work of Music and the Problem o f its Identity, ed. Jean G. Harrell, trans.
Adam Czemiawski (London: Macmillan, 1986), 119.
75 Scruton, The Aesthetics o f Music, 17.
76 Thomas Clifton, Music as Heard, 5.
140
by the horn does not suddenly become music, but we may intend it as music. It is 
therefore the listener who ascribes aesthetic meaning to certain sounds in particular 
contexts and not others.
Similarly, Michel Chion identifies a type of sound found in films, and indeed 
in everyday life, which he calls anempathetic.77 An example of this is found in Steven 
Spielberg’s debut movie Duel (1972). At one point in the film, we see the car driven 
by the character Mann veer dangerously off the road into a wooden fence after being 
pursued at a high speed by a large truck. Suddenly, we become aware of the country- 
and-westem music playing on his car radio; it sounds suddenly very loud in the 
aftermath of the chase, and its conspicuous indifference to the emotional state of the 
protagonist is striking. The song heard on the radio is of course recognised as music, 
but is it heard as music? It is clearly experienced in an aesthetically different way to 
an intentional hearing of the same music. It is, therefore, how we stand in relation to 
the object that determines whether it is to be listened to as music or not.
In his famous essay ‘The Death of the Author’, Roland Barthes writes that 
‘ [t]he reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are 
inscribed without any of them being lost; a text’s unity lies not in its origin but in its 
destination’. In this way, it is readers who imaginatively hold together all aspects of 
the text in a ‘single field’.78 Scruton asserts that the aesthetic description we give to 
the sound ‘is an attempt to characterize the intentional object -  that which we see,
*70hear, or understand in the work of art’, and it is here that we come to an integral part 
of the aesthetic experience: comprehension. We learn to understand the intentional
77 See Michel Chion, Audio-Vision: Sound on Screen, ed. and trans. Claudia Gorbman (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1994).
78 Roland Barthes, ‘The Death of the Author’, in Image-Music-Text, ed. and trans. Stephen Heath 
(London: Fontana, 1977), 142-48.
79 Scruton, The Aesthetics o f Music, 372 (italics original).
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object through the very distance that separates it from the material object (the actual 
sounds). Frances Berenson writes:
As long as music conveys something/anything to us then that something is represented. There 
are many kinds of representation including abstract, non-material reality. If we can talk about 
something in the music then we have a subject-matter the representation of which is in some 
way there, in the music. Music has the ability for representation of the most subtle kind, the 
kind which can only be conveyed by sounds captured in very particular tones; the subject- 
matter itself being non-material -  our shareable emotional experiences, our Lebenswelt.80 
That is what we are able to respond to in a most powerful way, that is what makes us want to 
listen to music as opposed to merely theorizing about it. Limiting ‘representation’ to the 
material world is merely legislating without any solid logical basis behind it.81
So when we speak of music we speak of something out of reach, distantiated from its 
material basis. We situate the sounds in an imaginative space and populate it with the 
phenomenal objects of our perception, and these are not the physical or actual sounds 
themselves. The subject matter has no material reality, and the way the ‘representation 
[...] is in some way there’ is in our conceptual interpretation of the sounding objects.
Roger Scruton, like Clifton before him, argues that ‘ [t]he life in music belongs 
in the musical process, abstract, indeterminate, unowned except through the act 
whereby we listeners possess it’.82 Accordingly, music is constituted within a single 
phenomenal field in our imaginations, and that is why we possess it. It is through the 
lived world (the Lebenswelt) that the percepts emanating from the musical experience 
come to belong to us; and it is also how we come to believe a particular musical 
representation is in the music, because it is the content of the musical experience
80 Lebenswelt literally translates as ‘life world’ and is a Husserlian term meaning the world as it is 
encountered in our experience, the revealed presence o f the phenomenal world, the world as lived.
81 Frances Berenson, ‘Representation and Music’, British Journal o f Aesthetics, 34/1, (1994), 65.
82 Scruton, The Aesthetics o f Music, 355.
142
which takes place from our participation -  the music is in us, and it therefore follows 
that the musical representation is in us too. Seen this way, any musical content is a 
result of our ascription and projection onto the sounds from other experiential 
domains, such as the painting indicated by a title.
3.6 From the Virtual to the Actual
Although we have now found a convenient model from which the musical 
representation of a painting may take place, from projection and imaginative action 
upon the phenomenal sounds, such a model seems to be veering dangerously towards 
a relativism that might permit us to attach any projection or imaginative ordering to 
any set of sounds. But, as we said above, it is how we stand, or listen, in relation to 
the music, mediated by the painting and its conceptual frame, that determines how the 
musical object becomes a bearer of meaning. In this way, the musical objects under 
scrutiny in Part II possess their own inherent qualities, which are founded sonically 
and represented by their musical scores. These qualities, it will be shown, have the 
potential to bear certain meanings and not others; they will, then, afford and delimit 
particular interpretations that we might project upon them from our mediations of the 
painting as referent.
Ronald Bogue cites the Swedish-bom ethologist Jakob von Uexkull’s 
influence on the thought of Deleuze and Guattari, explaining that human beings 
inhabit ‘worlds of meaning’. Bogue offers a particularly vivid example of this when 
he writes:
When von Uexktill meets a furiously barking dog on his daily walk and throws a paving stone 
toward it to scare it away, the stone does not change its physical properties, but its meaning 
for the dog does change. What had been an object functioning in the human world as a support
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for the steps of pedestrians (and probably as an indifferent feature of the ground for the dog) 
has been converted into a menacing projectile in the dog’s world, into a bearer o f meaning.83
He quotes Uexkiill: ‘It is only by way of a relation that the object is changed into a 
bearer of meaning, meaning which is conferred on it by the subject.’84 It is, then, how 
we stand in relation to an object that affects how we see it, a fact that clearly disputes 
the idea of meaning being immanent with the object. He continues, an animal ‘milieu 
constitutes a unity closed in on itself; each part of it is determined by the significance
Of
it receives for the subject of this milieu’. Hence, although it seems that we all live in 
the same universe, in fact our universe is subjectively determined in relation to 
everything else.
Recalling the monism espoused by the phenomenologists, Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari in their book A Thousand Plateaus regard this oneness of perceptual 
orientation and object as determining a singular plane:
In any case, there is a pure plane of immanence, univocality, composition, upon which 
everything is given, upon which unformed elements and materials dance that are distinguished 
from one another only by their speed and that enter into this or that individuated assemblage 
depending on their connections, their relations of movement. A fixed plane of life upon which 
everything stirs, slows down or accelerates.86
They regard philosophical concepts as taking place on this plane of immanence:
0 7
‘Concepts are events, but the plane is the horizon of events.’ Moreover, this horizon 
is ‘not a concept that is or can be thought but rather the image of thought, the image
83 Ronald Bogue, Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), 
59 (italics original).
84 Quoted in Bogue, 59.
85 Ibid.
86 Gilles Deleuze and F61ix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. and 
with a foreword by Brian Massumi (London: Continuum, 2004), 281.
87 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 36.
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thought gives itself of what it means to think, to make use of thought, to find one’s
00
bearings in thought’. So, through this image the orientation of our thoughts are 
changed as we resonate with where the imagery takes us conceptually. Engaged thus, 
‘I am no longer myself, but thought’s aptitude of thought for finding itself and 
spreading across a plane that passes through me at several places’.89 They see this as a 
‘becoming other’ and distinguish between ‘sensory becoming’ (that of aesthetic 
figures such as paintings and music) as ‘the action by which something or someone is 
ceaselessly becoming-other (while continuing to be what they are)’, and ‘conceptual 
becoming’ as ‘the action by which the common event eludes what it is’. In other 
words, the image, though belonging to a ‘conceptual becoming’, may stand apart from 
the object which it describes and which gave it existence in the first place. Thus, 
works of art may embody an event (a horizon), giving it a body, a life and a universe. 
They ‘construct their own limits, their distances and proximities, their constellations 
and the blocs of sensations they put into motion -  Rembrandt-universe or Debussy- 
universe. These universes are neither virtual nor actual; they are possibles’.90
If we take the example of Francis Bacon’s Study after Velazquez’s Portrait o f  
Pope Innocent X  (1953) (fig. 3.3) the screaming pope expresses a possible world -  
that is, until we discover the source of the scream. The face remains a sign of some as 
yet unspecified possible universe. And is this not the case in MaP? In its ‘becoming- 
other’, through our discovering the source of its utterance, the painting, the possible 
universes belonging to the music move from the virtual into the actual. Our change of 
orientation, then, is an event of actualisation. Thus, like the Bacon painting, the music 
expresses a possible world. Deleuze and Guattari write that it is an absurdity to 
believe that any language as such carries a message: ‘A language is always embedded
88 Ibid., 37.
89 Cited in Bogue, Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts, 174-75.
90 Ibid., 177.
in the faces that announce its statements and ballast them in relation to the signifiers 
in progress and the subjects concerned.’91 Thus, language is not transparent as it is 
always coextensive and contingent upon the context of its expression, that context 
being primarily the facial movements -  eye, mouth and tone of voice.
Figure 3.3: Francis Bacon, Study after Velazquez's Portrait o f Pope Innocent 
X(1953)92
Accordingly, a statement such as ‘you are a great driver’ may be meant 
literally or ironically depending on the facial context; the twist of a wry smile or the 
slant of the eyes, for example, may signal diametrically opposed meanings. Such a
91A Thousand Plateaus, 199.
92 Oil on canvas, 153 x 118 cm, Des Moines Art Center, Iowa.
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statement* then, as any other, is informed by the immediate context of its delivery, so 
if I am told this immediately after having driven through a red light then I can expect 
irony here. Hence, our ‘choices are guided by faces, elements are organised around 
faces: a common grammar is never separable from a facial education’.93 The 
expression communicated by Bacon’s painting is different, however, for we are 
missing any such context which might give clues to the scream, and we therefore have 
no choice but to intuit the source of the subject’s expression.
This would also seem particularly true of any meaning conveyed by MaP. Any 
communication here is anchored by the qualities of the musical attributes -  it is those 
qualities -  because we cannot separate out the musical face from what is being said. 
Furthermore, the unspecified universe that is the music becomes named through its 
title after the painting; hence, we now know its universe and, therefore, we know its 
context too, so we are able to connect the musical attributes to this world. Bogue 
writes: ‘The face as sign, in Deleuze’s sense of the term, is an embodied difference, 
an entity that enfolds something unknown and requires unfolding in order to be 
deciphered.’94 With MaP, then, our job is to unfold the musical attributes with respect 
to the painting’s world, for the meaning is not immanently within the music but is 
dependent upon our relation to the sonic object. Thus the sonic object may be said to 
have the potential for meaning to arise in conjunction with the relational frame of the 
painting. The meaning is embedded, therefore, in that musical face.
What is interesting about this for our purposes is the affinity posited by 
Deleuze and Guattari between the arts and philosophy: ‘In the one there is the 
constellation of a universe or affects and percepts; and in the other, constitutions of 
immanence or concepts. Art thinks no less than philosophy, but it thinks through
93 A Thousand Plateaus, 199.
94 Bogue, Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts, 111.
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affects and percepts.’95 And both strain towards an outside: concepts strain towards 
new ways of thinking, affects towards new ways of feeling, and percepts towards new 
ways of seeing and hearing. It is in this related field of forces that philosophy and the 
arts converge.
For Deleuze and Guattari, philosophy is suffused in the same driving force as 
the arts; or, as Paul Klee puts it, ‘[a]rt does not reproduce the visible but makes 
visible’.96 Significantly, for our discussion of the mechanisms involved in MaP, the 
title, as we have observed, provides a world, but it also provides a conceptual 
framework. MaP is sui generis because it provides us with three facets: sonic 
material, a literary title and a painting as referent. Within this trinity, we find a 
presentation of the virtual and the possible, together with the concept that extends 
from the painting and its title as a field of forces or a framework. It is to the question 
of how this virtual and possible becomes an actual world, how the imperceptible is 
rendered perceptible, that we must turn next. And to do this we must now address the 
meaning of concept and how metaphorical transference functions across these 
different experiential domains.
What we have thus far been trying to show in both this and the previous 
chapters is that meaning is a dynamic process, whether it is from a literary text, a 
painting, or from music. The virtual nature of these texts presents a possible world 
that invites its actualisation in ‘becoming-other’, whether our role is that of a reader, a 
viewer or a listener. Nevertheless, it is literary texts and representational paintings that 
seem to possess meaning of a non-reflexive nature; that is, meaning which does not 
necessarily reflect back upon the text itself, but points to concepts which lie outside 
the immediate remit of its own materials. And, apart from certain abstract or non-
95 Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 66.
96 Cited in Paul Klee, ‘Creative Credo’, in Notebooks, vol. 1: The Thinking Eye, ed. by Jurg Spiller, 
trans. Ralph Mannheim (New York: Overlook Press, 1992), 76-80.
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representational paintings, music alone seems to be pre-eminently self-reflexive: 
drawing our attention to the quality of its meaning-bearing units for their own sake 
and the expectations implicated by its intrinsic structure. In this way, rather than 
possessing reflexive meaning, MaP seems to acquire it along the way; that is to say, it 
accumulates meaning by standing in a particular relation to the concepts provided by 
the imagined painting.
3.7 Musical Signification
Lawrence Kramer writes that music may act like ‘a sign fragment, the signifier of a 
veiled or unrealized signified. It is not a full sign because it lacks both a referent and a 
signified, but is not merely an “empty sign” (in Kevin Barry’s phrase) because it 
could at any time have either or both’. Seemingly shifting his previous music-as- 
culturally-determined position, he argues:
But one must above all not conclude from this that music lacks meaning. On the contrary, the 
semantic fragmentation forms one basis of music’s semantic absorptiveness. The absence of 
meaning at the level o f virtual utterance is the medium at which meaning arises in the 
semantic loop. Hegel’s criterion for the sign, that it assumes a meaning foreign to its own 
nature, is precisely the one that music pointedly does not meet, or at least gives the illusion of 
not meeting. Music heard as meaningful does not seem to transmit a meaning that it signifies 
but a meaning that it exemplifies -  “as if present and incarnated.”97
So, firstly, Kramer is asserting that music lacks the classical semiotic principle of 
signifier and signified, yet it has the potential to have either or both at any time. 
Secondly, that it is this potential that gives music its ability to be meaningful -  
‘semantic absorptiveness’ as he puts it. And thirdly, music does not convey a meaning
97 Lawrence Kramer, Musical Meaning: Toward a Critical History (Berkeley and London: University 
of California Press, 2002), 156-57.
away from its sign as a word seems to do, rather it ‘exemplifies’ the meaning in and 
of itself; it is, in other words, at one and the same time the signifier and the signified. 
This is, of course, what we have been saying throughout: whatever meaning arises 
from our contact with music, it is not transparent to its medium. But, in the case of 
MaP, the music is given the task of signifying the painting, and this leaves it the job 
of self-reflexively commenting on that signification.
Kramer’s formulation bears a striking resemblance to what Roland Barthes
QQ
calls an ‘obtuse’, ‘supplementary’, or ‘third meaning’. In contrast to the ‘obvious 
meaning’ (the informational and symbolic referential levels) the third meaning is a 
‘signifier without a signified’. It refers only to the field of the signifier until, that is, it 
is able to gain significance “‘on the back” of articulated language’.99 Hence Barthes 
claims that the burlesque proportions of Ivan’s beard in Sergei Eisenstein’s film Ivan 
the Terrible assume a third meaning by underlining the absurdity and obvious falsity 
of the image, which nonetheless retains its referential and historical potency.100 In this 
way, it supplements the obvious meaning of the text or image, for it offers something 
in addition to the primary signification.
Applying this to MaP, the music contains a field of signifiers which refer self- 
reflexively to themselves. But extending this frame outwards and intersecting with the 
territory of the painting (to use the Deleuzian concept from Chapter 1), the music may 
be said to offer something of a ‘third meaning’ on the back of the obvious meanings 
within the title and the painting -  and a third meaning with signification by virtue of 
its title. Significantly, this meaning does not overwhelm the first-order meaning of the 
painting or the music, but it may add to or exceed it.
98 Roland Barthes, ‘The Third Meaning’, in The Responsibility o f Forms: Critical Essays on Music,
Art, and Representation, trans. Richard Howard (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 41— 
62.
99 Ibid., 55.
100 Ibid., 48-49.
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This apparent indeterminacy may well be one of the keys to understanding 
MaP as ‘representational’. The musical representation -  and let us call it that for the 
time being -  of the painting is always less than the painting, for it can never obviously 
be the painting, but also more than the painting precisely because it is indeterminate. 
By being unfixed and possessing ‘semantic absorptiveness’, it has a certain 
malleability which enables it to absorb a greater potential variety of meanings than the 
painting. The music, then, has potential for meaning to arise. As Nicholas Cook puts it 
in discussing multimedia:
The alignment of the other media with music, that is to say, induces a specific perceptual 
selection from its available attributes. [...] [0]ne might think o f music -  and perhaps any 
other medium -  as having potential for signification which is much broader than anything that 
can be realized in any given context. What matters, from this point of view, is not so much the 
signification that is ‘in’ the sound, but rather the potential for signification that it may support 
by virtue o f specific intersections with other media. Seen thus, signification becomes a 
function of context: it is, in a word, performative.101
Such potential for signification may be viewed as the possible worlds we discussed in 
the last section. And in ‘becoming-other’, MaP may come to signify, or at least 
designate, the painting through this ‘intersection’ with the other media. It is tempting 
to see this interaction as similar to one that might emerge when we mix an accelerant 
with a substance, but it is in the ‘single field’ of the listener that the combustion, so to
i nospeak, takes place -  like the Barthesian space where the unified text is written. 
Perhaps, therefore, it is better to think of the listener as the accelerant. MaP in these 
terms may, then, afford the existence or affordance of certain meanings. It also 
suggests that the meaning does not reside solely in the music, because it may come to
101 Cook, Analysing Musical Multimedia, 83.
102 See p. 141 above.
support and absorb certain meanings from the painting which, in turn, comment back 
on the original artwork. Above all, the theory we are describing problematizes the 
view that music communicates to us in an uncontaminated way.
The notion that language actually participates in the construction of meaning 
rather than merely reflecting transparently how things are highlights the same mode of 
being for music: a musical experience is mediated by the sound itself and thus it does 
more than simply transmit a message. If music’s sole function was to communicate a 
message from signifier to signified, then once this had been achieved it would all be 
used up and could be disregarded. The very fact that we repeatedly return to the same 
piece of music suggests that if the sound can afford the meaning, something about its 
meaning is mediated. Moreover, its aesthetic value must surely be in the experience, 
not in a transcendent meaning that we extract from the art-object, exhausting the latter 
in the process.
Cook memorably writes that ‘[p]ure music, it seems, is an aesthetician’s (and 
music theorist’s) fiction: the real thing unites itself promiscuously with any other 
media that are available’.103 But, of course, it is listeners who conjoin and marry up 
the music to a particular context -  we are the accelerant here because we make the 
connections. Writing about music in commercials, Cook asserts: ‘That is how the 
music of these commercials seems: empty of meaning, but ready to accommodate 
meaning that is aligned to it, or even to create meaning where there was none.’104 The 
music has potential then to become meaningful, and this is why it can go beyond the 
painting because what it brings to the aesthetic experience is more than either the 
painting or the music could bring in isolation. This is what Cook terms an ‘emergent
103 Cook, Analysing Musical Multimedia, 92.
104 Ibid., 96.
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property’;105 a property, then, which comes from the negotiation between two 
media.106
Edward T. Cone writes that musical gestures ‘are both meaningless and 
meaningful’:
This apparent contradiction arises, of course, from a play on words. In the same spirit we 
might also say: musical gestures lack signification, but they can be significant. Like a sigh, a 
musical gesture has no specific referent, it conveys no specific message. But like a sigh, it can 
prove appropriate to many occasions; it can fit into many contexts, which in return can explain 
its significance. The expressive content of the musical gesture, then, depends on its context. 
Deprived of context, the gesture expresses nothing; it is only potentially expressive.
This excellent example illustrates admirably what Cone terms ‘[n]o context, no
107content’. As we discussed earlier, a piece of music may be said to be expressive of 
sadness, but sad about what or whom? Without a proper object the music remains 
intransitive. Once it is given an object, however, the music has the potential to be 
subsumed with that particular context -  in our case, the painting -  it becomes, then, 
significant within that context. Because the musical gestures remain bereft of 
representational meaning without a context, we may say that they are latently 
expressive of a possible world. Once provided, however, a context explains the 
significance of a musical gesture and affords it meaning -  it is, then, no longer a 
‘signifier without a signified’.
It is important to stress, though, that the image of the context will not always 
demystify the musical structure. It depends, rather, on the enabling similarity between 
the musical object and the ideation that takes place in our imaging of the painting.
105 Ibid., 68.
106 In this description, Cook is, of course, discussing the interaction between film and music, but it 
nonetheless remains valid for the discussion of relationships between music and painting.
107 Edward T. Cone, The Composer’s Voice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 165.
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Viewing music as a ‘sign fragment’ allows it what Kramer calls ‘semantic 
absorptiveness’ because it can become the referent or the signified at any point. This 
concept of music would explain how its chameleon-like nature fits itself happily into 
numerous contexts because it can assume many roles. However, meaning only arises 
subject to the appropriateness of the music to this other context.
Kramer wrote m 1990 that music ‘must be made to yield to understanding’, 
and this, we are arguing, may be accomplished by transferring meaning from the 
image of the painting to the music. A decade later, in Musical Meaning: Towards a 
Critical History, he wrote that ‘ [interpretation joins one communicative stream with 
another so that meaning can run through both’.109 In this way, it is the mechanism of 
metaphor which provides an explanation for joining the communication streams of 
music and painting by enabling the listener to understand one domain of experience in 
terms of another. It is clear, though, that a representational (or even a non- 
representational) painting’s meaning is more readily available than musical meaning, 
and its concepts more recognisable, making it thus privileged in directing the 
interpretation.
Notwithstanding this primacy of meaning, however, Kramer observes that 
musical meaning shares something with W. J. T. Mitchell’s ‘imagetext’. The 
‘imagetext’ articulates a level of meaning which is not medium specific and in which 
words and imagery implicate, complement and reinforce each other. Accordingly, all 
media are to some extent ‘mixed’. This formulation bears similarity to Adorno’s and 
Clifton’s espousal that the phenomenal encounter with either the ‘spatial’ or the 
‘temporal’ arts implicates the essential aspects of both. Seen thus, musical meaning
108 Lawrence Kramer, Music as Cultural Practice (Berkeley and London: University of California 
Press, 1990), 5.
109 Lawrence Kramer, Musical Meaning: Towards a Critical History (Berkeley and London: University 
of California Press, 2002), 167.
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runs on what Kramer calls a ‘semantic loop’. This loop describes a process whereby 
the music both receives meaning from the imagetext but also returns meaning to it, 
and in doing so, augments and transforms it. Kramer continues: ‘The meaning-bearing 
music seems both to blend with the imagetext and envelop it, both to saturate and 
exceed it.’110 It would seem useful to think of our MaP in this way too. Under the 
condition of its appropriateness to the context of the painting, once the music has 
absorbed this new conceptual structure, it will also comment on and perhaps enrich its 
primary source.
This dynamic relationship illustrates the relational nature of meaning, and it 
also shows us how our subjectivity mediated by the painting-concept selects from the 
musical object. Like Cone’s sigh, MaP may be deemed to have signification because 
it has a specific referent which explains its significance. But, as we have said 
previously, the music always has the potential to be more than its ascription would 
suggest; it will always inform the original conceptual structure even if in an 
impoverished way. It is this relational aspect that gives the musical object its lived 
experience through our interpretation.
The reason it is useful to think of our music-painting relationship in terms of 
an imagetext is that the notion posited by Kramer is one of absence: the image implies 
an absent text and the text implies an absent image. We saw in Chapter 2 that 
perception requires the actual presence of an object, and ideation its absence, and thus 
the very absence of the painting invites our imaginative involvement and therefore our 
supplementation of the aesthetic experience. Without this mechanism the painting 
would be without consequence.
110 Ibid., 153.
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What we have been in the business of proposing, then, is a dynamic response 
theory to MaP; one where the music has the potential to bear meanings ascribed to it 
and is able to articulate itself from an interrelationship with the painting. Taking our 
lead from a number of different fields to explore how meaning or a representation 
might be generated, we have seen how there has been a shift away from the idea that 
musical meaning is immanent in the text. As Roger Scruton has compellingly 
demonstrated, music is what he calls a tertiary quality of a sounding object, for it is 
more than just a sensory perception as in the way we perceive colour,111 because to
119hear music involves the faculty of our imagination. Moreover, intentionality has 
been the thread that has bound these theories together, for were it not for our intention 
we should not be able to project, respond to, or imagine any of the meaning we see as 
ultimately belonging to the musical domain.
R. K. Elliott writes that any other way of viewing the philosophy of art
119involves an ‘objectivist Aesthetic [sic]' where we inspect and come to know an 
object through examining the intrinsic qualities of the work without the use of our 
imagination. According to this view, we are not called upon to imagine anything, but 
simply to apprehend what is there to be seen or heard. However, Elliott adds, ‘what 
constitutes a proper response to a work of art [...] may be that a work of art is 
precisely the kind of thing which calls for imaginal and personal response. One might 
say that that is its essence and its life, and that the objectivist aesthetic extols not the
111 When we see an apple as green or red, the greenness or redness is what philosophers call a 
‘secondary property’, for the colour cannot really be in the apple, for the fact that I see it depends on 
my labelling my interpretation o f the light reflecting off the apple. It could be said, though, that the 
apple possesses intrinsic properties that cause my brain to see the apple as green or red, and this must 
be the case given the considerable inter-subjective agreement in the colour judgements made by 
observers.
112 See Scruton, The Aesthetics o f  Music, 94.
113 R. K. Elliott, ‘Imagination in the Experience o f Art’, in Philosophy and the Arts: Royal Institute o f 
Philosophy Lectures, vol. 6: 1971-72, ed. Godfrey Vesey (London: Macmillan, 1973), 98.
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work itself but its husk or corpse.’114 And it is this view -  that the aesthetic experience 
of MaP is driven by our imaginative involvement -  that forms the response theory put 
forward here.
We shall now turn towards some examples of MaP in order to examine the 
mechanism and conditions that revolve around the contingency of the imagined 
painting. These conditions will involve an analysis of the musical attributes grounded 
in the score as a representation of the sonic experience, and also an examination of the 
painterly attributes to which this music ostensibly refers. The critical interpretation of 
these facets will therefore be driven by my own phenomenal experiences of both the 
music and the painting, with the latter acting as a framework for the selection of 
musical attributes. Moreover, where available, and as an additional framework for the 
interpretations that follow, this process is also enabled by the composers’ own 
writings about their subjective and compositional relationship with the painting. This 
aspect, though, is seen as secondary to the discussion of the phenomenal encounter 
with the music in the context of the painting.
114 Ibid., 103.
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Part II: The Case Studies
CHAPTER 4
Phenomenological Impressions of Time and Space in Morton Feldman’s Rothko 
Chapel
One might call [my compositions] time canvases in which I more or less prime the canvas 
with an overall hue of music.
I prefer to think o f my work as: between categories. Between Time and Space. Between 
painting and music. Between the music’s construction, and its surface.1
-  Morton Feldman
Morton Feldman’s well-known treatment of his musical scores as ‘time canvases’ 
seizes upon the metaphor that ‘music is a painting’. In this chapter, an interpretation 
of the Rothko Chapel paintings posits a frame of reference for understanding 
Feldman’s musical composition Rothko Chapel. The key questions addressed, then, 
are whether the paintings-as-metaphor provide a source domain from which to 
comprehend the musical experience, but also whether this is a necessary component 
for an effective aesthetic experience. How does the music relate to the chapel and its 
abstract paintings? What is it about this non-figurative backdrop that may enrich our 
understanding of the music? And how does music represent paintings that are 
seemingly without a subject? Furthermore, is the music able to create an experience in 
its listeners analogous to that of experiencing the chapel paintings?
In Feldman’s writings and lectures, we find an abundance of vivid rhetorical 
formulations comparing his own compositional art to that of contemporary painters. 
Feldman regarded his work as lying somewhere ‘between music and painting’. He 
claimed that he learned how to compose primarily from looking at the work of
1 Feldman, ‘Between Catgories’, in Give My Regards to Eighth Street: Collected Writings o f Morton 
Feldman, ed. B. H. Friedman (Cambridge: Exact Change, 2000), 88.
painters and listening to their views rather than through formal training in music.2 
While Feldman’s claims concerning his apprenticeship should not be accepted 
uncritically, his assertions do at least provide some insights into how we might 
interpret Rothko Chapel ‘visually’. Moreover, it seems without question that certain 
aesthetic characteristics of Feldman’s compositional style paralleled similar 
tendencies in the work of painters belonging particularly to the New York School. 
Accordingly, what follows is an analysis of the phenomenological encounter with this 
piece in relation to the Rothko Chapel paintings. How does the music sound in 
relation to the colour, texture, space and arrangement of this installation?
4.1 Mark Rothko and the Rothko Chapel
Mark Rothko was bom Marcus Rothkowitz in Latvia in 1903, and arrived in the 
United States after his Jewish family emigrated there in 1913. Despite winning a 
prestigious scholarship, Rothko dropped out of Yale University at the end of his 
sophomore year and moved in 1923 to New York, where he pursued an interest in 
painting. For the first twenty years his paintings were largely figurative, and it was not 
until 1949, ‘the year that he made his most daring painting gesture’,3 that he painted 
the first of his well-known rectilinear signature images. From his writings, it is clear 
that Rothko was an intellectual, passionate about music, literature and philosophy -  
particularly Dostoevsky, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard. One of the leading exponents of 
Abstract Expressionism, Rothko always denied that his work was empty of meaning, 
provocatively describing it as ‘nothing but content’.4 It also seems evident that
2 For Feldman’s own observations on his artistic formation, see Morton Feldman Essays, ed. Walter 
Zimmerman (Cologne: Beginner Press, 1985) and Give My Regards to Eighth Street.
3 Dore Ashton, About Rothko (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 5.
4 Rothko, cited in Anna C. Chave, Mark Rothko: Subjects in Abstraction (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1989), 196.
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Rothko saw his art as performing a phenomenological rather than a representational 
function: ‘[it] is not about an experience, it is an experience’.5
Commissioned by the art patrons John and Dominique de Menil in 1964, 
Rothko’s Chapel is an interdenominational place of worship that houses an 
installation of fourteen paintings by Rothko. The painter clearly regarded this 
commission as the culmination of his life’s work, writing to the Menils,
The magnitude, on every level of experience and meaning, o f the task in which you have 
involved me, exceeds all my preoccupations. And it is teaching me to extend myself beyond 
what I thought was possible for me.6
Tragically, in 1968 the painter’s health deteriorated suddenly, he suffered an aneurism 
and began drinking heavily. He separated from his wife and five-year-old son in 1969, 
and in February 1970 he committed suicide almost one year before the chapel opened 
to the public in January 1971. It was during the dedication ceremony in February 
1971 that the Menils met Rothko’s friend Morton Feldman and commissioned him to 
write a composition as a tribute to the artist. The musical work was premiered the 
following year in the chapel on 9 April 1972.
The commissioning of paintings to adorn religious spaces is of course nothing 
new in the Western art tradition, whose early history is closely bound to that of the 
Christian church. By the mid-twentieth century, such work was rarer. Nonetheless, the 
two decades preceding Rothko’s Chapel had seen at least two notable examples in the 
Matisse Chapel of the Rosary in Vence, whose interior and stained glass was designed
5 Rothko, quoted in Dorothy Seiberling Life, 16 November 1959, cited in Sheldon Nodelman, The 
Rothko Chapel: Origins, Structure, Meaning (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997), 341 (italics 
original).
6 Letter from Mark Rothko to John and Dominque de Menil, 1 January 1966. Cited in Carol Mancusi- 
Ungaro, ‘Material and Immaterial Surface: the Paintings of Mark Rothko’, in Jeffrey Weiss, Mark 
Rothko Catalogue for the National Gallery o f Art in Washington D.C. (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1999), 283.
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by Henri Matisse in 1950, and the chapel of Notre Dame de Haut in Ronchamp, 
designed in its entirety by Le Corbusier in 1956.7 However, what marks Rothko’s 
Chapel as unique is the fundamental integration of architecture and painting -  the 
building was designed around the installation rather than the other way around. 
Rothko’s commission gave him autonomy over all aspects of the chapel’s design and, 
significantly, this allowed him complete control over the lighting that would
o
illuminate his works. Rothko even made a replica of the chapel’s planned internal 
layout and its lighting in his New York studio so that he could accurately simulate the 
intended environment for his work.
The fourteen Rothko Chapel paintings are among the artist’s largest, ranging 
upwards in size to 11 feet by 15 feet. The arrangement consists of three triptychs in 
the north, east and west, and five single paintings hung on the other five walls (see 
figs. 4.1 and 4.2).9 Rothko’s idea was to ‘make East and West merge in an octagonal 
chapel’,10 and, indeed, the black-figure triptychs adorning these opposing side walls 
are almost identical.11 Apart from the south-wall panel, which is characteristically 
rectilinear, the paintings are largely monochromatic, predominantly composed in the 
hues of purple, brown, ochre, and black. In this way, the installation’s conspicuous 
lack of figuration arguably reaches new heights of abstraction.
7 Sheldon Nodelman argues that the de Menils’ commission for the Rothko Chapel in Houston was 
directly inspired by the Dominican Father Marie-Alain Couturier’s mission for the Art Sacre 
movement, which had already resulted in the religious works by Matisse and Le Corbusier. See 
Nodelman, The Rothko Chapel Paintings: Origins, Structure, Meaning, 34.
8 The renowned architect Philip Johnson withdrew from his commission to design the building due to a 
disagreement with Rothko concerning the chapel’s design. Two new architects, Howard Bamstone and 
Eugene Aubrey, finished the plans according to Rothko’s wishes.
9 Steven Johnson, in his essay ''Rothko Chapel and Rothko’s Chapel’, Perspectives o f New Music, 32/2 
(1994), describes the east and west triptychs as having a ‘cruciform’ configuration resulting from their 
transept-like outer panels being slightly lowered.
10 Cited in Dore Ashton, About Rothko, 169.
11 For some high quality reproductions o f these paintings, see Nodelman, The Rothko Chapel Paintings, 
16-30.
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The overriding impression of this all-consuming abstraction is one of 
otherness: these paintings are diametrically opposed to worldly representations and 
are seemingly impenetrable because of this. Rothko’s final artistic period, including 
the chapel paintings (1964-67), saw a move away from his bright-coloured rectangles 
towards a tenebrous mood, culminating in his black on grey paintings of 1969. 
Stylistically, too, these paintings mark a difference to his earlier work through their 
clean, taped edges -  gone are the characteristically blurred, nebulous boundaries of 
his earlier colour planes. Robert Goldwater observes in these later paintings: ‘It was 
not the expressive mood embodied that occupied him but the construction -  the 
means.’12 As in Greenbergian modernism, then, it was the medium, the physicality of 
paint itself that became paramount. Furthermore, Dore Ashton observed that any 
questions about the meaning of Rothko’s work were to be ‘definitively answered’ by 
the chapel installation.13
It is hard to ignore the possible relationship of Rothko’s series of panels to the 
Roman Catholic tradition of meditating on depictions of the fourteen Stations of the 
Cross, particularly given that the chapel’s original purpose was for Roman Catholic 
worship.14 Significantly, Barnett Newman (1905-70), who provided the sculpture 
Broken Obelisk (1963-67) which balances on the apex of the pyramid at the front of 
the chapel, had painted a set of fourteen black and white paintings entitled Stations o f  
the Cross (1958-64) just a few years earlier.
12 Robert Goldwater quoted in Carol Mancusi-Ungaro, ‘Material and Immaterial Surface: the Paintings 
of Mark Rothko’, 284.
13 See Ashton, About Rothko, 168.
14 The chapel was originally intended as a Catholic institution for the University of St. Thomas, but a 
disagreement between the University and the de Menils prompted the patrons to give the chapel an 
interdenominational status. Although many have read the number of fourteen paintings as significant, 
Sheldon Nodelman argues that there are only eight functional units in the ensemble: three triptychs and 
five single panels. See Nodelman, The Rothko Chapel Paintings, 307.
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Figure 4.1: Schematic of the interior of the Rothko Chapel15
Adopting a phenomenological position, Rothko explains in 1953 that the 
viewer will have noticed two characteristics that exist in his painting: ‘either their 
surfaces are expansive and push outward in all directions, or their surfaces contract 
and rush inward in all directions.’16 To experience the paintings in this way implicates 
a phenomenal encounter with the artworks, and one that provokes a temporal response 
too. Moreover, it recalls the discussion of framing in Part I: where does the picture 
stop (Derrida)? And which other territories does it intersect with in its aesthetic 
reception (Deleuze and Guattari)? Furthermore, something about the size of Rothko’s 
paintings invites an immediate phenomenal response from the viewer. Just as an
15 Taken from Steven Johnson, 1 Rothko Chapel and Rothko’s Chapel’, 11.
16 James E. B. Breslin, Mark Rothko: a Biography (London and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1993), 301.
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individual might find themselves awestruck and humbled by the magnitude of a 
cathedral’s architectural proportions, so, too, does a viewer upon viewing these 
imposing works.
Rothko had long striven for closeness and intimacy in his paintings, displaying 
them so that the viewer feels immersed in the picture, and he had also painted a group 
of large pictures before -  the Seagram murals, now housed in the Tate Modem.17 He 
claims that the reason he painted them this way was to convey an experience that was 
intimate and human: ‘However you paint the larger pictures you are in it.’18 The 
inherent phenomenalism in this gesture relates to the way one feels consumed by the 
sheer scale of the paintings. In the chapel and the Tate’s Rothko Room, the paintings 
encircle and smother, halting the viewer’s reflective distance and ensuring the 
paintings’ immediacy. The octagonal enclosure of the chapel envelops its viewers 
quite literally as they become surrounded by the fourteen paintings. Accordingly, 
multiplying the effects of scale by erecting a field of paintings seems to lessen the 
individual’s role as a spectator and instead posits the oneness of their lived experience 
with the paintings.
17 These paintings became known as the Seagram murals, painted between 1958 and 1959, as they were 
originally intended for the Four Seasons Restaurant in the Seagram Building. Rothko, concerned with 
the materialistic opulence of the restaurant, eventually withdrew from the commission and returned the 
considerable advance he was given.
18 Rothko, cited in Carol Mancusi-Ungaro, ‘Material and Immaterial Surface: the Paintings of Mark 
Rothko’, 284.
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Figure 4.2: Installation view: north apse triptych flanked by northwest and northeast angle-wall paintings
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4.2 Morton Feldman and the New York School
From the 1940s onwards, the American composer Morton Feldman (1926-87) 
belonged to the New York School -  a loose term used to describe the cultural scene of 
visual artists and composers in New York from the early 1940s to the 1950s. Other 
leading members of this group included the painters Barnett Newman, Willem de 
Kooning (1904-97), Franz Kline (1910-62), Philip Guston (1913-80) and Jackson 
Pollock (1912-56); and the composers John Cage (1912-92), Earle Brown (1926- 
2002) and Christian Wolff (1934—). The term is also synonymous with Abstract 
Expressionism and action painting -  action because the focus was on the act or 
process of painting rather than the finished physical object. Feldman was close friends 
with many of these artists, including Rothko, and delighted particularly in the new 
means of expression that painting showed him following his own excursions into 
graphic notation in compositions such as Projections and Intersections (1950-51).
This affinity with the painters expressed itself through a number of musical 
works that Rothko dedicated to his artist friends, including the sextet For Franz Kline 
(1962), the quintet De Kooning (1963) and the trio For Philip Guston (1984).19 
However, Feldman considered Rothko Chapel unique because it was ‘the only score 
where other factors determined what kind of music it was going to be’ and it is the 
‘only piece -  and it will never happen again -  when all kinds of facts, literary facts,
onreminiscent facts, came into the piece’. Does this statement mean, then, that the 
composition might be regarded as a musical representation of the chapel paintings? 
How might such musical representation work where non-figurative paintings are
19 He also dedicated his last piano piece Palais de Mari (1986) to the painter Francesco Clemente, who 
painted his portrait in the 1980s, and he composed the music for Hans Namuth’s film Jackson Pollock 
(1951).
20 ‘Morton Feldman: Interview by Fred Orton and Gavin Bryars’, Studio International, 192 / Nov-Dee 
(1976) 244—48 <http://www.cnvill.net/mforton.htm> [accessed 4 August 2005]
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concerned? What, precisely, is there to represent? The title, Rothko Chapel, would 
suggest that Feldman was concerned not just with the artist and his paintings but also 
with their arrangement within the chapel’s interior and the installation’s spiritual 
premise. But how did these concerns manifest themselves in the finished 
composition?
Firstly, we should consider the aesthetic concerns that Feldman shared with
the painters. Jonathan W. Bernard writes that Feldman believed the Abstract
Expressionists were ‘shaking off the pernicious effects of the modernism of the first
half of the twentieth century, in which the idea had reigned supreme, and thinking had
0 1come to substitute for looking’. Similarly, there was a profound distrust of systems. 
Feldman scathingly wrote that Pierre Boulez is ‘not interested in how a piece sounds, 
only in how it is made’, and he commented: ‘No painter would talk that way. Philip 
Guston once told me that when he sees how a painting is made he becomes bored with
O ' )it.’ Dore Ashton observes that Rothko, too, ‘was enough of a Nietzschean to be
O 'Xwary of systems’. This quest for what we might understand as an ‘innocent’ gaze 
harks back to the phenomenological principles discussed in Part I.
When asked what he had learned from the Abstract Expressionist painters in a 
1976 interview, Feldman replied: ‘Maybe the insight where process could be a 
fantastic subject matter’.24 Moreover, in drawing attention to the raw physicality of 
the medium, he states: ‘The new painting made me desirous of a sound world more 
direct, more immediate, more physical than anything that had existed heretofore.’25 
Accordingly, Feldman’s focus was on the sounds themselves in the process of their
21 Jonathan W. Bernard, ‘Feldman’s Painters’, in The New York Schools o f Music and Visual Arts, ed. 
Steven Johnson (London: Routledge, 2002), 177 (italics original).
22 Feldman, ‘Predeterminate -  Indeterminate’, in Essays, 47.
23 Ashton, About Rothko, 173.
24 ‘Morton Feldman: Interview by Fred Orton and Gavin Bryars’ <http://www.cnvill.net/mforton.htm> 
[accessed 4 August 2005]
25 Feldman, ‘Autobiography’, in Essays, 38.
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execution:: ‘That collision with the Instant which I witnessed is the first step to the 
Abstract Experience. And the Abstract Experience cannot be represented. It is, then, 
not visible in the painting, yet it is there -  felt.’ For Feldman, then, the aesthetic 
experience emerges from the physical encounter with the sounds.
In a similar manner, Irving Sandler explains that the painters were interested 
in ‘the manipulation of paint as an end in itself, that is, for purely visual or retinal
77purposes’. Harold Rosenberg, who invented the term ‘action painters’, writes,
What was to go on the canvas was not a picture, but an event. The painter no longer 
approached the easel with an image in his mind; he went up to it with material in his hand to 
do something to that other piece of material in front of him. The image would be the result of 
this encounter.
Accordingly, the materials and process became paramount: ‘What matters always is 
the revelation contained in the act.’28 Importantly, though, the focus on the word 
‘action’ underlines the fact that paintings such as Pollock’s capture in their frozenness 
all of that kinetic energy that went into their creation. But it is in the phenomenal 
encounter with the artwork that the ‘revelation’ of these forces takes place.
The New York School poet Frank O’Hara (1926-66) explains that the 
influence between the different arts has been mutual: ‘the very extremity of the 
differences between the arts has thrown their technical analogies into sharp relief.’29 
This observation has definite resonances with Adorno’s and Klee’s view that it is in 
the phenomenal encounter that the fictional space of a painting requires time to
26 Feldman, ‘After Modernism’, in Essays, 104 (italics original).
27 Irving Sandler, The New York Schools: the Painters and Sculptors o f the Fifties (London: Harper and 
Row, 1978), 163, quoted in Johnson, New York Schools, 8.
28 Harold Rosenberg, ‘The American Action Painters,’ in The Tradition o f the New (New York:
Horizon Press, 1960; repr. Da Capo Press, 1994), 25-27.
29 Frank O’Hara, cited in Morton Feldman: Essays, 24.
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unfold, and how, too, the parsing of musical voices takes place within a field of 
imagined space. O’Hara argues that it was the paintings of Philip Guston which 
allowed Feldman to focus on the ‘condition under which the work was created and 
which is left behind the moment a given work is completed’. In this way, the 
aesthetics of the New York School saw a turning away from history and the past, 
highlighted by Barnett Newman’s statement that ‘[t]he image we produce is the self- 
evident one of revelation, real and concrete, that can be understood by anyone who
^ i
will look at it without the nostalgic glasses of history’. And this simplicity and 
purity of approach was also voiced by Feldman in regards to music: ‘To rebel against 
history is still to be part of it. We were simply not concerned with historical 
processes. We were concerned with sound itself. And sound does not know its 
history.’32
In summary, then, the key points concerning Feldman’s shared aesthetic with 
the painters are his eschewal of systems and ideas and a focus on the physical 
materials and process as revelatory of meaning. Significantly, though, considering this 
project’s concern with the possibilities of musical representation, the composer’s 
modernist focus on the process and materials themselves led to a rejection of 
representation and the object. So how does Rothko Chapel fit into this aesthetic? Is 
the work a representation despite itself, and, if so, a representation of what, precisely? 
By being non-figurative with no overt subject-matter, the paintings in the chapel draw 
the viewer’s attention self-reflexively towards their surface and scale and to the 
phenomenal encounter one might have with them. The task ahead, then, will be to 
examine whether Feldman’s musical attributes attain a similar level of self-reflexivity
30 Ibid., 25.
31 Barnett Newman, 1948, quoted in Jacob Baal-Teshuva, Rothko (1903-1970): Pictures As Drama 
(London: Taschen, 2003), 10.
32 Feldman, ‘The Anxiety of Art’, in Essays, 86.
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and whether the experience of Feldman’s music in any way corresponds with the 
experiences of Rothko’s paintings in their original setting.
4.3 The Programme
For this composition, Feldman wrote the following as part of his programme note:
The total rhythm of the paintings as Rothko arranged them created an unbroken continuity. 
While it was possible with the paintings to reiterate color and scale and still retain dramatic 
interest, I felt that the music called for a series of highly contrasted merging sections. I 
envisioned an immobile procession not unlike the friezes on Greek temples.33
The notion of rhythm here is significant, for it implies some level of temporality in the 
experience of the paintings -  space becoming time. Meanwhile, imagining ‘an 
immobile procession’ suggests that the surround of paintings somehow creates a 
frozen snapshot of movement. In this way, they are similar to Jackson Pollock’s 
paintings, where movement seems preserved and frozen in the skein of drips and 
swirls. In the chapel, though, the processional component seems of a different order, 
dependent on the arrangement itself.
In arguing that it was not possible for the music to reiterate colour and scale 
like the paintings, Feldman problematizes the possibilities for a musical 
representation whilst also suggesting the musical solution -  sections with a significant 
degree of contrast which also merge together. Thus, we find the composer 
acknowledging that an analogue with certain features of Rothko’s paintings is simply 
not viable for this particular musical representation. Instead, something else is 
required that better suits the world of sound.
33 Feldman, ‘Crippled Symmetry’, in Essays, 125. Also quoted in the liner notes to CD Morton 
Feldman Rothko Chapel, Why Patterns, compact disc, New Albion NA039CD (1991).
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Why he felt that the music called for this difference to the paintings is perhaps 
explained by the experiential nature of the octagonal arrangement in the chapel. The 
paintings create their own boundaries (or territories) as the viewer looks from one 
adorned wall to the other whilst still relating to the ‘whole’. If, likewise, the music 
were to reiterate the same colour (that is, sonority) and proportions then it would be 
much harder for the listener to distinguish an equivalent alterity. Hence the music 
would fall into a single, unindividuated field, denying the processional element 
Feldman sought. Notwithstanding the need for such differentiation, Feldman felt the 
sections of his music should merge into each other to maintain, presumably, a 
cohesive experience and, perhaps, to recall the merging of colour planes in Rothko’s 
earlier paintings.
Feldman’s statement that various extra-musical ‘facts’ came into the 
composition suggests some kind of guiding programme behind the music, and indeed 
Feldman has offered a programme of sorts, both through the actual titles of the 
individual movements and their description. He also elaborated further in 
commentaries such as this programme note of 1972:
Like the chapel, the music is conceived in an ecumenical spirit. I think of it as a ‘secular 
service’. I tried to create a music that walks the thin line between the abstraction of all art and 
the emotional longing that characterises what it is to be ‘human’. The chorus symbolizes art’s 
abstractness; the solo viola, the need for human expression. It is only at the end of the work 
that I think o f Rothko and his own love for the melody. Here, I collage a Hebrewesque [s/c] 
melody which I wrote thirty years ago -  at sixteen.34
34 From the press release from Rothko Chapel for concert, April 9, 1972, cited in Dore Ashton, About 
Rothko, 185.
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Calling it a  ‘secular service’ suggests that Feldman saw Rothko’s art and his own as 
performing an immediately human experience, and one which relates to basic human 
needs rather than less tangible, religious ones. Writing that ‘the Abstract Experience is 
really far closer to the religious,’ he posits a tension, perhaps something that he felt 
in the chapel, between the abstract art and the real, living world. Interestingly, it is to 
the chorus that he assigns the job of rendering ‘art’s abstractness’ and to the solo viola 
‘the need for human expression’. The expectation would perhaps have been for the 
human voices to symbolise human expression.
Feldman, by declaring that this was the first and last time his music would 
contain such ‘facts’, was presumably thinking of the conceptual component such 
programmatic ideation might confer. Rothko and Feldman, therefore, both seem to 
endorse a phenomenological approach towards the purely experiential nature of their 
work before any reflective thinking sidelines that initial impact. One of the key 
aesthetic questions is: by what mechanism is this music representational of Rothko’s 
Chapel? If the music is representational, can it support multiple meanings or 
representations? Why is it that this music seems an effective represention of the soft 
reflectiveness of Rothko’s paintings, whereas it would be decidedly ill-matched to, 
say, the stark imagery of a work by Francis Bacon?
As we discussed in Part I, the music must have pertinent similarities to (or 
analogical correspondences with) its context in order to enable the transfer of meaning 
from one domain to another; it must, in other words, harbour attributes that are felt to 
be commensurate or isomorphic with the experience of the Rothko Chapel. It would 
seem indubitable that the musical structure embodies sufficient looseness to relate to 
these colour-field paintings, but to pair it with the violence of Bacon’s imagery would
35 Feldman, ‘After Modernism’, in Essays, 104.
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seem ludicrous, for it simply does not possess anything we might construe as 
musically ‘violent’. Further still, it would also seem incongruous to pair it with the 
soft, diaphanous colours in Monet’s water-lily paintings. The solemnity of the music, 
as we shall see, would simply seem out-of-step with Monet’s subject matter. The 
subject of Feldman’s music, however, by virtue of its context alone, conveys a gravity 
that demands the hushed quietitude that the music engenders. The paintings’ 
abstractness, ensigned in tenebrous, funereal colours, clearly adds to that impression.
Accordingly, what follows is an analysis of the musical attributes as a basis for 
engendering an experience commensurate with the one emanating from the paintings. 
Since the paintings lack overt figuration, we are forced to contemplate, head-on, the 
manner in which the music represents the experience and pure painterliness of the 
artwork itself. Without the distraction of a subject matter, there is a potential here for 
uncovering how the music might represent the painted surface itself before the mind 
reflects on anything outside that medium. The ensuing perception of such a 
phenomenal encounter is one that is grounded in the musical experience itself rather 
than in any cognitive deferral. In short, we will investigate whether this music 
functions in a parallel way to the paintings through its own immediate material focus. 
Through an inward-looking refinement, paradoxically, does the music reach outwards 
towards the visual domain, and in this way maintain a modernist agenda set forth by 
Adorno, Greenberg and others?
4.4 The Analysis
What are the conditions here that allow meaning to emerge in the musical work 
Rothko Chapel? This section seeks out enabling similarities between the musical 
structure and the paintings and their arrangement within the chapel. This allows the
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creation of critical interpretations that show the interpreter actively engaged in the 
creation of meaning -  in a kind of self-reflexive analysis -  rather than passively 
attendant to it. Moreover, the relatively large body of text that Feldman left behind 
regarding Rothko Chapel will provide a basis from which to mobilise and construct 
our visual interpretations of the music.
In his programme note for Rothko Chapel, Feldman divides the piece into four 
sections, giving each of these a brief description:
1. A longish declamatory opening; 2: A more stationary “abstract” section for chorus and 
chimes’; section 3: ‘a motivic interlude for soprano, viola and tympani [sic]', 4: a lyrical 
ending for viola with vibraphone accompaniment, later joined by the chorus in a collage 
effect.37
He also wrote:
To a large degree, my choice of instruments (in terms o f forces used, balance and timbre) was 
affected by the space of the chapel as well as the paintings. Rothko’s imagery goes right to the 
edge of his canvas, and I wanted the same effect with the music -  that it should permeate the 
whole octagonal-shaped room and not be heard from a certain distance. The result is very 
much what you have in a recording -  the sound is closer, more physically with you than in a 
concert hall.38
The similarity here between Feldman’s desire for the listener to be immersed in the 
music and Rothko’s desire to envelop the viewer inside his painting is especially 
striking.
36 The recording used here is directed by Philip Brett, dividing the work into five sections, with the fifth 
being comprised of the chorus from section four. See liner notes to Morton Feldman, Rothko Chapel, 
Why Patterns, compact disc, New Albion, NA039CD (1991).
37 Feldman, ‘Rothko Chapel’, in Essays, 141, and in Give My Regards to Eighth Street: Collected 
Writings o f Morton Feldman, 125.
38 Ibid.
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The analysis consists of the following sections: Dynamics and Immersion, TI 
Antiphon, The Processional, Stasis, Hebrew Melody, and Dissonance and the Gaze. 
Each considers its own particular aspect of the music in relation to the experience of 
the Rothko Chapel. Just as the paintings marked a stylistic departure for Rothko with 
the hard, geometric edges, so, too, does Rothko Chapel mark a stylistic change for 
Feldman with its unusual melodic sections.
This discussion inevitably retraces some of the ground covered by the 
American musicologist Steven Johnson in his article ‘Rothko Chapel and Rothko’s 
Chapel’.40 However, the primary focus here is on the experiential nature of the music 
and its parallels to the phenomenal effects of the chapel. While this chapter broadly 
agrees with certain of Johnson’s findings, concerning, for instance, Feldman’s 
musical recreation of stylistic characteristics of the chapel paintings, it posits further 
that Feldman was grappling with issues that are not exclusive to Rothko’s Chapel bui 
that pertain to the aesthetics of the New York School in general and to the subject of 
cross-fertilization between the arts. Accordingly, Feldman’s musical response will be 
discussed within the larger subject of musical 'stasis’.
39 For example, Gustav Holst memorably uses a wordless (offstage) choir in the movements ‘Venus’, 
‘Mercury’ and ‘Neptune’ of his suite The Planets.
40 Perspectives o f New Music, 32/2 (1994), 6-53.
17
4.4.2 Dynamics and Immersion
Discussing, as he saw it, contemporary music’s obsession with differentiation, 
Feldman writes that ‘[cjhange is the only solution to an unchanging aural plane 
created by the constant element of projection, of attack’.41 Thus, the repetition of that 
instrumental attack makes such invariance in the music intolerable -  change therefore 
becomes necessary to alleviate this sameness.42 And he explains further when he says:
This is perhaps why in my own music I am so involved with the decay of each sound, and try 
to make its attack sourceless. The attack of the sound is not its character. Actually, what we 
hear is the attack and not the sound. Decay, however, this departing landscape, this expresses 
where the sound exists in our hearing -  leaving us rather than coming toward us.43
Seemingly, then, for Feldman, the real musical ‘event’ takes place just when it is 
fading away -  as with his view of abstract paintings -  and therefore it is not about the 
variegation and development he observed as salient in most other contemporary art 
music. In this way, he was creating a new musical aesthetic and one that had an 
analogue with the aesthetic he so admired in the painters -  that is, the focus on 
process and materials (the individual sounds) rather than systems and ideas.
The first section is marked triple piano, consistent with the attendant quietude 
of a chapel or religious setting (see ex. 4.1). The opening drum roll on the timpani, 
according to familiar topical convention, heralds the onset of an event -  somewhat 
ominously here due to the attenuated dynamics. When the muted viola enters in bar 
four, first with four notes, each marked with crescendo hairpins from an initial mp, an
41 Feldman, ‘The Anxiety of Art’, in Essays, 89.
42 It is significant, too, that Feldman’s efforts to reduce instrumental attack also serves to obscure the 
instrument’s own identity, for it is through the instrument’s characteristic attack envelope that we can 
ascribe such identity. Accordingly, this serves to limit the sound’s ability to represent the instrument 
and so make it, too, abstract. See Robert Erickson, Sound Structure in Music (Berkeley and London: 
University of California Press, 1975).
43 Feldman, ‘The Anxiety of Art’, in Essays, 89 (italics original).
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aural impression is given of something moving closer, in that a gradual increase in 
volume is often an index of the increasing proximity of an object. This effect is 
consistent with the ecological theory of Eric Clarke that we discussed in Chapter 2; 
the musical object demonstrates its ability to enable the listener to assume a particular 
subject position. The aural effect of these single notes fading in to perception might 
be considered analogous to the effect on a viewer standing in the middle of the 
octagonal room and feeling Rothko’s colour planes moving inwards as the intensity of 
their hue is absorbed.
Example 4.1: full score showing bars 1-7
Nothing in the music feels rushed, and Feldman instructs his performers to play as 
quietly as possible and suppress attack, in order to make the sound source as 
ambiguous as possible. Once again, this provides an analogue with the gentle 
blending of colour in the paintings, their eschewal of hard outlines, for a suppression
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of attack from his musicians produces a similar softness at an aural level. The 
suppression of instrumental attack, and with it rhythmic / metrical differentiation, 
ensures that the listener’s focus is on the sound and timbre. By drawing attention to 
sound’s physical being, Feldman confronts the listener with tone ‘colours’ in the same 
way that the viewer is confronted by the visible colours of the paintings.
In an interview with Paul Griffiths in 1972, Feldman remarked:
I’m not happy with electronic sound -  the physical impact to me is like neon lights, like 
plastic paint, it’s right on top, whereas I like my paint to seep in a bit. Part of my musical 
thinking is to have the sound sourceless, and it’s too identifiable. My pieces fail if one can 
say: ‘Ah, there's a trombone, there’s a horn’. I like the instruments to play in the natural way; 
they become anonymous. Most new sounds come about when the instrument does not become 
anonymous, but deals in marginal worlds; and so they are precarious in execution.44
His metaphor that music is paint and needs to ‘seep in a bit’ is reminiscent of his 
painterly language, quoted above, about priming his ‘canvas with an overall hue of 
music’. Examples of this effect might be said to occur between bars 134 and 194 with 
the timpani ostinato demarcating a large section of the music (see ex. 4.4) -  and in 
any of the choral episodes (see exs. 4.2, 4.3, 4.6, 4.7 and 4.9).
The style of these choral episodes is one of sustainment. Although the 
thickness of the sound texture may alter through the omission and addition of voices, 
the sound of the choir covers large tracts of the musical surface. Not only the 
overlapping lines of the voices, but also their wordlessness and their lack of phonetic 
articulation serve to render the ‘wash’ of sound that Feldman designs. Moreover, the 
seamless nature of the writing and its complete immersion in the creation of a sound
44 In Paul Griffiths, ‘Morton Feldman’ [interview], Musical Times, 113 (1972), 758.
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plane or ‘territory’ parallels the all-enveloping nature of Rothko’s flat planar panels in 
the chapel. The hazy, soft focus of the paintings bathes the viewer in a seemingly 
infinite void. With no figuration, there can be no reference point by which to anchor 
oneself visually. As in the music, there is no painterly ‘attack’ either: the colours 
merge seamlessly into their neighbouring areas.
Example 4.2: full score showing bars 161-66
4.4.3 The Antiphon
Turning now to the octagonal schema within the chapel, is there anything about the 
physical arrangement of the paintings that Feldman responds to? In traditional 
figurative painting, viewers are able to situate themselves in relation not only to the 
size of the actual painting but also to the proportions that hold within the painting’s 
internal representational system -  this holds true for many abstract works, too, whose 
inner relationships may be discerned through their various shapes and lines
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(Kandinsky, for example). The fact that the chapel paintings possess no more than one 
contained form -  the south entrance-wall painting bears a characteristic rectangular 
form -  means that any internal relationships within the units are largely absent. 
Consequently, their relation is to the ensemble as a whole, yielding an external and 
environmental focus as opposed to one that is classically internal -  as in other works 
of abstract or figurative painting -  and therefore exploding the unit’s frame outwards.
The octagonal configuration, as shown in fig. 4.1, shows how each of the 
imposing panels has an opposite. In an interview in 1976 with Fred Orton and Gavin 
Bryars, Feldman, aware of this aspect, recalled,
I think the orchestration was to some degree affected by the fact that I was writing it for a big 
production at the chapel. I went down there and I just walked around the chapel. It is built in a 
kind of glamorous idea of his studio. Actually the studio was bigger than the chapel, and it just 
cried out -  the octagonal situation -  to do something at the sides. That’s where the antiphonal 
chorus came in, and something in the middle, and then they had the benches in the middle and 
they could bring in others. Visually too the whole battery o f percussion looks nice.
In fig. 4.1, we can see that every single painting faces a counterpart on the opposing 
wall. To reflect the physical arrangement of the paintings, Feldman deployed his 
choirs antiphonally thus providing an analogue to the paintings’ visual arrangement. 
He spoke of how the device of antiphony has the effect of ‘makfing] you get involved 
with the totality’.45 In this way, he maintains an immersive effect too, for the tone 
colours alternately come at the listener, filling the sound field from all areas.
A choral episode at bar 123, accompanied by the woodblock only, is repeated 
at bar 128 (ex. 4.3) now with crescendo and with the accompaniment of the viola. 
There exists no musical development here to prepare the listener for this restatement,
45 ‘Morton Feldman: Interview by Fred Orton and Gavin Bryars’.
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and the contrasting next ‘processional’ episode, discussed below, quickly usurps the 
memory of these voices until their reappearance in identical formation at bars 179 and 
189. This accords with Feldman’s statement that ‘I would prefer never knowing when 
you are going to hear something, when you are going to see something’.46 The 
surprise re-presentations of earlier material suggest a calculated unpredictability 
analogous, say, to the interjection of a Rothko panel into the chapel ensemble.
S
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Example 4.3: bar 128 -  repeated from bar 123
Moreover, the final, fourth section between bars 314—427 (ex. 4.4) marks the 
greatest contrast in the whole piece and stands in stark relief against the earlier, more 
‘abstract’ sections. Bar 314 sees the introduction of the aforementioned viola and 
vibraphone section, an ostinato pattern in the vibraphone, marked quintuple piano and 
resonating freely (through use of the pedal), continues to the end of the piece -  once 
again ‘priming’ a large area of musical ‘canvas’. Then at bar 360, the chorus enters 
the proceedings with the addition of the celesta playing two octaves above the
46 Feldman, ‘XXX Anecdotes & Drawings’, in Essays, 155.
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vibraphone (see ex. 4.10). At bar 372, the viola melody and vibraphone 
accompaniment reappear almost verbatim, before once again being displaced by the 
re-emergence of the identical chorus and celesta episode that had immediately 
preceded it. This section, then, creates an antiphonal quality by collaging the choral 
section between the viola and vibraphone episodes. We can also see here how the call 
and response effected between the viola and the chorus relates back to Feldman’s 
assertion that they represent art’s abstractness and human feeling respectively.
# * M  e x a c tly
Example 4.4: full score showing bars 314-19
4.4.4 The Processional
In the programme note quoted above, Feldman said that the effect of the chapel 
created in him the sense of an ‘immobile procession not unlike the friezes on Greek
182
temples’. This statement suggests that Feldman saw some implied movement 
emanating from the fourteen panels, either within or between them, analogous to the 
frozen processional movement depicted on an entablature. The art historians Barbara 
Novak and Brian O’Doherty observed something similar when they wrote,
As eyes become dark-adapted, the paintings overlay this blindness, first with the classical 
“answering” of formats on opposing walls, then with the perception of colour, then with the 
sustained effort after whatever structures are discernible within. There is perhaps a sequential 
reading within the ensemble that in this context has a solemn, quasi-ritualistic echo.47
Clearly, the notion of a ‘sequential reading’ does imply that a spectator moves from 
one canvas to the next, and that of the ‘quasi-ritualistic echo’ has overtones of a 
processional. Rothko also told the art historian Katherine Kuh that his canvases 
envelop the viewer and resist being absorbed in a single glance; they require one to 
‘turn in space’.48 The saturation of our visual phenomenal field, then, takes time. 
Furthermore, in light of his friendship with Rothko, it would seem likely that Feldman 
would have been familiar with the painter’s sentiments regarding this temporal quality 
to his work. The composer colourfully observes animation in Philip Guston’s 
paintings:
Not long ago Guston asked some friends, myself among them, to see his recent work at a 
warehouse. The paintings were like sleeping giants, hardly breathing. As the others were 
leaving I turned for a last look, then said to him, “There they are. They’re up.” They were 
already engulfing the room.49
47 Barbara Novak and Brian O’Doherty, ‘Rothko’s Dark Paintings: Tragedy and Void’, in Rothko 
Catalogue, 274.
48 Katherine Kuh, interview, 1982-83, 154, Archives of American Art, Washington DC, quoted in 
Jeffrey Weiss, ‘Rothko’s Unknown Space’, in Mark Rothko Catalogue, 319-20.
49 Morton Feldman, ‘Philip Guston: The Last Painter’, Art News Annual 1966, 31 (1966), 100, quoted 
in Jonathan W. Bernard, ‘Feldman’s Painters’, 182.
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In the music, the processional quality seems aurally evident from bars 134-94 (ex. 
4.5) and is effected by a minor-third ostinato pattern on the timpani, which provides 
the sense of a slow but relentless march. Interestingly, this episode occurs in triple 
time but retains the quality of a duple march through the equidistance of the two 
repeated notes (three crotchets apart) across the bar lines. This is complemented by a 
two-voiced chorus where the tenor enters in bar 135 and is joined by the alto a 
semitone higher in a rhythmically identical pattern from bar 138.
s
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Example 4.5: full score showing bars 134-40
From bars 142 and 143 the simultaneous presentation of three and four voices 
respectively reminds one of Feldman’s statement above regarding the ‘thickening and 
thinning’ of his musical textures. Then, from bar 148, the viola joins the choir, 
performing an act of stasis through its repetition of D=. A musical analogue with the
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gradations of hue in the paintings is created by the dynamic markings, ranging from 
triple piano to mezzo piano. The presentation of the voices (bars 154—60) uses largely 
the same pitch material as the previous bars, before the voices re-emerge in bars 161— 
64 together with a concurrent thickening of texture, which divides into eight choral 
voices and a solo alto singer.
At bar 171, we hear an unaccompanied melodic line played by the viola, 
lasting eight bars, striking in its contrast to the preceding choral episode. A solo 
soprano, again relatively melodic, displaces the viola at bar 180 until the 
‘processional’ timpani ostinato reappears. The section, then, seems at least to provide 
the illusion of immobility that Feldman prescribes through its choral voicing, where 
each voice is given a particular pitch that is either held or enters and re-enters in 
canon. In marked contrast, the ‘processional’ two-note timpani figure provides a firm, 
rhythmic foundation and a strong directional impulse for the first time. The eight-bar 
solo viola episode supports the composer’s assertion that it is this instrument which 
injects a human element. Its intervallic leaps seem to be reaching outwards against the 
abstract wordless choir. The combination, then, of the rhythmic ostinato on the 
timpani against the purity of the ‘static’ choral voices exemplifies this idea of the 
music being ‘frozen’, but in a constant state of oscillation.
4.4.5 Stasis
In this section, we will continue the theme of immobility expressed in the last section 
by examining two further aspects of musical stasis: the continuation of musical 
material across a broad strip of musical ‘canvas’, and the related reiteration of chord 
and contour patterns altered chromatically. As we noted earlier in section 4.3,
Feldman saw that it would not be possible in the music to simply reiterate musical
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elements equivalent in colour and scale, and sought instead to merge highly 
contrasted episodes. Nevertheless, this section will argue that he has prolonged 
musical time by extending it across certain pitch clusters and repeating others with 
minute changes. Thus, in a way analogous to that in which the paintings are fixed in 
time for as long as we see them, the music is ‘fixed’ in the present moment through its 
extension and repetition. This idea is similar to what Edward T. Cone called a 
‘suspended saturation’ of musical material, discussed in Chapter 1, whereby musical 
sounds may develop a painterly saturation of space through their continuation. 
Feldman writes of being
involved like a painter, involved with gradations in the chromatic world [...] I work very 
much like a painter, insofar as I’m watching the phenomena and I’m thickening and thinning 
and I’m working in that way and just watching what it needs.
He continues:
But it’s like Rothko, just a question of keeping that tension or that stasis. You find it in 
Matisse, the whole idea of stasis. That’s the word. I’m involved in stasis. It’s frozen, at the 
same time it’s vibrating.50
Indeed, in experiencing a Rothko at first hand one is confronted by their sheer 
vibrancy. Despite their inertia, the colour fields typically yield a luminescent aura that 
is aided by the low-level lighting specified by Rothko -  they seem to glow outwards 
into the room.51 Similarly, writing about her experience of the paintings in Rothko’s
50 Feldman, ‘XXX Anecdotes & Drawings’, in Essays, 168.
51 This effect is especially prominent in a painting such as Red on Maroon seen in the Rothko room in 
the Tate Modem. These paintings were originally displayed in the Tate Gallery under strict guidelines 
from Rothko about their positioning and lighting.
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Chapel, the art historian Barbara Rose notes that ‘the paintings seem to glow 
mysteriously from within’.
In his interview with Paul Griffiths, Feldman commented: ‘My compositional 
impetus is in terms of the vertical quality, and not what happens in terms of the 
horizontal scheme.’53 Indeed, the small chromatic shifts evident in the vertical 
dimension of this music strikingly recall the minute shades and depths of hue a painter 
like Rothko uses across his vertical planes. Moreover, the oscillations from certain 
permutations of vertically positioned pitches exemplify moments of static vibrancy. 
This is perhaps what John Cage meant when he observed that Feldman’s music 
‘seems more to continue than change’.54
In the following statement, Feldman explains the especial importance stasis 
had for his music:
Stasis, as it is utilized in painting, is not traditionally part o f the apparatus of music. Music can 
achieve aspects of immobility, or the illusion o f it. The degrees of stasis, found in a Rothko or 
a Guston, were perhaps the most significant elements that I brought to my music from 
painting. For me, stasis, scale, and pattern have put the whole question of symmetry and 
asymmetry in abeyance.55
This is, of course, reminiscent of Feldman’s statement envisioning an immobile 
procession. However, while a painting is static and fixed in space at any single 
moment of time, how does music, the arch-temporal medium, create a similar sense of 
immobility or stasis?
52 Barbara Rose, cited in Jacob Baal-Teshuva, Rothko, 75.
53 Paul Griffiths, ‘Morton Feldman’, 758.
54 John Cage, ‘A Lecture on Something’, in Silence: Lectures and Writings by John Cage (Middletown, 
CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 128.
55 Feldman, ‘Crippled Symmetry’, in Essays, 137.
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Perhaps one of the keys to understanding this aspect of his compositional 
process reveals itself in the composer’s interest in Anatolian rugs:
The color-scale of most nonurban rugs appears more extensive than it actually is, due to the 
great variation of shades of the same color (abrash) -  a result of the yam having been dyed in 
small quantities. As a composer, I respond to this most singular aspect affecting a mg’s 
coloration and its creation of a microchromatic overall hue. My music has been influenced 
mainly by the methods in which color is used on essentially simple devices. It has made me 
question the nature of musical material. What could be best used to accommodate, by equally 
simple means, musical color? Patterns.56
We will see below how the music produces a similar ‘vibrancy’: chromatic shifts in 
sound ‘colours’ emulate the subtle changes of colour in the rugs and in the chapel 
paintings. Patterns, too, are evident throughout Feldman’s Rothko Chapel:; reiterations 
of musical material, re-presented identically or with subtle chromatic alteration, 
abound.
Similarly, Feldman states that, as in the art of minimal painting, from 1958 his 
musical surfaces were quite flat: ‘My primary concern (as in all my music) is to 
sustain a “flat surface” with a minimum of contrast.’57 In Rothko Chapel, evidence for 
this is found in the extreme subtlety of variation in time values and pitch repetition 
across the extent of the musical surface. Such repetition provides for a relatively 
stable or flat surface, and, accordingly, we might consider this a form of stasis. In 
addition, it provides a direct analogue with the strikingly low colour contrasts evident 
across the chapel paintings.
The first example of this low contrast occurs in the time values at the onset of 
the first choral episode in bar 29. A seven-part wordless chorus enters and remains
56 Ibid., 128.
57 Feldman, ‘For Frank O’Hara (1973)’, in Essays, 142.
largely in-rhythmic unison until the episode beginning at bar 211. Stasis of a different 
kind also occurs in the held notes throughout these choral episodes. In addition, the 
dynamic markings that fade these voices in and out produce a similar perception of 
the same hue continuing across the surface of the canvas, lightening or darkening only 
gradually. Like the dimming and brightening of a light, the louder the voices the 
closer and more vividly into ‘focus’ they become; and the following attenuation pulls 
them vaporously back into the oblivion from which they emerged. Examples of this 
are found between bars 29-37 and 84-93 (see ex. 4.6).
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Example 4.6: bars 29-35
The messa di voce technique found in each of the choral voices at bars 34 and 37 
effects fixedness, for the only aspect that changes is the volume, through its gradual 
crescendo and decrescendo -  the musical space is thus saturated by gradation. 
Occurring in the soprano and alto voices one octave apart, it illustrates once again the
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lack of pitch variety. Ironically, the impression of stasis manifests itself through the 
continuation of these voices over a spread of time.
Each instrument or voice has its own distinct material, so that instrument and 
musical figure are no longer separable, but instead the instrument along with its 
characteristic material becomes a musical entity heard alongside the other musical 
entities, like one of the canvases viewed side by side with the others. In this way, it 
assumes the identity of a fixed object, for it seems to ‘own’ a particular acoustical 
space, a territory, in the same way that one of the immense canvases occupies its 
physical space. The choral voices enter, fade, and re-enter like the imposing panels 
enveloping the viewer in the chapel ensemble.
The most compelling example of this aspect, and also of the continuation of 
material over the musical ‘canvas’ is found in the second section for chorus and 
chimes, which Feldman calls ‘abstract’ (bars 211-42, ex. 4.7). Feldman refers to this 
section as very ‘monochromey’ and closer to the chapel paintings in that it maintains
fO
‘that kind of one hue of a colour’.
Consisting of a twelve-part wordless chorus, plus chimes, the episode is the 
most densely scored in the piece. The chorus presents a sustained hexachord (E=, G, 
A=, A, B and C), and the chimes gradually fill out the remaining six pitch classes (E, 
F, Gs, B=, C# and D) to form the aggregate. As Steven Johnson observes, Feldman 
disperses the rhythmic emphasis of each note evenly among the performers ensuring a 
uniform and continuous extension of sound.59 Through its density of sound and its 
extension across thirty-two bars, the full complement of twelve notes musically 
reflects both the rich darkness of the monochrome paintings and the separate panels 
themselves. Just as the ensemble of fourteen paintings saturates the physical space of
58 ‘Morton Feldman: Interview by Fred Orton and Gavin Bryars’.
59 See Johnson, ‘Rothko Chapel and Rothko Chapel’, 31.
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the chapel and creates a totality from them, so, too, the twelve notes gradually enter 
and saturate the sound space of the listener.
©
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Example 4.7: full score showing bars 211-17
Responding with his characteristic wit to observations that all his music 
sounds the same, Feldman writes, ‘I seem content to be continually rearranging the 
same furniture in the same room.’60 So, is this a metaphor for how the composer 
achieves stasis, too, by rearranging his musical material? Using, as we have seen, the 
musical equivalent of abrash, Feldman varies his musical material with minute 
chromatic shifts over the musical surface. Similarly, looking at the distributional 
analysis in fig. 4.3, we can see that there is minimal variation in the pitch material of
60 Feldman, ‘The Anxiety of Art’, in Essays, 94.
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the viola part extending over the entire five movements. Moreover, the same contour 
of pitch shape keeps emerging throughout: see bar 16 and the following distributional 
column, where the interval leap of a major 7th, first D —> C# and then D= —► C, is 
repeated ten times. Similarly, we can see the falling intervals starting from bar 11 
(central column, fig. 4.3) as an augmented fifth, E —* A=, and then a series of 
intervals which fall by perfect and diminished fifths in bar 12: diminished fifth (Ds —► 
G), perfect fifth (G —► C), and diminished fifth again (C —► F#).
What this shows is the limited number of chords, ostinato patterns and 
melodic gestures Feldman is working with and the similarity of the musical contour 
that these intervallic repetitions generate. Moreover, if we look at columns two and 
three of fig. 4.3, we can see how the rhythmic distributions are also largely identical, 
only doubling or halving the note values at most. We might at this point aver that 
Feldman is attempting to represent musically the apparent sameness present across the 
paintings. However, as we saw above in Feldman’s programmatic realisation, it would 
not be possible to represent the homogeneity he observed in the chapel. The limited 
use of pitch, sameness of intervallic contour, and rhythm, then, constitute recurring 
patterns in which he casts his overall musical hue. The sections themselves are 
demarcated by strong shifts of contrast between abstract choral material and more 
melodic episodes.
The paintings generate subtle variations of hue and light in each individual 
panel and across the ensemble as a whole, and so, too, Feldman alters certain musical 
contours chromatically across the four sections, thus varying his musical colours in an 
analogous way. For examples of this chromatic variation, see column three in fig. 4.3, 
bars 128-270.
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Figure 4.3: Viola part, distributional analysis
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Feldman also employs an annuciatory gesture from the viola, which appears 
solo for a bar and heralds the following section (see ex. 4.8). The first instance, heard 
at bar 130, marked pizzicato, signals the next contrasting section beginning at bar 134. 
The next occurrence at bar 210 is also marked pizzicato, but this time with different 
pitch material, and it marks the arrival of Feldman’s second section beginning at bar 
211. The fourth occurrence appears at bar 243, again with different pitch material, and 
signals the third section: ‘a motivic interlude for soprano, viola and tympani [sic]\
Bar 130
Bar 210
pp
Example 4.8
Therefore, although each occurrence is constituted from different pitch material, the 
solo presentation and pizzicato marking over the minims, which vary from four or 
five in number, can stand as a musical gesture because of the timbral similarity which 
binds them together. Support for this relationship comes from the gesture’s 
appearance just before a contrasting section.
P
(piss ) *ulC* *
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Example 4.9: bars 36—42
The distributional analysis of the celesta part, fig. 4.4, also shows an 
overriding similarity in pitch, rhythm, and contour. The celesta’s opening chord in bar 
11 has a major seventh interval, B —► A#, whose repetition can be seen through to bar 
76. The chords shown in the other columns incorporate similar identical intervallic 
relationships, showing again the singularity of voicing that Feldman was working 
with.61 Perhaps these repetitions help underline the fact that the reflective power of 
the superficial monotony of the canvases elicits some deep meditative state from its 
viewer. Moreover, this singular voicing is constructed from the same pitch material as 
that presented in the chorus. For example, except for G#, the pitches that constitute 
the celesta chord at bars 42 and 46 are present in the choral voices heard at bars 36 
and 37 (ex. 4.9).
61 And here I mean singular in the sense that these musical voices are extraordinary because of their 
same-form repetition.
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Figure 4.4: Celesta part, distributional analysis
There are many other instances throughout the piece of the celesta chords 
being formed in this way. For example, a four-note chord presented at two-bar 
intervals between bars 79 and 93 reassembles material from the choral and vibraphone 
episode heard between bars 69 and 75 (F3 and G= are played by the vibraphone). 
Similarly, the celesta chord at bar 97 finds its pitches presented in various 
combinations in the preceding chorus, viola and vibraphone parts. The chords heard at 
bars 101, 103 and 107 are identical, each being one octave lower than the chord heard 
at bar 97; the celesta chords at bars 131 and 133 assemble material from the preceding 
chorus and viola appearances; and, finally, pitches accumulated from the previous 
choral and solo soprano episode form the celesta chord presented at 186.
This shows that Feldman is reusing pitch material by reassembling pitches 
presented by other instrumental and choral voices in the chords played by the celesta. 
And, although common practice in many pieces of music, the re-use of pitches seems 
more evident here because of their invariance of register and timbre across large parts 
of the musical space. In this way, the execution of a chord in the celesta is cast into 
sharp relief, for that may be the dominant sound for several bars. Similarly, the 
preceding wordless chorus finds an analogy with the recombining of colour that 
Rothko executes through layering paint over the ‘ground’ layers with which he
AOprepares canvases such as the chapel paintings. The effect is one of looking through 
the painting to other lighter or darker sections of a similar hue; and hearing the 
reconstituted celesta chords is like hearing through to our memories of the earlier 
sound colours.
62 Carol Mancusi-Ungaro discusses these multiple layers of ground pigments in her essay ‘Material and 
Immaterial Surface: The Paintings of Rothko’, in Mark Rothko Catalogue, 286.
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By-presenting pitches heard previously in the viola, vibraphone and choral 
parts, Feldman not only recombines but also re-contextualises these chords by means 
of their new presentation. This has an analogue with the multiple layers of paint on 
Rothko’s canvases as well as with the experience of seeing one of those paintings 
within the context of all the others: the sensation of seeing something similar but 
different again, or, in this case, hearing something familiar but different through its re- 
contextualisation. Recognition is possible because the context is sufficiently similar to 
the material’s previous incarnation -  the presentation alternates between chorus and 
celesta. In this manner, it bears comparison to a viewer rotating themselves about the 
central axis of the chapel and viewing the paintings from different angles, for the 
listener, too, will have a renewed perspective upon those sounds heard previously.
At the same time, the repetition of chordal patterns at irregular time intervals 
provides another kind of subtle variation through its unpredictability. These patterns 
appear slightly different from their earlier presentation because of their unexpected 
reappearance in the new context, but they also effect a kind of stasis because of their 
sameness. In this way, Feldman writes:
Repetitive chordal patterns might not progress from one to another, but might occur at 
irregular time intervals in order to diminish the close-knit aspect of patterning; while the more 
evident rhythmic patterns might be mottled at certain junctures to obscure their periodicity.
For me patterns are really self-contained sound-groupings that enable me to break off without 
preparation into something else.63
Feldman’s view that his musical patterns are ‘self-contained’ recalls the Deleuzian 
concept of territory. Each of the musical contours in figs. 4.3 and 4.4, with their 
associated timbres, create its own ‘territory’ through a distinctive form of patterning.
6j Feldman, ‘Crippled Symmetry’, in Essays, 130.
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In this way, Feldman has created musical objects that are heard alongside each other, 
and which, like the paintings, each possess their own territory while forming part of a 
larger whole.
4.4.6 Hebrew Melody
In the final section, Feldman composes a four-note ostinato on the vibraphone, which, 
as we noted earlier, continues unchanged until the end of the work. At its first 
appearance (bars 314—59) it is joined by the viola (bar 320), which plays a beautiful 
lament (see ex. 4.4 above). At its second appearance (bars 360-71), a wordless chorus 
joins the vibraphone, replacing the melodic viola, forming a striking contrast to the 
preceding lyrical passage (ex. 4.10). The first chorus presents a six-note chord (D, F, 
C#, E, As and E), which the second chorus echoes half a bar later, and preserves 
unchanged in all of its subsequent presentations. Once again, the choirs are 
antiphonal, reflecting the juxtaposition of the paintings in the space of the chapel. 
After a seven-bar interlude in which the vibraphone plays unaccompanied, the viola 
makes its second appearance, this time one octave higher, creating an effect of still 
greater tenderness. For the last time, the choirs replace the viola in the final episode, 
singing the same chord as before. This ABAB interposition of the viola and choral 
episodes contrasts both the stasis of the repeating ostinati and the chorus with the 
lyrical viola melody.
The choral episodes here enfold the listener in a manner similar to the 
‘abstract’ section between bars 211-43 (ex. 4.7). Feldman was perhaps after the same 
effect that Dore Ashton observed in Rothko’s Tate paintings: ‘he sought the 
enveloping sensation that can be generated when tones from one surface echo another;
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when the events on the canvas have the psychological effect of drawing the viewer 
into its space, rather than allowing him to stand outside, as did Renaissance artists.’64
Example 4.10: full score, bars 360-65
In explaining the inclusion of this melodic viola episode, Feldman states that 
he was thinking of Robert Rauschenberg’s photomontages: ‘At that time I would use 
a tune just the same way Bob would put a photo on the canvas. But I now feel that in
64 Ashton, About Rothko, 157. Concerning this envelopment of the viewer, Rothko was also very 
exacting about the distance from which his viewer stood or sat in relation to the painting. Dominique 
de Menil recalls how during a visit to Rothko’s studio, the painter placed a chair twenty feet from one 
of the newly completed chapel canvases and another for himself between her and the painting: ‘He did 
not utter a word. He just looked at me.’ See foreword to Sheldon Nodelman, The Rothko Chapel, 9.
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music it doesn’t work the same way.’65 That the composer includes such a distinctly 
melodic component here suggests that it has some special import concerning the 
nature of the commission. Accordingly, it is possible to hear this Hebraic melody not 
as an embodiment, but certainly as a more explicit representation of Rothko himself, 
in that it evokes a sense of pathos consistent with the painter’s own obsession with 
tragedy while recalling his Jewish heritage. It may also be no accident that Feldman’s 
choice of this particular melody, together with his programme note making the 
Semitic reference explicit, could also be referring to the etymology of the word 
Hebrew (‘ibri’), which means ‘one from the other side (of the river)’.66 In this way, 
the sharp contrast the viola melody makes with the predominantly ‘abstract’ choral 
episodes, draws the listener’s attention to the ‘otherness’ that is evoked by this work 
and Rothko’s.
4.4.7 Dissonance and the Gaze
It is possible to argue that there is a dissonance produced by the effect of these 
imposing monochromatic paintings: a destabilising unease brought on by the absence 
of subject matter. Feldman writes, ‘There is a real fear of the Abstract because one
rn
does not know its function’ -  the meaning, then, appears ungraspable. The octagonal 
and triptych arrangements add to this uncertainty. Disposing three of the paintings 
into triptychs on the north, east and west walls of the chapel would seem to suggest 
some kind of relationship, a narrative perhaps, but one that is elusive and 
impenetrable like the deep, dark layers of paint across these giant canvases.
65 Feldman, quoted in Cole Gagne and Tracy Caras, ‘Morton Feldman’, in Soundpieces: Interviews 
with American Composers (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1982), 170.
66 The Shorter Oxford Dictionary, s.v. ‘Hebrew’.
67 Feldman, ‘After Modernism’, in Essays, 104.
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At the same time, Feldman’s sustained voices stimulate a reflective calm that 
seems to resonate with the chapel’s meditative function and purpose. They achieve 
this effect through their invariability and wordless nature, and the aural effect of this 
is analogous to the sustained inhalations and exhalations we might encounter from the 
repeated mantra of a Buddhist chant. The wordlessness of the chorus effectively 
represents the abstractness of the paintings and their attendant lack of subject matter. 
Moreover, the sense of transcendent otherness is enhanced by the fact that Feldman’s 
musical idiom is largely atonal, lacking a clear tonal centre and making much use of 
dissonant intervals. The wordless chorus therefore appears doubly disconnected 
through both its wordlessness and eschewal of a clear tonal language. Thus, it 
represents the strange abstractness of the environment Rothko has created and the 
attendant disconnection from the material world that this implies. Feldman writes that 
the abstract experience ‘is a metaphor without an answer’, and because it combines 
the mystery of the unknown with the opacity of the art form, it ‘is really far closer to
Aftthe religious’. Feldman’s abstract music, then, also creates mystery; it leaves a 
metaphorical door open on the unknown because it lacks the directionality of a tonal 
language. We do not feel the push and pull of a gravitational tonal field; rather, the 
prolonged voices float like the colour fields that seem to hover in front of and beyond 
the paintings.
Dominique de Menil’s dedication speech at the public opening of the chapel 
draws our attention to qualities of time embodied by the painting when she says that 
the artist wanted the paintings to be ‘intimate and timeless’: ‘[The paintings] embrace 
us without enclosing us. Their dark surfaces do not stop the gaze. A light surface is 
active -  it stops the eye but we can gaze right through these purplish browns, gaze
68 Ibid., 104.
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into the infinite. They are warm too.’69 Menil’s suggestion that Rothko’s artworks act 
like portals through which we can gaze into the beyond is predicated, paradoxically, 
on their opaqueness; precisely the fact that there is nothing to see means we can carry 
on seeing. Consistent with this gaze is, of course, the chapel’s function for meditative 
contemplation of a spiritual nature.
The painter’s long-standing interest in Friedrich Nietzsche also seems relevant
70here: ‘And if you gaze for long enough into an abyss, the abyss gazes also into you’. 
The chapel has the proportions of a private auditorium, and, in fig. 4.2, we can see 
that the triptychs and the individual paintings appear as cinema screens or as windows 
into the infinite beyond. The gaze continues, as we have said, because there is no 
subject-matter to thwart it. Moreover, when Menil talks about their intimacy and 
embrace we can perhaps feel as if the paintings are watching us instead of us 
watching them. We cannot see through the paintings, so instead we are encouraged to
71look, at one and the same time, into the infinite and back into ourselves.
4.5 Conclusion
Through its melodic episodes, Rothko Chapel is unique in Feldman’s oeuvre; he was 
clearly attempting something musically out of the ordinary for this commission. 
Ironically, the composer’s solution to representing Rothko’s most challengingly
69 Dominique de Mend’s dedication speech, cited in Jacob Baal-Teshuva Rothko, 74-75.
70 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy o f the Future, trans. Marion 
Faber with an introduction by Robert C. Holub (Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks, 1998), chapter 4, § 146, 
64.
71 This imposed-self awareness was also alluded to by Feldman when he wrote: ‘if, say, I begin with 
Piero, go on to Rembrandt, to Mondrian, then to Rothko and Guston -  a certain sensation begins to 
emerge: a sensation that we are not looking at the painting, but the painting is looking at us.’ Cited in 
Feldman, ‘After Modernism’, in Essays, 108. Significantly, too, it is not possible to see all of the 
paintings at once in Rothko’s Chapel due to their 360-degree arrangement; therefore the paintings 
standing behind us at any particular point have the advantage of ‘seeing us’ whilst not allowing us to 
see them.
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abstract work is through his most accessible composition, containing, as it does, a 
significant, if restrained, melodic impulse. What is noteworthy is that Rothko and 
Feldman went about the creation of intimacy through very different means. The 
painter uses the sheer physical size of his work and the surround effect of the chapel 
walls to consume the totality of the viewer’s perception, and the composer uses 
intimate, soft dynamics to envelop and saturate the listener in sound. Both, then, draw 
upon a phenomenological encounter with their media.
The phenomenological method seems admirably suited to the question of the 
music’s relationship to the chapel paintings, given that the principles of the New York 
School are about the immediacy of the encounter with an artwork, the event through 
which we live. Thus, it becomes less a case of the music trying to represent this or 
that feature of the paintings, and more a case of it engendering an event or experience 
that matches the qualities one might experience upon entering the Rothko Chapel. 
That said, if the music itself is so creative, we might reasonably ask if we need the 
paintings in order to ‘hear’ the music properly or to have the full aesthetic experience 
in the sense demanded by Peter Kivy in Part I.
Edward T. Cone wrote that music without context has no content and that we 
therefore need a context for signification to occur. But is that the issue here? Are the 
chapel paintings on the one hand and the music on the other intending to generate 
their own context, and hence content, through their effects and experience? The above 
analysis has shown how the music combines a prolongation of pitch with a particular 
use of dynamics to immerse the listener in the sound field in a way analogous to that 
in which the colour fields saturate the viewer surrounded by the paintings. Moreover, 
fading these musical voices in and out of that musical ‘space’ bears comparison to the 
effect of rotating ourselves about the space of the chapel and seeing the paintings fade
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in and out of perception. The antiphonal arrangement of the choral episodes 
intensifies this effect by representing the ‘answering’ of the paintings within their 
octagonally complementary placements.
Together with this immersion, the music remains relatively inert through its 
sustainment of the choral voices across large sections of music. Devoid of words and 
continuing over the musical surface, these choral voices seem to ‘float’ as abstractly 
as the layers of hue seem to hover in front of the paintings’ transparent surfaces. 
Meanwhile, the invariance of the pitch material, subject to only small chromatic shifts 
over time, continues this sense of stasis and reflects Rothko’s gently changing colour 
fields. The absence of an internal representational system in the paintings generates a 
striking fixedness in space, because the panels are just themselves with no obvious 
reference to anything outside that ensemble. By making only small changes to his 
musical material, Feldman also represents something of this nature, for the music 
extends and continues over a period. In this way, musical time become like the 
paintings’ fields of space, recalling the metaphor ‘music is painting’.
There is no doubting the fact that these and the other musical attributes 
mentioned may be heard in a way that is analogous to the qualities of the chapel 
paintings. However, the vestigial signs of the material and its execution belong to 
many other examples in the New York School’s oeuvre and not just to Rothko, 
therefore complicating the issue of this particular representation. Is this a musical 
representation of Rothko’s Chapel, of Rothko’s work as a whole, or the work of the 
New York School in general? Notwithstanding this quandary, there are sufficient 
attributes here to identify the musical work with the chapel series. But, more 
importantly, does the chapel confer some advantage to, or enrich, the musical 
experience?
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It is argued that the ideological framework that the chapel paintings enable 
draws out musical aspects hitherto hidden, thereby projecting a logic upon those 
musical attributes that would otherwise remain without meaning. It is what 
Wittgenstein calls the ‘dawning of an aspect’.72 As was discussed in Chapter 2, it is in 
noticing an aspect of an object, that we may come to see or hear it differently whilst 
simultaneously noticing that it has not physically changed itself. Accordingly, it is the 
meaning or significance that has changed and not the music itself, and it is this 
meaning which constitutes the aesthetic experience of the music. Our response, in 
other words, has changed because of the paintings seen as a concept. It is about more 
than simply positing a similarity between the two domains, because the listener must 
bring something that is absent in order to parse the musical domain -  to supplement 
the musical experience for it to make sense.
Thus, although the music might be said to exemplify itself and to draw 
attention to its own medium, it also, paradoxically, becomes imaginatively joined with 
the other communication stream that is Rothko’s Chapel. In this way, the two 
experiential domains form a single entity by means of their confluence, and the 
resultant meaning pools in a semantic ‘sea’. Each perceptual field, then, may conflate 
with and comment on the other domain. Hearing the music within this frame of 
reference allows the listener to attach certain sounds to an image of the paintings. The 
combined experience of hearing the sounds and imaginatively invoking the chapel 
paintings enables the musical voices to sound as if they are uttering forth from the 
paintings themselves. Accordingly, it seems appropriate that, just as Rothko said his 
painting was not about an experience but is an experience, listening to Rothko Chapel
72 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (London: Blackwell, 2002), 166.
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is something that happens as an event rather than as a representation; that event, 
however, is framed and enriched by its context.
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CHAPTER 5
Colour, Space and Movement in Henri Dutilleux’s Timbres, Espace, Mouvement 
ou La nuit etoilee
In contrast to Morton Feldman’s Rothko Chapel, discussed in the previous chapter, 
Henri Dutilleux’s Timbres, Espace, Mouvement ou La nuit etoilee is composed after a 
representational painting -  Vincent van Gogh’s famous La nuit etoilee (‘The Starry 
Night’, 1889) -  see fig. 5.1. However, despite its overt subject matter, it is clear that 
this painting is one whose aesthetic significance is largely derived both from its 
painted surface and the emotional effects to which this gives rise. Thus, it seems fair 
to say that the rendering of the subject matter is not something that is abstractable 
from the ostensible subject itself. Indeed, the painting is remarkable for its 
phenomenal effects. But, unlike in Rothko’s chapel paintings, these effects are 
attributable to visible subjects -  a small village, distant hills, a cypress and a starry 
night sky. Accordingly, these mundane objects bring with them their attendant 
conceptual components which orientate and give direction to their fantastical setting.
Here, then, the music will be discussed in terms of its tone colour, texture, 
space and movement, and how these aspects might be heard in relation to the Van 
Gogh painting. The central aim will be to establish whether the visual context 
supplements the musical experience. In a word, does the experience of the music 
somehow become ‘animated’, phenomenally speaking, through its relationship to the 
painting? Without this context, would the musical experience be in some way 
impoverished and lacking in coherent structure? And if this is the case, do we need 
knowledge of the absent painting in order for the sounds to make musical sense?
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Figure 5.1: Vincent van Gogh, La nuit etoilee (1889)1
1 Oil on canvas, 73.7 x 92.1 cm. Since 1941 it is has been held in the permanent collection of MoMA in New York.
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Dutilleux states that he had the painting ‘constantly in mind’ while he was 
composing. The first part of this chapter will examine Dutilleux’s representational 
intent together with his known concerns about making too explicit a link with the 
painting. Why, for instance, did Dutilleux give the painting’s title, La nuit etoilee, as a 
subtitle rather than as the main title of his composition? The second part will focus on 
the musical representation of the painting’s physical and painterly qualities: its 
famous impressionistic texture and range of colour, and how these aspects are 
represented in the composition. The third part considers the phenomenal effects of the 
painting alongside the phenomenal effects of the music. For example, does the music 
convey something similar to the dramatic movement one feels when gazing at the 
painting’s swirls of colour and paint, and does it generate an experience which 
represents, sonically, the vortical chasm between the ground and sky? An interesting 
idea that emerges from this composition is that of the composer rendering musically 
the various psychological sensations and perceptions he felt upon viewing the 
painting. This affective response will be considered in relation to Dutilleux’s writings 
and interviews about the piece.
Accordingly, the focus will be on two principal areas of the painting’s 
potential for musical representation: firstly, representation of the objective, physical 
aspects of the painting -  its colour range and texture -  and, secondly, the affective 
aspects induced by one’s phenomenological experience of the painting -  feelings of 
vertigo, rapid and turbulent movement, circling, and space, which are also cited by 
Dutilleux as forming part of his response to the piece. The closing discussion will 
consider whether these subjective components may be subsumed under the rubric of 
musical representation along with potentially more objective aspects. The point of
2 Dutilleux in interview with Roger Nichols, 19 April 1991, cited in ‘Dutilleux at 75’, Musical Times, 
132(1991), 701-2.
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interest is whether the representation of colour in music, enshrined as it is in 
conventional musical terminology, is any more ‘natural’ than that of such qualities as 
turbulence, vertigo, space and movement.
5.1 Vincent Van Gogh (1853-90) and La nuit etoilee
Van Gogh was bom in 1853 and turned to art only late in life, working variously as a 
bookshop clerk, art dealer and missionary evangelist before he took up painting. In his 
decade-long career, 1880-90, he produced nearly 900 canvases and over 1100 works 
on paper, though he is remembered mainly for the brilliantly coloured works of his 
last few years, unique for their impastoed bmsh strokes and replete with frozen 
energy. Key examples include his well-known suite of sunflowers and his wheatfield 
paintings. La nuit etoilee was to form the culmination of what might be considered a 
trilogy of starry, nocturnal images: Terrasse de cafe la nuit (‘Cafe Terrace at Night’) 
came first in 1888 followed later that same year by La nuit etoilee sur le Rhone 
(‘Starry Night Over the Rhone’). These first two were executed in Arles, Provence, 
but La nuit etoilee was painted during his voluntary commitment to the nearby mental 
asylum at Saint-Remy after the infamous ear-cutting incident. All three use his 
familiar contrast between cobalt blues and chrome yellows to depict their subject 
matter, but it is the painting under consideration here which reaches new heights in its 
illusory effects of space and movement.
After Sunflowers (1888), La nuit etoilee is probably Van Gogh’s most 
recognisable and appreciated work, and it is rightly famed for its remarkable sense of 
movement, texture, space, colour and light. The range of imagery encompasses 
distant, undulating hills, a church steeple, cosily lit houses laid low in the foreground,
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a dominating upwardly spiralling cypress on the left, and, of course, the starry sky 
itself, which consumes the upper-third portion of the image. These subjects are 
rendered in almost caricature-like proportions: the cypress, for example, takes up 
almost a third of the painting and extends way up to the night sky above with its 
incongruously large orbs of light.
The painting possesses an almost palpable sense-impression of movement, 
most obviously in the portrayal of the cypress and the sky. Even the contours of the 
receding hills seem wave-like, matching the turbid contours of the cavernous sky. The 
sky is filled with nebula-like swirls spinning individually within their own orbits 
against this larger fabric. Rushes of streaked paint form vortices in the centre, 
implying that some larger stars have spun wildly out of their orbits and are tearing 
through the cosmos into this giant whirlpool of forces. The rendering of light, too, 
with its impastoed daubs of colour, seems to pulsate amidst this roiling mass of forms. 
There is a striking resemblance here to Lord Rosse’s drawing of the Whirlpool Nebula 
(M51) from 1845, and it has been suggested that this well-known sketch inspired the 
painting (see fig. 5.2).4
La nuit etoilee is a painting of contrasts: between the bright yellow and the 
sober blue; between the serene normality of the sleepy village and the turbulent starry 
night; between the immediate foreground and the chasm of space; and between the 
individual stars and the charged vortex at the painting’s centre. The visionary 
painting, then, can be primarily characterised as a rendering of extremes between 
relatively static areas to areas of extraordinary agitation. Moreover, this, combined 
with the sense of space, has the viewer’s gaze travelling backwards and forwards
3 Indeed, cypresses seem to have been something of a favourite to Van Gogh, for they feature in a 
number of paintings from the same year, 1889.
4 Simon Singh makes this point in his recent book Big Bang (London: Fourth Estate, 2004), 183-84.
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between these vertigo-inducing opposites, invoking our affective feelings and 
experience.
The phenomenological effect of this painting is remarkable and it must also be 
one of the best examples of what we might describe as a synaesthetic painting. Its 
texture invites a haptic response, and the sense-impression of movement and space 
implicates our body phenomenologically. Moreover, its illusory sense of depth and 
tumult seems to reach outwards beyond its frame, producing a visual effect that 
threatens to overwhelm its modest proportions -  recalling our earlier discussions 
about frames and how a picture may ‘explode’ beyond its boundaries (Chapter 1).
Figure 5.2: Whirlpool Nebula, M51 (1845)
5.2 Henri Dutilleux and Timbre, Espace, Mouvement ou La nuit etoilee 
Henri Dutilleux was bom in Angers, western France in 1916. He attended the Paris 
Conservatoire and in 1938 won the Prix de Rome, though his residency in Italy was
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cut short by the outbreak of World War II. A meticulous and non-prolific composer, 
he came to consider his first original work to be the Piano Sonata No. 1 (1946-48), 
renouncing his earlier output before this point. Dutilleux has previously included 
extra-musical links in his works, notably the Baudelaire-inspired cello concerto Tout 
un monde lointain (1968-70), whose five movements feature a Baudelaire epigraph at 
the head of each section of the score.
Dutilleux’s musical style is notable for its use of timbre and is highly 
colouristic, often characterised by an upward movement through the pitch registers: 
for example, the passacaglia from the First Symphony (1950) presents a theme played 
by the double basses that gradually extends into the higher register of the orchestra. 
Moreover, Dutilleux’s scores are remarkable for their visual quality, and he has even 
likened the physical appearance of a printed page of music to an abstract painting.5 He 
writes: ‘Often, in my own work, if I am not satisfied with a page of orchestral music 
from purely a visual point of view, then I feel something is wrong.’6
Commissioned by Mstislav Rostropovich to mark his first season as conductor 
and musical director of the National Symphony Orchestra of Washington in 1978-79, 
and dedicated to the memory of the conductor Charles Munch, Timbre, Espace, 
Mouvement was composed between 1976 and 1978 and consists of two movements: 
‘Nebuleuse’ and ‘Constellations’. In 1990, the composer revised the score, adding an 
interlude for cello and celeste. This chapter, however, will focus on the first 
movement, ‘Nebuleuse’, given that ‘Constellations’ demonstrates many of the same 
compositional devices (pitch sustainment, static and fast sections, and spatial and 
textural features) to similar representational ends.
In explaining his compositional impetus, Dutilleux states:
5 See Caroline Potter, Henri Dutilleux: His Life and Work (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), 122-23.
6 Ibid., 123.
I felt that I could use this Van Gogh painting -  with its prodigious cosmic and mystic force -  
as the basis for an attempt at reproducing in sound the strange impression of vertigo and 
cosmic space this picture gives you, for which I should need to find something quite new in 
the way of form but particularly of instrumental texture. So La nuit etoilee was indeed my 
point of departure.7
In the orchestral score we find the following diagram of the orchestral layout (fig.
5.3):
v 1 M  B A  i  t  s
/  C. <■' > v II £ s -V
HA,,>K BO IS % .
(  l : I .  K S  1 A  J
CIIHh
Figure 5.3: Timbre, Espace, Mouvement: orchestral layout
The instrumentation of the score is highly unusual: twelve cellos are placed in a 
semicircle in front of the conductor, woodwinds sit immediately behind (two piccolos 
and two flutes, three oboes, oboe d’amore, E= clarinet, two clarinets in A, bass 
clarinet, three bassoons, and a contrabassoon). Next comes a row of brass (four homs, 
three trumpets, three trombones and a tuba), followed by the final row of percussion, 
timpani and double basses. To the left are placed a celesta and a harp between the 
cellos and percussion. The notable absence is, of course, the upper strings, and the 
instrumentation produces a sharp polarization between the woodwinds and low 
strings.
7 Dutilleux, cited in Claude Glayman, Henri Dutilleux: Music -  Mystery and Memory: Conversations 
with Claude Glayman, trans. Roger Nichols (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 73.
D.utilleux’s various writings and statements about this composition indicate 
that he conceives of the painting in a phenomenological manner, that is, temporally 
and experientially, describing his experience of the kaleidoscopic painting in terms of 
his various emotional and affective states. The following analysis will explore the idea 
that the composer’s experience is somehow presented in a musical form creating a 
virtual ‘image’ and sonic representation of the painting and its affects for the listener.
5.3 The Analysis
5.3.1 Ordering and Chronology of the Titles
Before embarking on an analysis of the music and its possible relationship with the 
painting, it is important to say something about the title. The composer originally 
titled the composition Timbres, Espace, Mouvement, only adding the painting’s title,
o
La nuit etoilee, as a subtitle after the work’s premiere to make the ‘link with [V]an 
Gogh’.9 This action calls into question the composer’s representational intentions and 
motivations about the painting; the very omission of the painting’s title in the first 
instance and its subsequent addition only as a subtitle would seems to indicate 
something about the representational priority here and the intended message regarding 
the musical connection to the painting. Indeed, Dutilleux had described his 
relationship with the painting as ‘a sort of osmosis’,10 perhaps indicating that his 
intentions were more to assimilate musically the effects of the painting than to 
represent its subject matter.
8 In the orchestral score the main title is emblazoned in large, bold capital letters and the subtitle 
parenthesized in smaller, lower-case italics.
9 Dutilleux, cited in Claude Glayman, Henri Dutilleux, 79.
10 Cited and translated by Caroline Potter in Henri Dutilleux: His Life and Works, 19.
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Furthermore, as we have said, in 1990 Dutilleux composed a short interlude 
for the two-movement work, which divides the two outer sections, while adding the 
titles ‘Nebuleuse’ and ‘Constellations’ to the original first and second movements 
respectively. In a conversation with Rene Koering, he explains that ‘there was a time 
when I wanted to forget about the painting, because it is extremely dangerous to 
attempt musical illustration’.11 He later adds that the titles are ‘perhaps too closely 
linked with the painting’.12 It would therefore seem that Dutilleux’s placement of 
Timbre, Espace, Mouvement as the main title reflects this circumspection. The main 
title of the work suggests that these are the qualities he experiences from the effects of 
the painting, and that his intention was to represent in music the fundamental contrast 
between relative calm and tumultuous movement. Accordingly, the composition 
provides a particular example of a musical representation and calls into question what 
might be included under such a category. Is, for example, this composition a musical 
representation of the main title’s generic qualities rather than of the painting itself, 
even if these are qualities which originate from the composer’s affective response to 
the painting?
Moreover, it is interesting to note that Morton Feldman and Dutilleux have 
both proclaimed their reticence at invoking an extra-musical dimension to their work. 
Dutilleux’s point above about, that it is ‘extremely dangerous to attempt a musical 
illustration’, indicates the extent of his concerns and explains the almost fence-sitting 
position that he adopts. This recalls our earlier discussion in Chapter 1 about whether 
the mark of good programme music is that it survives as a satisfying experience away 
from its programme, or that it does not. The equivocal position that Dutilleux adopts
11 Dutilleux in conversation with Ren6 Koering, cited in Potter, Henri Dutilleux, 131.
12 Dutilleux in conversation with Caroline Potter, cited in Potter, Henri Dutilleux, 131.
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through his titling seems to suggest that something about the painting-as-programme 
must be retained for an effective aesthetic experience.
However, notwithstanding the composer’s particular titling of the piece or his 
overt proclamations regarding this, the following discussion will take at face value the 
subtitle’s invitation to consider attributes of the painting in relation to corresponding 
musical attributes, not least because we cannot take the composer’s statements as 
authoritative or as a definitive source for musical meaning. The very spirit of this 
inquiry is about how meaning is generated in collaboration with the listener.
5.3.2 Colour
In choosing his main title, Dutilleux explains that ‘timbres’ was chosen ‘by analogy
1 ^with [V]an Gogh’s colours’. He also adds that he felt ‘certain “chromaticisms” of 
colour could correspond to individual timbres’.14 Thus, the distinctive quality of the 
sounds other than their pitch becomes analogous to the rendering of the objects in the 
painting. Qualities of the sounds themselves take on a significance which parallels the 
significance of the thick impastos of yellow and blue, and it becomes less about the 
subjects -  pitch and object -  and more about the way those subjects are portrayed, 
both sonically and visually.
One of the immediately striking aspects of the orchestral score is the 
conspicuous absence of the upper strings: this ‘hole’ in the orchestral texture creates a 
distinctive timbre. Dutilleux explains:
As you will remember, everything is happening in the sky, and the only links with the earth 
are the little church and a cypress in the foreground, which share the same upward movement.
13 Dutilleux, cited in Glayman, Henri Dutilleux, 73.
14 Cited in Potter, Henri Dutilleux, 124.
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Between them and the canopy of the sky there is a vertiginous impression of space, which 
immediately made me think of an instrumental grouping without any violins or violas.15
However, this void caused by the upper strings’ absence not only results from his 
response to the ‘vertiginous impression of space’, an aspect we will return to in the 
next section, but also reflects Van Gogh’s colour range. In the painting, the two 
primary colours that clearly dominate are blue and yellow, and this sparseness of hue 
is interrupted only by the dark green (a blend of blue and yellow), the brown of the 
cypress and the white halos surrounding the stars.
This is not to suggest that the composer feels that the violins and violas 
correspond exactly to the hues that are absent from the colour spectrum, but the 
absence of such a significant, middle part of the orchestra -  physically and 
acoustically - 16 is persuasively analogous to the omission of Van Gogh’s middle part 
of the colour spectrum. Blue and yellow are both visually and affectively colour 
extremes, with blue at the lower end of the colour spectrum and denotative of night, 
and yellow at the higher end of the spectrum and denotative of day and therefore light. 
Similarly, the tessitura created by the remaining instruments offers similar extremes: 
the flutes offering the high, ‘brighter’ end of the sound spectrum and the double 
basses presenting the lower ‘darker’ frequencies.
15 Dutilleux, cited in Glayman, Henri Dutilleux, 12-1 A.
16 Obviously, this is rather a crude portrayal of the middle ground the violins and violas occupy because 
clearly they are capable of some of the highest frequencies in an orchestra, but it does serve to reflect 
an analogous impression of the painting’s colour range.
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Example 5.1: bars 1-7
Other textural effects concern the renowned impressionistic brushstrokes, 
which are clearly visible in the reproduction in figure 5.1. These brushstrokes are 
instantly recognisable as the work of Van Gogh, and this individualistic style of 
thickly daubed paint upon the canvas creates very distinct rhythmic lines of texture. In 
the musical score too, one can see very distinct patterns of instrumental line: for 
example, the largely homorhythmic lines of the flutes over the first seven pages of the 
orchestral score (see ex. 5.1). In fact, Dutilleux said this ‘static period is intended to 
be an exploration of colours’.17 His musical ‘colours’, then, are presented here before 
being further developed. Accordingly, this section might be regarded as analogous to 
Van Gogh’s presentation of colour and contour through the coagulation of musical
17 Dutilleux in conversation, broadcast on France-Musique, 28 December 1978, cited and translated in 
Potter, Henri Dutilleux, 125.
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lines -  through the onward sustaining of each individual note of the melody -  that also 
have a very similar sound colour.
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Example 5.2: full score, figure 30
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5.3.3 Space
In Timbres, Espace, Mouvement, Dutilleux says that for him ‘the notion of space is far
more a question of psychology than of acoustics, everything happens on stage and it is
1 £through the actual writing that I tried to create the impression of unusual space’. 
Sonically, this spatial dimension, referred to by the title, is created by the instrumental 
lines shown in exs. 5.1 and 5.2, which seem to hang or float away from the rest of the 
musical texture. Detached, both rhythmically and harmonically, they therefore seem 
to occupy their own space and hang independently like the orbs in the painting.
In Part I, we discussed how, phenomenologically, the texture and time of 
music both imply and are experienced in an imaginative space. As Thomas Clifton 
has written, ‘space is what texture is all about’, and in these examples an acoustical 
space is constructed for the listener. Another pertinent example of this detachment 
from the musical texture occurs in the thematic flourishes discussed in the next 
section which discusses movement, as these episodes also seem to move 
independently through the background ‘space’, like the energised orbs firing through 
the night sky. Moreover, these lines interweave like the tangled melange of swirling 
orbitals in the painting.
The instrumental groupings shown in the orchestral layout in fig. 5.3 above 
could be said to reflect, graphically, something about the layout of the painting. And if 
to some degree the cellos and doubles basses, the traditional anchors of an orchestra, 
represent physically and visually the ground of the painting -  symbolised by the dark 
green cypress -  perhaps this ‘darker’ area is represented by the instruments’ texture 
and frequency range too.
18 Dutilleux, cited in Glayman, Henri Dutilleux, 96.
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Example 5.3: full score, figure 6
Accordingly, at various points, textures remarkable for their density are 
produced from the combined forces of the cellos and double basses. For example, in 
figures 30 and 31 (ex. 5.2) of the first movement, the cellos divide into twelve 
individual parts, and the double basses play a harmonised chorale-like passage. At 
other times, the lower strings are noticeably absent, for example at the opening and at 
figures 17 and 18 of the first movement. However, another aspect of this particular
creation of texture and colour arises from using the lower strings up in their highest 
registers, often incorporating their harmonics, which causes them to extend into the 
higher end of the colour spectrum: see, for example, figure 6 (ex. 5.3) where the 
double basses have a G# harmonic above the flutes. Dutilleux explains these musical 
events in visual terms when he writes:
The cellos sit in front of the rest of the orchestra in a ring round the conductor. Together with 
the ten double basses they form a mass of lower strings that counterbalances the luminous 
sounds o f woodwind and brass, with nothing in the middle. But there’s no system about this. 
Sometimes the cellos move up into their high register -  and cellos can go a long way up -  and 
at a certain moment they sound as though they are suspended in space.19
What this passage suggests is that Dutilleux envisions the physical arrangement of his 
orchestra as somehow reflecting the disposition of the painting’s subjects -  which is, 
of course, highly reminiscent of Feldman’s antiphonal deployment of his choirs in 
Rothko Chapel, examined in the previous chapter. In describing the lower strings as a 
‘mass’, Dutilleux’s evocative language figuratively conjures the image of the ground 
or the mass of the earth. And conversely, characterizing the woodwinds and brass as 
‘luminous’ suggests that he intends these as representatives of the glowing and 
swirling orbs in the sky. Similarly, portraying the cellos as being ‘suspended in space’ 
in their highest register exploits a metaphor for physical and visual space.
However, more interesting still is the counterbalance of the woodwinds and 
brass and the lower strings; for he mentions ‘there’s no system about this’, implying 
that there is not a straightforward linear balance of the lower strings in the ‘ground’ 
and winds in the ‘sky’. Instead, the lower strings sometimes, as mentioned above, 
move into their highest registers, thus effectively turning the musical world upside
19 Dutilleux, cited in Glayman, Henri Dutilleux, 73.
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down and creating a vertiginous experience like the one he experiences from the
painting.
H arpe
Example 5.4: full score, figure 9
In explaining the spatial effect produced by this counterbalancing and ‘his 
search for contrast between the extreme registers of the orchestra’, Dutilleux writes, in 
the third person:
By a play of timbres, opposing the clear and luminous quality of the wind instruments in their 
high register with the mass of lower strings, he tried to create an impression of vast space 
which the extraordinary visionary painting which is La nuit etoilee suggested to him. Besides, 
Van Gogh himself was tom between his ardent desire to rise above earthly concerns -  an 
almost spiritual state of mind -  and “the appalling human passions” of the world.20
And in ex. 5.2 above, the sonic ‘chasm’ created by the absence of any wind 
instruments effects a pendulum shift of emphasis between the lower and higher parts 
of the orchestra. Therefore, this draws the listener’s attention sharply towards the 
alternation between these two extremes of the orchestra. Sonically, then, one feels a 
disorientation and phenomenological effect which perhaps offers something akin to 
the experience of the painting.
To create this experience of vast space sonically, we can see that in ex. 5.4 
Dutilleux presents every G# within the orchestra’s range from G#1 in the double 
basses to G#7 in the flutes and piccolos. With very little activity in the mid-orchestral 
spectrum, save for the trilled G#s in the winds, the sheer five-octave distance between 
the double basses and upper woodwinds is suggestive of some kind of imaginary void 
in the musical texture.21 Therefore the episode achieves a form of stasis, a hole in the 
musical space.
20 Dutilleux’s introductory note to Timbre, Espace, Mouvement ou La nuit etoilee, housed in the 
Bibilothdque Nationale in Paris and cited in Potter, Henri Dutilleux, 125.
21 Despite the extremes of G#1 and G#7, a six-octave gap is never produced, as G#7 moves down to 
G#6 in the piccolo just as the double basses move down from G#2 to G#l.
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Between figures 7 and 10 of the orchestral score, each instrumental line is 
marked with substantial trill episodes, creating an unmistakable swirling sound effect 
from each of the respective instruments. This dramatic trill section culminates during 
the first two bars of figure 9, seen in ex. 5.4 above, where one can observe an overall 
two-octave leap in the piccolo, and octave leaps in the flutes, trumpets and trombones. 
Interestingly, these octave leaps are immediately followed by octave falls, creating a 
dizzying rising and falling motion enhanced by the trills. The use of octaves here also 
adds to the feelings of vertigo created by the void of notes in between the octavo 
registers.
In describing what he regards as some of the problems posed by octaves,
Pierre Boulez proscriptively writes that
octaves create a weakening or hole in the succession of sound relationships by way of 
reinstating a principle of identity denied by other sounds, so they are at variance with the 
principle of structural organization in the world in which they appear; [...] octaves must be 
completely avoided at the risk of structural nonsense.22
In other words, by drawing attention to their pitch identity through their sameness, 
octaves lack a directional impulse precisely because of their relative salience. The 
octave’s lack of drive to resolve therefore sets it apart from the rest of the orchestral 
texture, creating a sonic vacuum -  perhaps like the visual one experienced spatially 
between the ground and sky in the painting.
22 Pierre Boulez, Boulez on Music Today, trans. Susan Bradshaw and Richard Rodney Bennett 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1971), 46 (italics original).
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5.3.4 Movement
Dutilleux explains that the composition’s main title includes ‘Mouvement’ as one of 
its three qualities because Van Gogh’s painting generates the appearance of 
movement: Tve tried to represent it by music that goes from almost static moments
93to passages of extreme movement and great violence.’ And, as we have already 
discussed, the painting imparts a spectacular tableau of movement. The first 
movement’s title, ‘Nebuleuse’, almost certainly refers to the glowing nebula depicted 
in the painting. It consists of several episodes of rapid movement each followed by 
periods of relative repose: episode 1 (figures 1-9), episode 2 (figures 10-16), episode 
3 (figures 17-29), and episode 4 (figure 30 to the end of the movement). Dutilleux 
writes:
The first part of Timbres, espace, movement is presented in a single, unbroken piece, although 
three different rhythmic episodes underline its form. Sound events are tied together around a 
pivotal sound, G sharp, which runs through the work under a variety of lighting effects. Static, 
almost stagnant periods alternate with outbursts of violence.24
Once again, the composer opts for a visual metaphor, ‘lighting effects’, to describe his 
musical treatment. The description of static episodes alternating with violent 
‘outbursts’ must presumably approximate to the turbulent effects that Dutilleux 
experienced whilst viewing the painting and may represent his own phenomenal 
experience of allowing his eyes to range across the canvas between these stark 
contrasts.
23 Dutilleux, cited in Glayman, Henri Dutilleux, 73.
24 Henri Dutilleux (1978), cited in the liner notes to the Symphony No. 1; Timbre, espace, mouvement. 
Orchestre National de Lyon, cond. Serge Baudo, compact disc, Harmonia Mundi HMC 905159 (1986).
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The opening figure 1 (ex. 5.1) creates an aural impression of the flutes shifting 
slowly across the musical canvas, and a disquieting intensity is sustained by the 
chromatic near-saturation of the octave below the initial high G#. Each atonal 
woodwind presentation seems to possess its own territory and sounds independent of 
the other musical lines, thus eschewing any real sense of harmonic structure. In the 
same way, the first harmonic grouping five bars into figure 1 (ex. 5.5) incorporates 
several minor seconds and major sevenths, but instead of creating any particular 
harmonic dissonance the atonal context seems to assimilate this potential within its 
pitch-oriented fabric.
Example 5.5: bar 5, figure 1
(*enza rret r  I
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In other words, the instrumental voices assume the phenomenal appearance of floating 
lines adrift from the other musical textures, and the resulting inharmonic structure 
seems to accommodate (and absorb) the normally expected dissonance from such 
intervals. Moreover, the oscillations these intervals set up provide an analogue to the 
‘vibrating’ orbs in the painting. The first notable change in the musical texture occurs 
in bar 3 at figure 2, where an irregular crotchet division, played staccato, appears in 
the oboe and clarinets, adding to the unrest. Further still, figure 1 presents a series of 
repeated-note triplets passed down through the woodwinds -  first the flutes, second 
the clarinets, third the clarinets and bassoons, and then all winds together (exs. 5.1 and 
5.5). This has the effect of punctuating the ‘static’ instrumental texture in a manner 
analogous to the orbs coruscating through their murky backdrop, as the viewer’s gaze 
alights upon the shimmering brilliance of each star before moving on to the next one.
From the opening, there is also a definite -  and literal -  sense of accumulating 
tension for the listener, stemming from a gradual thickening of the instrumental 
texture, together with a regular presentation of episodes of increasing acceleration. In 
the third bar after figure 3 there are four progressively accelerating, irregular crotchet 
divisions in the four horns (ex. 5.6). The episodes provide a dramatic contrast to the 
previously more ‘static’ texture, and produce an effect analogous to being suddenly 
pulled violently into the painting’s implied vortices.
Example 5.6: bar 3, figure 3, 
showing Cors anglais 1 -4
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The instrumental forces continue to gather at figure 4, but this time the 
impetus fs conferred upon the two clarinets in A through their irregular upward 
flourishes -  combined with a crescendo (ex. 5.7). This episode culminates in the forte 
crescendos in the next two bars where the flourishes switch to the E= clarinet and the 
flutes (ex. 5.8).
Example 5.7: figure 4, showing Clarinets 1 and 2 in A
ftcs
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Example 5.8: figure 4, showing flutes, oboes and clarinet in E=
These gathering instrumental forces, then, with their attendant increases in 
dynamics, convey something of the ‘cosmic whirling’ that Dutilleux writes about 
below, and the flutter-tonguing in the flutes continues this idea, with the oscillations 
circling and therefore implying the pulsating light from the orbs. Dutilleux records his 
affective impressions vividly in the following:
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[I]t seemed to me that the intense pulsation that gives life to this picture, the sense of space 
that dominates it, the palpitation of the subject matter, and above all the effect of the almost 
cosmic whirling emitting from it, could have their equivalents on a musical level. And that 
certain “chromatics” of colour could correspond to particular sound colours.25
For Dutilleux, then, pulsation and palpitation are central impressions of this painting, 
combined with the apparent cosmic whirling. The kind of upward flourishes 
illustrated in exs. 5.7 and 5.8 have a dramatic phenomenal effect, providing the 
listener with a feeling of acceleration. Moreover, the way these turbulent episodes are 
interlaced and distributed reminds the listener of the latent whirlwind effects that 
emanate from the manifold shapes and sizes of the orbs implied in the painting, so 
animating and giving ‘voice’ to the visual tumult. Very often the smaller rhythmic 
swirls seem to be part of an intricate and much larger network of cycling movements, 
revolving generally around G# as a focal pitch (ex. 5.9). These revolutions about G# 
have the effect of fixing the listener sonically to one place, both in musical and 
phenomenological time, for there is no overarching goal which propels either us or the 
music forward, save for the completion of these seemingly random circulations.
(t»r Jin )
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Example 5.9: figure 14 showing Flutes 1 and 2
25 Henri Dutilleux, cited in Kyle Gann’s programme note for the Cincinnati Symphony Orchestra, 8 
October 2004 <http://www.cincinnatisymphony.org/PDF/ProgramNotes/CS04_0405.pdf> [accessed 5 
January 2005].
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Bars 4 and 5 at figure 8 (ex. 5.10) present an interesting counter-motion 
between the flutes and oboes and the clarinets and bassoons: the trilled flutes and 
oboes fall predominantly in minor thirds in quaver movements, whilst the clarinets 
and bassoons ascend more slowly in a mixture of semitones and minor thirds. This 
contrary motion augments the whirling effects by adding to the representation of 
turbulence. These sonic ‘eddies’ seem to reflect the visual swirls in the painting and 
provide the sense that, although subsumed by a more sweeping motion or 
undercurrent, these orbs spin within their own orbits independent of this grander 
scheme, effecting a kind of tableau vivant.
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Example 5.10: figure 8, bars 4-5
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Figure 10 (ex. 5.11) is perhaps one of the most striking episodes in the 
composition because it marks the introduction of a theme. Hitherto, there has been no 
such thematic subject, save for the rhythmic figures featuring increasing diminution. 
The first presentation of this theme is played by the oboe d’amore and begins on G#4, 
occuring twice more with some small pitch changes in the shorter note-values.
Example 5.11: figure 10, showing the oboe d’amore
The same theme appears next on the trumpet, third bar of figure 12, and then again in 
unison on the clarinet and oboe, both times also beginning on G#4. One bar into this 
last presentation from the clarinet and oboe at figure 13, the flutes enter on G#5 (ex. 
5.12), creating a close, almost stretto-like canonic imitation, and this process 
continues in truncated fashion across all of the woodwind voices to the end of figure 
15.
One of the striking effects of this instrumental interweaving is the turbulent 
chaos that ensues as each voice competes against the other, because no sooner have 
we heard the start of one statement than we hear the same theme beginning in another 
voice, overlapping the one already in motion. Moreover, there is an attendant feeling 
of acceleration and vertigo produced by the skein of overlapping voices and the 
increasing truncation of the thematic material in figures 14 and 15 (ex. 5.13) as the 
voices scramble to be heard.
Another interesting consequence from dividing this theme’s presentation 
across the various woodwind voices is the possible analogue with the shades of colour 
in the painting’s swirls. Van Gogh’s treatment of blue and yellow, for example, finds
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him using many impastoed shades of the colour resulting in a variety of textures. And, 
sonically,' Dutilleux has created something similar by using the same theme but 
varying its ‘colour’ and timbre through its appearance across the differing 
instrumental voices. These thematic episodes, then, represent something of a plastic, 
object-oriented approach to composition: the ‘theme’ being rather like a sculpture 
viewed repeatedly from different angles -  identified as the same object and seen 
differently on each new presentation -  but never ‘developed’ in the sense of the 
‘thematic working’ of the Austro-German classical tradition.
1 icol Oboe
Example 5.12: figure 13
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Example 5.13: figure 15, full score
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5.3.5 Stationary Effects and the Prolongation of Time
Thus far, we have considered the musical generation of implied movement in the 
composition to represent the affective feelings driven by the illusory motion effects 
that Dutilleux sees in the painting. However, what makes this composition so 
effective is its juxtaposition of contrasting ‘static’ episodes, such as the G# circling 
episode in ex. 5.4 above, against these more accelerated episodes -  casting the latter 
into sharp relief. Accordingly, our discussion will now turn towards an analysis of 
these more stable elements of the music in terms of a response to the fixedness in time 
of the painting, which generates a sense of timelessness through minimal musical 
development and prolongation.
It might be argued that Dutilleux’s recurrent recirculation of musical material, 
and in particular the omnipresent G#, serves to reflect the vortical illusion induced by 
the painting: the listener feels continually pulled from side to side towards the same 
group of sounds just as the viewer feels as if they are being sucked inescapably into 
this picture, rocked violently between the orbs like a ball bearing fired into a pinball 
machine. In this way, both picture and music expedite a feeling of maintaining one’s 
position rather than developing a sense of progression.
Example 5.14: figure 1, showing Piccolos 1 and 2
As we saw previously, Dutilleux sustains each individual note of the opening 
melody throughout the opening bars. These lines are generated from the thematic
figure (G#, E, D#, and F) presented in piccolo two in bar 5, ex. 5.14. Each pitch is 
then sustained successively: the G# by first piccolo, the E by first flute, the D# by the 
second flute, and the F by the second piccolo (see ex. 5.1) -  saturating the musical 
space. Interestingly, Dutilleux told the composer Rene Koering that bars 5-10 of this 
first movement are ‘la toile du fond’ (the backdrop) of the score, just as the 
ubiquitous swirls form the backdrop to the painting.
Example 5.15: figure 1, Piccolo 1, bar 8
In the eighth bar, two bars before figure 2 (ex. 5.15), Piccolo 1 takes the theme
and presents it in retrograde, adding an initial C. Once again, the winds successively
sustain each of these pitches. This time the brass underpins the process, the homs
sustaining a chord whilst the trumpets reinforce the ubiquitous G#. There is also a
concomitant thickening of texture: Flutes 1 and 2 in the ninth bar sustain a minor
second (D# and E), and similarly Oboes 1 and 2 sustain the augmented second (C and
D#), thus recreating the same pitch material previously heard at bar 8.
The sustaining and accumulation of the voices that emerge from the thematic
cell heard at figure 1 (exs. 5.14 and 5.15) display a circling formation analogous to the
rhythmic swirls in the painting, circling because they are orbiting the same material.
Moreover, these voices ‘float’, like the orbs in the painting, suspended in their own
musical space through an absence of tonal ‘gravity’ pulling them in any one direction.
The palindrome strengthens this effect, too, through its retroversion, giving an
26 Dutilleux in conversation, radio broadcast on France-Musique, 28 December 1978, cited in Potter, 
Henri Dutilleux: His Life and Works, 125.
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impression of a reversal of direction -  a phenomenon which a listener is likely to 
recognise'due to the relatively slow tempo and the limited extent of the pattern. The 
accumulation of the musical texture through the prolongation of successive notes of 
the thematic cell thus creates an analogue to the accumulations of circular lines that 
form the contours in the painting. Confronted by the problem that music requires a 
particular duration of time to unfold its entire structure, whereas a painting is 
available to (if not perceptible by) the human gaze in a single instant, Dutilleux has 
found a way of prolonging an instant of time, a musical voice, through an absence of 
musical development. This, again, is what Edward T. Cone calls in Chapter 1 a 
‘suspended saturation’ of musical space.
Similarly, if the opening section is a microcosm of the rest of the composition, 
this provides an analogue with the experience of the painting by introducing, for 
example, the pitch ‘colours’ presented in figure 1 (exs. 5.1 and 5.14) and prolonging 
them through the following bars. The analogue lies in the similarity between 
experiencing the painting’s colours first and then seeing their prolongation in the 
tableau’s constituent parts -  principally the circulating swirls. Dutilleux constructs his 
composition upon this idea through the prolongation mentioned and thus builds up his 
musical texture in a similar way to Van Gogh’s method of building up his impastos 
using multiple lines and layers of paint.
Of particular interest here is the way this thematic material becomes a sort of 
template for the formal organisation of the piece as a whole. The pitch voices or lines 
circulate the same material without any particular development, motivic or otherwise, 
thus creating a sense of stasis. It is perhaps in this way that Dutilleux is attempting to 
represent the fixity of the painting’s images through the invariability of the musical 
material, which tends to change in aspect rather than form. What motion there is takes
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the form of a kind of circumambulation, rather like the roving of the eye across the 
canvas -  a sense of walking or circling about something and alighting upon certain 
moments that pique our interest, our consciousness, before we are drawn to ‘observe’ 
another part.
5.4 Conclusion
Throughout this chapter it has been argued that Dutilleux, rather than trying to 
represent the painting’s ostensible subject matter, has sought to present something 
sonically akin to a phenomenal experience of La nuit etoilee, such as the one that he 
says he experiences himself in terms of timbre, space and movement -  hence the 
composition’s main title. In other words, the composer’s musical intention has been to 
produce emotional affects in his listener analogous to those one might feel upon 
viewing the painting itself -  to reproduce ‘in sound the strange impression of vertigo 
and cosmic space this picture gives you’. The questions are whether these musical 
means we have discussed are enough to recreate the phenomenal effect of the painting 
in the mind of the listener and, indeed, whether this is enough to constitute a musical 
representation of Van Gogh’s painting.
Accordingly, we might say that the application of Clifton’s phenomenological 
approach to musical experience provides a particular and cogent way of describing the 
possible ways this composition may engender Dutilleux’s -  and our -  impressions of 
the painting. The principal facets discussed, then, have been musical space, and its 
implied texture, and musical time, which it has been contended are posited 
phenomenally by contrasting the extremes of instrumental tessitura and creating 
episodes between stasis and accelerating movement, respectively. Consistent with this 
theory and its methodology, the experiential foundation of, and bodily bases for, our
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perception enable the listener to feel, affectively, these perceptual experiences: the 
highs and lows of the instrumental textures, the spatial void at the heart of the music 
caused by the absence of the upper strings, and the violence of the movement in the 
music’s most frenetic sections. Therefore, it can be seen that the corporeal body of the 
experiencing subject may actually become part of our understanding of the music and 
the painting through notions of space, movement, touch and texture in the lived 
musical experience.
The two levels of representation that we have discussed, physical and 
affective, are also both driven by the primary attributes of space and movement, the 
former belonging virtually to the painting and implied by its subject matter, and the 
latter, affectively, through the composer’s (and probably our) response to it. It is 
argued that the affective components intimated by the title Timbre, Espace, 
Mouvement are in part driven by our phenomenological way of knowing the world. 
Furthermore, both of these levels, physical and affective, are contingent upon the 
imaginative and perceptive faculties of the perceiver. It therefore seems likely that we 
could not understand the virtual level of movement and space in the picture without 
access to our experiential pasts of other paintings and real night skies, and our own 
movement in and around the worlds which we inhabit. In this way, the sense of 
movement and space in the music is also phenomenological: the dizzying whirlwind 
passages are so partly because of the physical movement we have encountered 
corporeally. And the ensuing affective level is one that relies on our emotive faculties 
as feeling and responding participants to the musical and visual experience. Spatial 
relations and movement are therefore not intrinsic properties of the painting or of the 
musical object, but are instead fields of action in which we participate in collaboration 
with the music and painting to create meaning.
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Moreover, we said at the beginning that the visual experience of La nuit 
etoilee is not restricted to the sense of sight alone but stimulates other senses 
synaesthetically, creating experiences of physical space (the chasm), vertiginous 
movement (swirling) and touch (texture). And it seems also that Dutilleux’s musical 
effects work by stimulating impressions which normally pertain to senses other than 
hearing alone. For example, notions of musical colour may be subsumed under this 
sensual banner, for we may also think of this parameter as something that is textural 
and thus experienced in a spatial way. The textural extremes of the low strings and 
high woodwinds have an experiential basis in the real world; if something sounds 
rough we recognise this from other senses such as touch as well. Occurring in 
physical space, touch and hearing are mutually implicated because it is through 
touching something that we create sound, and thus reciprocally sound may also 
remind us of touch.
Furthermore, although a musical pitch cannot obviously be a colour, it may 
behave and be experienced in a way that is analogous to the experience of a single 
colour. Given that colour is generally recognised by its hue, brightness, and 
saturation, a continuously held musical note may therefore represent a colour in the 
painting, as it may be said to continue at a specific intensity (saturation) across a 
musical space at a particular pitch (brightness) and texture (hue). Musically, then, we 
are experiencing something akin to the phenomenological perception of time and 
space that Dutilleux experiences as belonging to the painting.
However, although the facets discussed have been demonstrated as originating 
from the painting, do we need the painting to make sense of the music? 
Phenomenology argues that the phenomenal encounter with music is bracketed off 
from extra-musical experiences, and that it is those things it purports to be about. But
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in the case of this composition, hearing what we might call the musical after-effects of 
Dutilleux’s experience of the painting seems incomplete without our own reference to 
this other experiential domain.
We might recall at this point Edward T. Cone’s example of hearing someone 
sigh: without knowing the context or what it refers to, the sigh may transmit no 
specific message and it remains intransitive and lacks causality until we discover its 
source. In the same way, Timbre, Espace, Mouvement only becomes expressive of the 
after-effects of Dutilleux’s affective response to seeing the painting when we regard 
the painting as causative to these effects. The painting-as-referent enables us to hear 
in the music the facets discussed because we transfer concepts from the experiential 
domain of the painting which, accordingly, helps us to make appropriate selections 
from the musical domain, whose phenomenological effects are then ascribed to the 
latent ones in the painting.
Finally let us compare Rothko Chapel and Timbre, Espace, Mouvement for a 
moment. Feldman’s work, on the one hand, seems intent on generating an event, 
reflecting aspects of the surround of abstract paintings, together with their colours and 
continuation. On the other hand, Dutilleux’s work seems to represent the various 
phenomenal effects the composer experienced in his encounter with a single, 
representational painting. Accordingly, the difference is a subtle one between levels of 
intent. If Rothko Chapel focuses exclusively on the painted surface, Timbre, Espace, 
Mouvement does, at least, give some consideration to the representational aspects of 
the painting, such as the implied void and vortical motion discussed -  a sonic 
representation of the composer’s phenomenal impressions of the painting. In this way, 
rather than creating simply a representation of Van Gogh’s painting (were such a 
thing possible), Dutilleux has sought to express something about his psychological
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and emotional experience upon viewing it. Once this extra-musical link is established, 
the listener is able to ascribe the musical happenings to this, the source domain, and so 
it becomes an integrative field of forces that has cause and effect. Thus, the music 
might be said to provide a representation of a physical encounter and a psychological 
involvement with the painting, led by certain recognisable aspects of the visual world 
so depicted.
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CHAPTER 6
Making Audible: Unlocking Time and Movement in Tan Dun’s Death and Fire: 
Dialogue with Paul Klee
For me, there are no boundaries between the visual and the audio in art creation itself. They 
constitute a unified yet circular realm for my thinking.1
-Tan Dun
Art does not reproduce the visible but makes visible.2
[Painting is taking a]n active line on a walk, moving freely, without goal.3
-  Paul Klee
Tan Dun’s Death and Fire: Dialogue with Paul Klee offers an example of music 
composed after Paul Klee’s paintings which are themselves indebted to musical ideas, 
suggesting a closer, almost circular integration between the two media: ‘music is 
painting is music’. This chapter will set out to examine how Tan’s music relates to 
Klee’s paintings and, indeed, his overall aesthetic. Does it, for example, respond to 
the visible painting itself, its subject matter, or the ideology that may lie behind the 
work?
Through the medium of paint, Klee strove to capture time in the form of 
movement as expressed by colour, line or rhythm. In this way, the viewer, confronted 
by these elements, unlocks time in the unfolding process of looking. Gilles Deleuze 
argues that in painting, as in music, the problem is not in the distinction between the
1 Tan Dun, ‘Visual Music’, Tan Dun Online
<http://www.tandunonline.com/Composition/VisualMusic_Overview.asp?id=4>
[accessed 25 January 2006].
2 Paul Klee, ‘Creative Credo’ [1920], in Notebooks, vol. 1: The Thinking Eye, ed. Jurg Spiller, trans. 
Ralph Manheim (New York: Overlook Press, 1992), 76-80.
3 Paul Klee, Pedagogical Sketchbook (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), 16 (bold original).
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figurative and the non-figurative, but in the rendering or ‘capturing’ of unseen and 
unheard forces. This was precisely what was meant by Klee’s famous formula, quoted 
above, that ‘[a]rt does not reproduce the visible but makes visible’. Forces such as 
time, then, are made visible. Likewise, Deleuze continues, just as painting must 
render ‘invisible forces visible’, so, too, music must render ‘nonsonorous forces 
sonorous’.4
Accordingly, the relationship or ‘dialogue’ between the music and the 
paintings will be examined by considering the extent to which Tan succeeds in 
making audible the inaudible forces latent in the paintings. These ‘forces’ will be 
regarded as primarily temporal, suggestive of movement, and sonic, suggestive of 
noise, but also sensual, suggesting audible and haptic textures. This chapter will 
pursue the idea that Tan reanimates the ‘frozen’ time of some of the paintings through 
his use of instrumental colour, line, rhythm and sound effects, and so generates 
musical ‘narratives’.
6.1 Paul Klee
The painter Paul Klee (1879-1940) was bom in Switzerland, although he studied and 
settled in Germany before returning to his homeland in 1933.5 Bom into a musical 
family, Klee was also a competent violinist, and he made copious references to music 
in both his visual art and his writings. Indeed, he wrote: ‘I am continually being made 
aware of parallels between music and the fine arts. As yet they defy analysis. It is
4 Gilles Deleuze, Francis Bacon: the Logic o f Sensation, trans. Daniel W. Smith (London: Continuum, 
2004), 40.
5 Klee left Germany and his teaching position at the Diisseldorf Academy in 1933 and returned to Bern 
in Switzerland after increasing hostility from the National Socialist movement and the Nazis. His 
paintings were displayed in the notorious Nazi exhibition in Dessau in 1937 entitled ‘Entartete Kunst’ 
(Degenerate Art), which featured over a hundred of his previously confiscated works.
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certain that both art forms are defined by time. That can easily be proved.’6 In 
particular, as the art historian Andrew Kagan writes, Klee’s search for ‘universally 
applicable aesthetic properties from the accomplishments of the titans of music’ -  
Bach, Beethoven and Mozart -  led him to discover ‘theoretical parallels between
n
painting and music’. In painting, Klee’s fixation with music is evident in the wirily 
rendered musical instruments, the visual trajectory of a conductor’s baton beating 
triple or common time in the ‘ship’ drawings, visualisations of fugue and counterpoint 
and the use of musical symbols such as the fermata.
A sharing of ideas and an imitation of the other medium’s intrinsic properties 
-  such as line, rhythm, polyphony, movement and time -  constituted Klee’s central 
aesthetic relationship with music. The titles of many of his paintings suggest a close 
alignment with music, for example: Dogmatisch Komposition (1918), Im Bachschen 
Stil (1919), Fugue in Rot (1921), Pastorale (Rhythmen) (1927), Nocturne fur Horn 
(1921), Blau-orange Harmonie (1923) and Polyphon gefasstes Weiss (1930). Visual 
rhythms, such as repeated line forms, abound in his works, and he frequently 
compares his painted lines to melodies. His extensive thoughts on this subject are 
effectively distilled into the quotation given at the head of the chapter, which suggests 
that painting is taking an ‘active line on a walk’. Through the fascinating and detailed 
examples of line in his writings and teaching notes, the artist shows how it is possible 
to represent, among other things, tension, movement, depth, balance and their 
opposites.8
Although Klee resisted facile connections between music and his painting, and 
was particularly vitriolic towards those that offered such a critique without
6 Hajo Diichting, Paul Klee: Painting Music (New York: Prestel, 2002), 8.
7 Andrew Kagan, Paul Klee: Art and Music (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983), 38- 
39.
8 See his Pedagogical Sketchbooks and Notebooks for fully detailed accounts of Klee’s theoretical 
workings on line.
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qualification,9 he remained interested in finding equivalents in painting to musical 
rhythm and polyphony. He wrote that ‘[achievements made in music by the end of 
the eighteenth century remain (for the present) in their infancy in the visual arts’,10 
and it is with these aspects in mind that he constructed many of his most enduring 
images, layering colours transparently on top of one another.
For Klee, the expressive effects of line and colour, once freed from the 
constraints of representational art, could be formalised in a manner similar to 
harmony and counterpoint in music. To this end, he spent a great deal of time creating 
values of light and dark gradations and then applying this to colour:
[T]ranslating the shadowy image, the method of measuring time in terms of light and dark, 
into colour means that [...] each tone value corresponds to a single colour. That is to say, do 
not add white to lighten or black to darken the colours, but use one single colour for one layer. 
The following layer gets another colour.11
These tectonic layers, then, are ‘read’ in a temporal manner but they also correspond 
to the synchronicity of voices found in a polyphonic musical composition. Kagan 
contends that Klee saw ‘the possibility of an authentic, personally significant parallel 
with music -  a parallel between absolute sound and theoretically autonomous form
19and colour’. This can be observed in his assertion that musical tones, like colour, 
can take on a variety of shades: ‘from the first, small steps to the rich flowering of a
I -y
coloured chord! What prospects for the thematic dimension! ’ And in the painting 
below Neue Harmonie (1936, fig. 6.1) we see a realisation of such a ‘coloured chord’.
9 See Duchting, Paul Klee: Painting Music, 11-12. Andrew Kagan also makes this point about Klee’s 
circumspection in Paul Klee: Art and Music, 21-22.
10 Quoted in Diichting, Paul Klee: Painting Music, 10.
11 Klee, Diaries, 142, cited in Duchting, 18.
12 Kagan, Paul Klee: Art and Music, 27.
13 Klee, Jena Lecture, quoted in Duchting, 46.
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Figure 6.1: Paul Klee, Neue Harmonie (1936)14
In a drive towards purism, Klee focused on colour, light, and their dynamism as his 
subjects.15 Andrew Kagan maintains that Klee’s Grail for pictorial polyphony was 
'inextricably bound up in transparent colour depth’.16 For example, Polyphon 
gefasstes Weiss (fig. 6.16) demonstrates exactly that colour transparency and depth 
through its overlapping rectilinear planes of intersecting colours.
The art critic Robert Hughes, in his book The Shock o f the New (1991), wrote 
that Klee’s ‘compositions of stacked forms, fanned out like decks of cards or color
14 Oil on canvas, 36 7/8 x 26 1/8, Guggenheim Museum, New York.
15 See Kagan, Paul Klee: Art and Music, 68-69.
16 Ibid., 78.
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swatches, are attempts to freeze time in a static composition, to give visual motifs the 
“unfolding” quality of aural ones’.17
Figure 6.2: Paul Klee, Fugue in Rot (1921)18
Indeed, the suggestion and evocation of frozen time through implied movement or 
rhythm was to become the dominant subject of much of Klee’s output. The small pen 
and ink sketch Flucht zum Recht (1913) is an early example of a ‘static composition’ 
evincing movement and its direction. Because of Klee’s striving to create analogues 
between musical polyphony and his graded layering of colour, as well as his 
introduction of a temporal dimension through the creation of colour ‘swatches’ that 
incline the viewer to search the image in a particular dimension, it takes time to ‘read’ 
his paintings. The musical titles of many of his paintings betray this aspect, for 
example the directional impulse in Fugue in Rot (fig. 6.2), whose ‘themes’ unfold 
from left to right and downwards, like a musical score, and Rosegarten (1920, fig.
17 Robert Hughes, The Shock o f the New: Art and the Century o f Change (London: Thames and 
Hudson, 1991), 304.
18 Watercolour on paper, 24.3 x 37.2 cm, private collection, Switzerland.
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6.3) with its vertiginous parallel lines that encourage the viewer’s gaze along its 
various paths.
Figure 6.3: Paul Klee, Rosegarten (1920)19
A directional reading effect can also be observed in the so-called ‘magic 
square’20 paintings, where one’s eyes are drawn in one particular direction through a 
certain rhythmic and dynamic use of colour. For example, in Alter Klang (1925, fig.
6.4) an arrangement of various coloured squares directs the viewer towards the 
conspicuous white square, middle right, through the various colour dynamics. 
Regarding this temporal aesthetic, Klee acknowledges the influence of the French 
artist Robert Delaunay (1885-1941), when he writes, ‘Delaunay strove to shift the
19 Oil on cardboard, 50 x 43 cm, Stddtische Galerie im Lenbachhaus, Munich.
20 Klee’s so-called ‘magic squares’ were dubbed thus by Will Grohmann, see Paul Klee (New York: 
Harry N. Abrams Inc., 1954).
21 Andrew Kagan argues convincingly that Alter Klang is painted after Leonardo da Vinci’s Saint John 
the Baptist, about which Klee had enthused to his wife a few years earlier after viewing it on his trip to 
Italy 1901-02, see Kagan, Paul Klee: Art and Music, 71.
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accent in art onto the time element, after the fashion of a fugue, by choosing formats 
that could not be encompassed in one glance.’22
Figure 6.4: Paul Klee, Alter (1927)23
In this way, there seems to be a concerted effort to slow the reading of a visual image, 
to let it unfold and be directional in time, like the presentation of a musical theme. 
Klee declared in 1917 that ‘[pjolyphonic painting is superior to music’,24 because the 
time element becomes spatialized, the temporal forces of polyphony captured, in the 
process. But, while striving for a polyphony in paint that presents itself all at once, he 
was at the same time interested in our reading of his paintings in time, 
multidimensionally. Naturally, the objects which populate any one of these paintings 
really are there all at once, but it is we as observers who unfold them in time. By
22 Klee, The Diaries o f Paul Klee 1898-1918, ed. and with an introduction by Felix Klee, trans. B. 
Schneider, R. Y. Zachary and M. Knight (London: Peter Owen, 1965), 374.
23 Oil on cardboard, 38 x38 cm, Offentliche Kunstsammlung, Basle.
24 Klee, The Diaries o f Paul Klee 1898-1918, ed. and introduced by Felix Klee, trans. B. Schneider, R. 
Y. Zachary and M. Knight (London: Peter Owen, 1965), 374.
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seeing music’s default condition as polyphonic, involving the sounding of all of its 
dimensions simultaneously, Klee challenged the widely held notion that music is the 
temporal art par excellence and painting the spatial art, whose meaning is recovered 
immediately in one perceptual hit. But as we discussed in Part I, music’s temporality 
may be said, phenomenally, to occupy a spatial component too, through its texture, so 
that it may not be entirely incommensurate with the space a painting occupies. Thus, 
both music and painting may be said to construct a field of action or territory in the 
Deleuzian manner. Moreover, the latent time component in Klee’s painting belies the 
idea that either constitutes an instantaneous perceptual acquisition.
Klee used a remarkable variety of materials, techniques and surfaces in his 
work. The materials included oils, watercolours, crayons, pen, pencil and ink; the 
techniques included gouache, lithographs, stencilling and spraying, as well as 
conventional painting; and the surfaces ranged from standard canvas to newspaper, 
cardboard, sandpaper, cloth, gauze, tracing paper and burlap. Accordingly, there is 
potential here for invoking the phenomenological effect of the resulting surfaces 
through musical texture, and this aspect will be explored in the following analyses.
6.2 Tan Dun and Death and Fire: Dialogue with Paul Klee
Tan Dim, based in New York since 1986, was bom in 1957 in Simao, China. Having 
worked as a rice-planter and a performer of Peking opera, he enrolled at Beijing’s 
Central Conservatory, before moving to the United States in 1986 to continue his 
studies. In 1993 he completed his DMA at Columbia University with the submission 
of the composition under analysis here. His music has brought together both Western 
and Eastern traditions, and he has written many multimedia compositions, including 
the film score for Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000), for which he won an
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Academy Award for best music score in 2001. Other compositions he describes as 
‘visual music’ include Soundshape (1990), written for an ensemble of 70 ceramic 
instruments, and, more recently, Deconstruction -  Reconstruction -  Resurrection 
(2005), the realisation of his concept for an installation of visual music incorporating 
the pyramidal rebuilding of two pianos in a visual and acoustic presentation. 
Therefore, it would seem that the composition for discussion here, Death and Fire, 
with its overt relationship to Klee’s work, is an extension of his visual music 
conception.
Death and Fire: Dialogue with Paul Klee (1992) is an orchestral work 
named after Paul Klee’s Tod und Feuer (1940), though the work as a whole (in all but 
three of its ten movements) refers to six other specific Klee paintings. In the preface 
to his commentary on the work, submitted for his DMA thesis, Tan writes,
There are several ways in which Klee’s aesthetic ideas can be related directly to my music. In 
Klee’s thinking, thickness, density, length and contour of line correspond to dynamic, color, 
duration and contour respectively, in musical line. In translating some of Klee’s drawings 
back into my auditory imagination -  in “reading” them as scores -  a kind of melodic thinking
which closely resembles certain Chinese music aesthetics was immediately recognizable to
26me.
• 77This Chinese aesthetic, he goes on to explain, is ‘linear [and] non-harmonic’, and 
consists of playing musical notes in a variety of ways that affect their sound colour. It 
is thus, he claims, fully congruent with Klee’s occupation with colour and line. From
25 First performed in Glasgow, 27 March 1993 by the BBC Scottish Symphony Orchestra with Tan 
Dun conducting.
26 Tan Dun, ‘Death and Fire: Dialogue with Paul Klee: an Analysis’ (unpublished DMA thesis, 
Columbia University, 1993), 2.
27 Tan Dun, cited in liner notes for Out o f Peking Opera; Death and Fire; Orchestral Theatre II, 
Helsinki Philharmonic Orchestra, cond. Muhai Tang, compact disc, Ondine ODE 864-2 (1998).
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this, it is clear that Tan intends to exploit melodic line and dynamics in his Dialogue 
with Paul Klee.
However, Tan’s seemingly straightforward assertion about ‘translating’ these 
pictures ‘back into’ music through the act of ‘reading’ them as scores is, as we have 
discussed in Part I, an unstable and problematic idea -  and somewhat reminiscent of 
Siglind Bruhn’s ‘transmedialization’. First of all, the notion of ‘reading’ a painting as 
a score implies that -  were such a thing possible -  a mere act of decoding. Even if 
Klee’s drawings do in some way capture time, a direct and unambiguous route into 
the musical domain is obviously not viable. If Tan has attempted translation here, then 
he has done so through his own mediated interpretation -  as we have been at pains to 
underline in Part I. But more significantly, it is how Tan’s music functions in relation 
to the paintings, and how it sounds to the listener within that context, that matters 
here.
Death and Fire: Dialogue with Paul Klee is divided as follows:
I. Portrait
Insert 1: Animals at Full Moon 
Insert 2: Senicio [szc]
Insert 3: Ad Pamassum
II. Self Portrait
Insert 4: Twittering Machine 
Insert 5: Earth Witches 
Insert 6: Intoxication 
Insert 7: J. S. Bach
III. Death and Fire
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Tan writes that the Roman numeral designations found in the score (I. Portrait, II. Self 
Portrait, III. Death and Fire) denote the main structural or ‘frame’ sections.28 These 
sections are distinct from the ‘inserts’ through their sharing of pitch material. He 
writes:
They contain the large-scale pitch or melodic development, and are written primarily for 
strings. The pitch material is divided between the first two sections in such a way that there is 
material which is unique and material which is common to each. Ill retains a part of the 
distinctive material of II and repeats that of I. Structurally, this is something of a return, and 
thus a closure.29
The significance of this, then, is the implied congruity of the structural sections. Tan 
specifies an absence of pauses between the individual sections of the work, indicating 
that despite the apparent division into three main sections and seven inserts, he sees 
the work as a cohesive and continuous whole, strengthened by the sense of closure 
brought by section III through the return of material presented originally in section I.
The work’s subtitle, ‘Dialogue with Paul Klee’, is explained as follows by the 
composer in the preface to the orchestral score:
About five years ago, I went to an exhibition on the works o f the painter Paul Klee at the 
Museum of Modem Art in New York City. I was extremely moved and wanted to write a 
symphony. This became a discussion, a dialogue between myself and Klee’s paintings, but not 
in any sense a musical description of any particular paintings. Although constructed of many 
small sections, my symphony is imagined as a complete, continuous work.30
A further explanation is found in the introduction to his DMA commentary:
28 See Tan, ‘Death and Fire [...]: an Analysis’, 18.
29 Ibid.
30 Tan Dun, programme note in full orchestral score, Tan Dun, Death and Fire: Dialogue with Paul 
Klee (New York: G. Schirmer, 1995).
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My intention was to have a dialogue with Klee concerning these issues, rather than to 
translate, interpret, or represent his work. The Inserts of “Death and Fire” are not musical 
equivalents of the paintings referred to by the section titles. They are rather my own response, 
my own discussions of the ideas and images of the paintings.31
I . PogrMir j ,  5 p b u r a i t  X  vzatm  a>mp
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Figure 6.5: Tan Dun’s ‘Structure of Orchestral Coloring’
Tan’s intention to have a discussion or dialogue with Klee’s ideas and images rather 
than a translation, interpretation, or representation of the paintings seems to contradict 
his assertion, cited above, concerning the need to translate ‘Klee’s drawings back into 
[his] auditory imagination’. And such equivocation seems once again indicative of a 
composer’s concern not to align their music too closely with the extra-musical 
domain. This draws into question the nature of the musical representation. To what 
extent does this remain ‘music after painting’ if the composer’s engagement is not 
with specific paintings but more with Klee’s ideas concerning the art, practice and 
philosophy of painting?
In Death and Fire, Tan exploits the standard orchestral instruments in novel 
ways that defy typical pitch classification, focusing instead on noise elements and 
timbre (sound ‘colour’). Such sounds include breathing through brass instruments and
31 Tan, ‘Death and Fire [...]: an Analysis’, 4.
257
clapping the mouthpiece, key clicking and blowing through the headjoints of 
woodwind instruments, and, on the strings, pizzicato, col legno and string slapping. 
These techniques perhaps find their analogue (and their dialogue) in Klee’s 
experimentation into colour dynamics. Tan writes that ‘Klee’s mastery and theory of 
color stimulate my own long-standing interest in tone color. [TJhere is an 
experimental approach in Klee which is akin to my own.’ It is clear that Klee spent 
much of his professional life theorizing and experimenting with colour, as is evident 
from his Notebooks, which consist of over a thousand pages of illustrated technical 
writing. It would therefore seem apposite to a work composed after Klee that it should 
be based on the idea of sound colour -  or at least the composer’s own ideas of what 
sound colour is. But whilst necessary to demonstrate a relationship with Klee’s 
painterly techniques, is such a general notion of sound colour sufficient for a musical 
representation or, indeed, a ‘dialogue’ with the paintings? It is perhaps a matter of 
how this sound ‘colour’ relates to Klee’s use of colour, and how the listener interprets 
this in light of the paintings.
The work has ten sections in all, and from Tan’s colour sketch of the 
‘symphonic’ layout (fig. 6.5)34 we can see that the Roman numeral sections -  ‘I. 
Portrait’, ‘II. Self Portrait’ and ‘III. Death and Fire’ -  form squared, graphical 
superscripts to the line of circular, coloured representations of Inserts 1-7, and 
therefore suggest a more solid and foundational function within the overall musical 
structure.
32 Ibid., 3.
33 See vols. 1 and 2 of Klee’s, Notebooks. The Thinking Eye, ed. Jurg Spiller, trans. Ralph Manheim 
and Heinz Norden (New York: Overlook Press, 1992).
34 This colour sketch is titled ‘Structure o f Orchestral Coloring’, obtained from the official website Tan 
Dun Online < http://www.tandunonline.com/Composition/composition.asp?id=21 &s=3> [accessed 4 
August 2006].
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Tan titles seven of his movements directly after the respective Klee paintings: 
Tiere im Vollmond (1927), Senecio (1922), Ad Parnassum (1932), Die Zwitscher- 
Maschine (1922), Erdhexen (1938), Rausch (1939) and Tod und Feuer (1940). The 
remaining movements focus on what appears to be different aspects of Tan’s 
relationship with Klee. ‘I. Portrait’ suggests a musical portrait of Klee, ‘II. Self 
Portrait’ is Tan’s musical portrait of himself, and ‘Insert 7: J. S. Bach’ presents a 
homage to Bach (and, by extension perhaps, an acknowledgement of his influence on 
Klee’s aesthetic). This arrangement accords with Tan’s desire for a musical ‘dialogue 
with Klee’ and his paintings, for the placing of his own musical ‘Self Portrait’ at the 
centre of the work secures Tan’s own voice. It seems likely, given that Senecio, Ad 
Parnassum, Die Zwitscher-Maschine and Tod und Feuer are among Klee’s most 
popular paintings, that Tan is expecting his listeners to be already familiar with these 
works. However, notwithstanding the foreknowledge of his listeners, it is also 
apparent that the descriptive titles of all of these works are sufficient to generate their 
own conceptual imagery, by pointing towards the subjects alluded to in their titles.
6.3 The Analysis
In this section, the three framing sections -  ‘I. Portrait’, ‘II. Self Portrait’ and ‘III. 
Death and Fire’ -  will be considered due to their exclusive use of the string section, 
which differentiates them from the seven inserts. Following this, the inserts will be 
analysed sequentially in relation to their corresponding paintings.
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6.3.1 Part I: Tan’s Structural Sections I, II, and III
I. Portrait
Figure 6.6: Paul Klee, Young Man Resting (1911)35
The opening movement, 'Portrait’, by implication a musical portrait of Klee, seems to 
draw on the style of Klee’s own self-portraits, such as Young Man Resting (1911, fig. 
6.6) and Lost in Thought (1916, fig. 6.7). It forms the first of the three foundational 
pillars of the piece suggested graphically by Tan’s colour sketch seen in fig. 6.5 
above. In this schematic drawing, the black square with its thick white line cutting a 
diagonal from the bottom left-hand comer up to the top right-hand comer is the only 
monochromatic image among Tan’s graphical illustrations. This graphical symbol 
serves, perhaps, two purposes here. First, the self-portraits themselves are black-and-
35 Pen and ink on paper, 14 x 20 cm, no location given. Reproduced in Constance Naubert-Riser, Klee: 
The Masterworks, trans. John Greaves, with an introduction by Gualtieri Di Sanzo Lazzaro (London: 
Studio Editions, 1988), 13.
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white sketches. Second, both Tan’s graphic and the self-portraits share a certain 
roughness of execution. The quality of the drawings’ facture reveals a scratchiness 
whereby one can almost feel the artist digging into the paper with his pen and ink.
Tan’s ‘Portrait’ employs a similar monochromaticism through its sparse 
musical material and its scoring exclusively for cellos and double basses. The double 
basses enter at bar 1 with narrow intervals played glissando. This three-note gesture 
(B^-C-BB) is what Tan calls the ‘Paul Klee theme’,36 and it is immediately restated 
twice with progressive rhythmic diminution (ex. 6.1). This melodic cell -  a rising tone 
and falling semitone -  returns throughout the work under various guises, and despite 
appearing with various durational values and at different pitch levels, its contour 
remains nonetheless constant.
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Example 6.1: bars 1-6
The monophonic linearity of this movement suggests a direct analogy with Klee’s 
notion of Tine’ and its execution in time. It is what Klee would describe as an active 
line ‘limited in its movement by fixed points’.37 The use of glissandi almost suggests 
the gliding of pen across paper, as if Tan is attempting to unleash once more the 
temporality inherent in the line ‘imprisoned’ on the sketchbook page or finished 
canvas.
j6 Tan, ‘Death and Fire [...]: an Analysis’, 25.
37 Klee, Pedagogical Sketchbook, 18.
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Example 6.2: bars 7-15
The double basses are then joined on the fourth beat of bar 3 by the cellos 
which double their line at the octave. The low pitch frequency, combined with the 
heavy timbre of the basses, seems to emulate the thick, heavy lines of the Klee self- 
portraits. The accented note-repetitions in the second quintuplet groups of bars 10 and 
15 (ex. 6.2) suggests a rougher, denser, less well-defined texture analogous to the 
shaded-in areas of the self-portraits. Indeed, the actual gesture of scrubbing or shading 
is suggested by the performance direction ‘the bow deeply pressing the strings to 
make noise5 (ex. 6.3). Tan5s performance notes indicate this serration as an instruction 
to ‘slap the strings and the fingerboard with the palm of the hand to make a dry 
percussive sound5, which generates sound resembling the rough friction of pencil 
against paper. Whether or not these sounds represent a literal evocation of the act of 
drawing, their effect seems to be to inject ‘real time5 back into the frozen polyphony 
of Klee5s drawings.
262
poco p o c o
Example 6.3: bars 19-26
Indeed, it is perhaps no accident that the visual trace of the serration bears a striking 
resemblance to the jagged lines in Klee’s self-portraiture in figs. 6.6 and 6.7. The 
instruction ‘to make noise’ also suggests an analogy with colour rather than pitch 
itself, as it focuses on sonic and timbral properties (hence, sound ‘colour’) rather than 
on any vertical (harmonic) or horizontal pitch relations. This suggests that, rather than 
try to create a portrait in a slavish manner, Tan has employed methods which 
acoustically reflect the physical actions of tracing lines on paper.
The two- and four-note gestures accompanying the cello provide momentary 
interjections rather than a polyphonic counterpoint. The cello solo is allowed to mark 
out its musical space, accompanied by these small gestural units which sound as if 
they are filling in small details whilst the overall contour of the musical ‘picture’, its 
foreground, is delineated by the dominant cello. Our main focus, however, is 
inevitably concentrated on the principal melodic line.
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Figure 6.7: Paul Klee, Lost in Thought (1916)38
II. Self Portrait
‘Self Portrait’ would appear to be Tan’s musical portrait of himself. The sketch shown 
in fig. 6.8 below exists on Tan’s own website under his work list for Death and 
Fire?9 Immediately striking is its resemblance to a fermata sign, no doubt paying 
homage to Klee, whose frequent use of this musical symbol was just as suggestive 
and ambiguous. Tan’s self-portrait suggests the physiognomy of a face seen side on, 
the white dot representing a left eye, framed by a white band outlining the shape of 
the head, possibly a head of hair. The image occupies about half the frame and has the 
appearance of having been roughly tom down the right diagonal. In fig. 6.5, Tan
38 Lithograph; private collection. Taken from Hans L. Jaffe, Klee (London: Hamlyn, 1972), 91.
39 <http://www.tandunonline.com/Composition/composition.asp?id=21> [accessed 4 August 4 2006].
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assigns this image a similarly styled graphic to the one for ‘Portrait’ above, but this 
time with the addition of a grey band dividing the white diagonal bar.
Figure 6.8: Tan Dun, Self Portrait
Clearly, Tan’s inclusion of this musical self-portrait amongst the other Klee- 
instigated compositions is noteworthy, since the movement was originally published 
as a separate work in 1983 before being revised in 1992 for inclusion in Death and 
Fire, and it is the longest piece of the set by some margin. Since Tan saw the Klee 
exhibition at MoMA around 1990, it is clear that ‘Self Portrait’ owes nothing to the 
stimulus of Klee.40 Perhaps, therefore, its inclusion is motivated by Tan’s desire to be 
a virtual part of this ostensible dialogue with Klee by integrating himself amongst the 
other Klee-specific movements. We now re-encounter the question of whether such 
music can still be considered ‘after’ a painting if it predates its putative ‘stimulus’? As
40 Cited in the preface to the score. Since the score was first published in 1995, Tan would have seen 
the Klee exhibition in approximately 1990.
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was argued in the Introduction, the fact that it forms part of this work affords it a 
viable relationship with Klee’s ideas and images because we are being invited to hear 
the musical object in light of this context.
According to Tan this is the second structural section, sitting roughly in the 
middle of the work, and like the earlier ‘Portrait’ it is scored exclusively for strings. 
The cello solo between bars 85 and 100 (ex. 6.4) is stylistically similar to the one 
heard between bars 33 and 47 of ‘Portrait’.
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Example 6.4: bars 86-90
This time, however, the scoring is for a full string section: Violins 1 and 2 (at times 
divided into eight individual parts), viola, cello and double bass, resulting in a 
thickening of the texture compared to ‘Portrait’. Many of the same kinds of sound 
effect that we saw in ‘Portrait’ are generated here: for example, the slapping of the 
strings and the fingerboards to make thudding percussive sounds, bows deeply 
pressed into the strings to produce a very rough texture, and the abundant use of 
glissandi. Additional techniques include col legno and the use of unpitched notes, 
particularly in the violins and violas, played at the highest registers possible.
Notable features of this piece concern Tan’s use of a musical foreground and 
background, recalling Klee’s visual use of this technique. At bar 1, Violin 1 plays 
triple piano semiquaver quintuplets all on the E string, of indefinite pitch apart from 
the instruction to play the ‘highest notes’. A similar pattern enters at bar 3, played by 
Violin 2 on the highest notes of the A string (ex. 6.5). The two instruments effect a
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‘whispering’ or ‘chattering’ pattern that continues until bar 13, where it reaches a 
double forte marking from the crescendo instigated in bar 11.
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Example 6.5: bars 1-5
Throughout this episode, the duo of viola and cello plays a contrasting sliding 
melody replete with glissandos and the serrated marking mentioned earlier. Again, an 
analogy may be drawn with the rough-sounding bowing and the act of pressing a pen 
or pencil deeply into the paper: the bowing provides a thicker and coarser sound and 
the pencil a deeper and more visible impression on the surface. As we saw in 
‘Portrait’, Tan seems to emulate the production of his portrait as much as the portrait 
itself.
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Example 6.6: bars 12-16
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This episode culminates with the violent quadruple forte of the double bass and a 
percussive beating on the body of the instrument, first with the palms of the hands and 
then with fingernails (ex. 6.6). The ‘chattering’ ends from the upper strings and the 
aural texture thickens in bar 16 with the divisi second violins ‘playing with noise 
behind the bridge’. The slap of the E double bass string produces a striking effect that 
serves to interrupt the reverie just gone. Here, then, we have several layers or voices: 
the background chattering in violins 1 and 2, the rough and scratchy viola glissandos, 
the disjointed, undulating melody from the cello, and the percussive beating of the 
palm and fingernails on the double bass. It is possible to argue that the influence of 
the Chinese musical aesthetic is felt through the linear, non-harmonic gestural style, 
together with the playing of a limited amount of pitch material using varied types of 
attack, dynamics, bowing techniques, glissandos and rhythms -  all of which draw 
attention to the movement’s surface structure.
III. Death and Fire
The third and final structural section, according to Tan’s layout of the work, ‘Death 
and Fire’, shares its name with the main title of the composition, and is the only one 
of the three sections to be named directly after a Klee painting -  Tod und Feuer. 
Stylistically, the painting is markedly different from Klee’s earlier work. Gone is the 
delicate tracery that characterised paintings like Die Zwitscher-Maschine. Instead in 
this, his last period, he paints in heavy black lines and moves increasingly towards 
recognisable figuration. Klee had previously worked almost exclusively with 
notebook-sized paintings, but in the period from 1937 until his death in 1940 he made 
increasing use of larger formats, up to four or five feet in width or height, although at 
46 x 44 cm this painting still retains the modest, intimate proportions of his earlier
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work. In addition, these later works have a striking element of symbolism, and this 
painting is no exception.
Figure 6.9: Paul Klee, Tod und Feuer (1940)41
The weave of the canvas material, plainly visible through the thinly-applied 
oils, and its frayed, tom-off edges seem symbolically to blur the very boundaries 
between art and reality -  the foundation of his art seeping through to the surface. 
Thick, black outlines describe a gleaming white facial figure in the centre of the 
painting, a stick-like figure dominates the right side, and we are presented with a 
partial glimpse of what appears to be a large sphere at the bottom of the painting from 
which extends a platform that supports a sun-like globe. The large sphere possibly
41 Oil on canvas, 46 x 44 cm, Paul Klee-Stiftung, Kunstmuseum Bern.
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represents the Earth and shows its affinity to the face of ‘Man’ via the neck-like 
connection of the black line extending from the orb. The stick figure on the right 
appears to be impaling the skull of the white face. The ghoulish face itself looks like a 
death mask, created from an elongated half circle, its features clearly formed from the 
letters of the word ‘Tod’. The incandescent red and orange that surrounds the face is 
presumably representative of ‘fire’. The image also embodies links to the historical 
tradition of the ‘memento mori’: the impaling of the white skull face by the stick 
figure is clearly suggestive of death, and perhaps the stark whiteness of the face and 
its suggestion of a sickly pallor is representative of Klee himself.42
Example 6.7: Vc
Cb
bars 1-5
The movement opens with the unison cellos and double basses transposing the 
Paul Klee theme that opened the first movement (ex. 6.7). The extended fermata, with 
its dramatic hairpin crescendo and decrescendo (ppp to f f f f  and back), give the line a 
sense of steadily increasing and decreasing weight and thickness, creating a thick, 
tactile surface, and this ‘dark’ timbre reflects the painting’s subject matter and texture.
The melody has a searching quality, perhaps because of the falling semitone 
intervals in bar 4, which, alternated with ascending sixths, result in a rapid registral 
ascent, culminating in a quadruple forte. At bar 6, with the arrival on G#, the string 
section is engaged in extending an E major chord, trilled for three bars. Then at bar 9, 
above the E major triad held by the tuba and trombone, Trumpets 1 and 2 play a three- 
note figuration whose muted and sombre gesture effects a distant-sounding call far
42 Klee had been suffering from a rare and fatal skin disease called sclerderma for a number of years.
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removed from a fanfare in its audible dissolution. This two-bar episode continues 
twice more until bar 15.
But it is the final five bars (21-25) which are the most dramatic in conveying a 
narrative that seems connected to the painting (ex. 6.8). At bar 21 the clarinets 
continue their E crescendo from bars 19 and 20, and the four horns play a unison E. 
Tan instructs the orchestral players inactive at this point to sing this E in ‘real’ pitch to 
the phoneme ‘wu’, while the instruments crescendo, culminating quadruple forte, on 
the note E, which is emphatically sounded by the tubular bell on the first beat of bar 
22. A narrative closure, then, is brought about by this blatant return to the E that we 
first encountered in ‘Portrait’. The striking of this tubular chime marks a ceremonious 
finality to the movement and the work as a whole, and may be heard as a death knell 
in the context of the painting, with its sinister title. This reading is supported by the 
gradual fading away of the remaining instruments and voices, the bell chiming very 
softly twice more, before it too fades away into the distance. The final beat of the 
movement, and therefore the composition, is played out by a sudden burst of frenetic 
energy, marked quadruple forte and played tremolando in the strings with flutter- 
tonguing in the winds (clarinets and horns), as if taking a last, desperate gasp of life.
In this way, the musical experience provides an example of ‘death’ as a concept 
circumventing Klee’s visual representation, along with elements (across the three 
‘portrait’ sections) of a birth-to-death narrative.
While the music’s sombre nature -  suggested by the thick string texture, 
distant trumpet calls, and solemn chimes -  might be evident to the listener without 
knowledge of its stimulus, there is little doubt that, considered alongside each other, 
the music and the painting generate interpretative implications that neither would give 
rise to independently.
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Example 6.8: full score, bars 21-25
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6.3.2 Part II: Inserts 1-7
Insert 1: Animals at Full Moon
Figure 6.10: Paul Klee, Tiere im Vollmond (1927)43
‘Insert 1: Animals at Full Moon’ is titled after Klee’s line drawing Tiere im Vollmond 
(1927, fig. 6.10). This is a curious drawing that superficially resembles a child’s 
doodle. We can see the representations of what appear to be four fox-like creatures 
gathered under the circle that represents the full moon mentioned in the title. Save 
obviously for the moon and the creatures’ eyes, the figures appear to be constructed 
from one single line, though this is a clever illusion. The wandering line which, by 
virtue of its execution, describes the trace of movement, aligns itself with Klee’s 
‘Creative Credo’, in particular the idea that ‘[t]he pictorial work springs from
43 In the F. C. Schang Collection, New York. Taken from G. di San Lazzaro, Klee: a Study o f his Life 
and Work, trans. Stuart Hood (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), 79.
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movement, is itself fixated movement, and is grasped in movement (eye muscles)’.44 
For this drawing is clearly borne in a temporal manner in both its creation and in our 
experience of it, and provides one of the finest examples of taking a ‘line on a walk’: 
‘The original movement, the agent, is a point that sets itself in motion. A line comes 
into being. It goes out for a walk, so to speak, aimlessly for the sake of the walk.’45 
This is not the only example of a Klee drawing that appears to have been completed in 
one continuous gesture.
Cries
Tan marks the piece ‘Andante amoroso’, and in bars 1 and 2 we can hear the viola 
play the ‘Paul Klee theme’ (E-F#-FE3) against a sustained second inversion triad of E 
major played by Violin 2 and Cello. The harp’s octaves sound like the gentle stirring 
of the creatures, which then emit their cries, played on the reeds of the clarinet and 
oboe at bars 3 and 4 (ex. 6.9). That Tan claims that neither this nor the other 
movements are representations of any of the paintings must surely be cast in doubt, 
given the overt nature of these gestures and their similarity to animal cries.
Andante  amoroso (# = 62)
Picc.
FI.
Ob.
I  (U ll - f l*  +■ pWy;
Example 6.9: bars 1-5
44 ‘Creative Credo’, in Notebooks, vol. 1, 78.
45 Cited in the programme guide to the exhibition: ‘Paul Klee: the Nature of Creation’, Hayward 
Gallery, London, 17 January -  1 April 2002.
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The piccolo continues these ‘cries’ in bar 5. In addition, between bars 25 and 26 there 
is the first occurrence of a two-bar gestural unit, played by three piccolos, which 
seems to embody another animal cry, repeated in bars 27-28 and 33-34 (ex. 6.10).
Example 6.10: bars 25-29
The initial ‘cries’ on the oboe and clarinet reeds appear again immediately following 
this episode in bar 35, before returning in an interlocutory fashion to the gestural unit 
played by the piccolos mentioned above, giving the piece a sense of closure, rather 
like the quasi-single line that Klee uses to begin and complete his drawing. Once 
again we hear the Paul Klee theme, this time in the muted cello between bars 29 and 
30. Interestingly, the passage between bars 29 and 35 is also identical in pitch material 
(except for the F# in bar 31) to bars 1-6 of ‘Death and Fire’. Thus, in the order of the 
work, this first Insert anticipates the closure of the work and also provides it with 
cohesion through re-presenting pitch material seen earlier on the same instrument.
Single Line and Overlap
In this movement, Tan appears to emulate the continuous line seen in the drawing. 
From the opening bar, an E major sonority is extended across the strings. Cutting 
across these sustained notes and lines are the gestural cries mentioned above. At the 
end of this episode, bar 10, the divisi cellos’ trilled line continues into bar 11, played
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with a glissando down to the (ex. 6.11). Thus the same pitched musical Tine’ 
continues from the previous texture.
Example «..■
Vr . I I
6.11: v*.
bars 6-11
This effect recurs from the second beat of bar 20, when Violin 1 emerges from the 
previous texture, and again at the end of the piece between bars 37 and 38, when 
Violin 2 plays solo in the final bar on C#. Similarly, from bar 23, following on from 
the orchestral tutti, a violin solo is presented, marked glissando with grace notes, 
which begins on the final note (D#) of the previous tutti. Again, this solitary musical 
line emerges cleanly from the dense string ensemble, like the wandering lines in 
Klee’s drawing, ascending via the glissando to the D# one octave higher at bar 25. 
Here, the listener gets the sense of motion extending outwards from within a static 
chord. Despite the return of the brass and woodwinds at bar 25, the solo violin 
continues holding the sustained D#, this time one octave higher, until bar 27. The 
musical line continues with a falling glissando to G# at bar 29, an ascent to the D# at 
bar 32, and a further fall to the G# at bar 34 (ex. 6.12).
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Example 6.12: bars 25-34
Discussing the reception of a painting, Klee states:
Receptively it is limited by the limitations of the perceiving eye. The limitation of the eye is 
its inability to see even a small surface equally sharply at all points. The eye must “graze” 
over the surface, grasping sharply portion after portion, to convey them to the brain which 
collects and stores the impressions. The eye travels along the paths cut out for it in the 
work.46
Such 'grazing’ naturally implies accumulation and the process of time, for such 
wandering does not occur instantaneously -  according to Adorno’s position that we 
saw earlier in Part I, where time is immanent in the painting. Moreover, collecting and 
storing impressions suggests the role of memory; perhaps an analogous mechanism to 
how we collect and store musical impressions as we listen to a piece of music. The 
phenomenal experience of the painting, then, becomes like a metaphorical journey, 
and the natural entailment is that we go on journeys with our bodies, such as we might 
walk along a forest path. Following Klee, it would seem that we experience painting 
in time, phenomenologically, because it becomes a lived experience that we traverse 
in a temporal manner. Accordingly, Tiere im Vollmond seems to provide an excellent 
example of just such a pathway for the eyes to ‘graze’ across, in the line which 
circumscribes the animal figures and their graphical relationships. Clement
46 Klee, Pedagogical Sketchbooks, 33 (bold original).
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Greenberg, too, notes that Klee’s line ‘indicates, directs, relates, connects’;47 and, 
indeed, in this instance we literally have a line to follow.
And mutatis mutandis, is it possible for the listener to follow these sustained 
lines of music in a way that resembles the viewer’s gaze, thereby unlocking the frozen 
or implied time contained within the line drawing? It might be argued that Tan 
‘draws’ a musical analogy between the overlapping musical voices and the tangled 
lines in Klee’s drawing. Together with this component, Tan has composed the above- 
mentioned gestural units which, played by the winds, do seem to embody animal cries 
and thus animate the representative aspect of the drawing. The music cannot depict 
every salient feature of the animals, so Tan presents what we might call a musical 
synecdoche by conveying an implied voice from the animals rather than the animals 
themselves -  an implied part of the representation comes to stand for the whole.
In Part I, we saw how Klee regards physical space as a temporal concept and 
that what the beholder does is temporal too. From a phenomenological point of view, 
Tan has enacted something aurally similar to what the roaming eye might do. This 
argument and ‘view’ of the music is formed from what Scruton calls the ‘deliberate 
construction of an intentional object from the infinitely ambiguous instructions 
implicit in a sequence of sounds’. The music animates the drawing because we 
assume that its attributes belong to the visual realm when in fact they really belong to 
us, emanating as they do from our imaginative projection.
47 ‘An Essay on Paul Klee’, in Clement Greenberg, The Collected Essays and Criticism, vol. 3: 
Affirmations and Refusals, 1950-56, ed. John O’Brian (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 7.
Roger Scruton, The Aesthetic Understanding: Essays in the Philosophy o f Art and Culture (London: 
Methuen, 1983), 88.
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Insert 2: Senicio49
J 4£L
Figure 6.11: Paul Klee, Senecio (1922)50
Senecio (1922) is one of the best known of Klee’s paintings and appears as the title 
for ‘Insert 2: Senicio’, which is effectively the third movement of the work. The 
painting is constructed from squares and depicts the upper portions of a human figure: 
square-edged shoulders and neck, and inner squares appearing to form the neck and 
the round head. Indeed, the figure in the painting seems roughly symmetrical about 
these squares, divided vertically down the middle and into three horizontals. The word 
senecio translates from the Latin as ‘old man’, but is also commonly associated with 
the genus of the daisy family or groundsel. It may be for this reason that Klee chose 
for this image the dominant colours of white, yellow and orange.
In any case, Klee’s paintings are renowned for their humour, and Senecio is a 
good example of that. It is an amusing caricature with asymmetrical eyes looking
49 The correct spelling of the Paul Klee painting is Senecio.
50 Oil on gauze, 40.5 x 38 cm, Kunstmuseum, Basel.
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askance against the comical representations of eyelids. The subject of the painting is 
unknown, except for the designation Senecio, but it is generally held to be another 
self-portrait by the artist. Part of its appeal is perhaps its childlike, clownish 
appearance, something that gives it an air of benevolence or, perhaps, self-mockery.
Marked ‘Misterioso’, the movement opens with percussion, comprising 
cowbell, woodblocks, roto and Chinese tom-toms. The swift ascending and 
descending figure played on the roto toms and then on the woodblock lends 
playfulness to the proceedings through the woodblock’s association with children’s 
toy instruments, but also in the way it emulates a sound not unlike the popping of 
cheeks.
Underscored by the staccato timpani, the brass instruments in bar 2 present, 
staccato, superimpositions of minor thirds transpositionally combined at the interval 
of a tone (ex. 6.13). This section is immediately followed by the first appearance of a 
staccato string section in bar 3, marked triple forte and based on the Klee theme (A- 
B-B=). On the second beat of this bar, the four horns are instructed to 4breath[e] 
through the instruments’, creating a playful wheezing sound. Once again this adds a 
bodily component to the music that is especially fitting for Senecio. In 
phenomenological terms, our own bodily experiences of breathing and wheezing are 
implicated in the process of listening to this effect.
Next we hear a playful antiphonal effect between the bassoons and the bass 
clarinet (marked staccato) and the Chinese tom-toms and cowbells, which continues 
the previously heard disjointed rhythm caused by the alternation of semi-to- 
demisemiquaver rhythm. Episodes of ostinati or small gestural units like those seen in 
bars 2 and 4 constitute the style of this piece, perhaps reflecting the imagined jerky 
movements of Senecio.
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Example 6.13: bars 1-5 (wind and percussion only)
Following the gestures played by the bass clarinet and bassoons in bars 6-8, 
the string section bursts into a frenetic three-bar episode beginning with unison 
semiquavers (first heard in bar 3), marked triple forte, staccato, accented on all of the 
beats, and punctuated by clusters in the horns and brass. In the second bar of this 
episode (bar 10), the motion becomes increasingly agitated with the interposition of 
shorter note-values amongst the groupings. It is as if this three-bar section is trying to
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characterise Senecio being led violently around like a puppet, manipulated erratically 
by invisible strings controlling him in an erratic fashion (ex. 6.14).
Alternating between the brass and strings, the staccato playing combines with 
the one- and three-bar episodes throughout the movement to create an impression of 
frantic, uncoordinated movement. Interspersed with rests, these effects seem to bring 
Senecio jerkily to life.
0~
Va.
Vc.
Cb.
Example 6.14: bars 9-10
Insert 3: Ad Parnassum
This unusual movement is named after Klee’s Ad Parnassum (1932, fig. 6.12), whose 
title draws on the ideal state of beauty associated with Apollo and the Muses. Klee’s 
interest in music suggests that it may also allude to the eighteenth-century treatise on 
counterpoint Gradus ad Parnassum by the Austrian composer and theorist Johann 
Josef Fux (1660-1741).51 Andrew Kagan doubts that Klee could have been unaware 
of this important work of music theory.>2 Furthermore, Klee’s lecture notes devised 
for his teaching at the Bauhaus, detail systems of colour codification, such as the
51 Fux’s Gradus was first published in Latin (1725), and such was its influence and popularity it was 
subsequently translated into German (1742), Italian (1761), French (1763) and English (1791). A 
modem English translation can be found in Steps to Parnassus: the Study of Counterpoint, trans. and 
ed. Alfred Mann (London: Dent, 1944).
52 See Andrew Kagan, Paul Klee: Art and Music, 42.
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‘canon of totality’, that beg comparison to the systems of counterpoint in Fux’s 
treatise on music.53
Figure 6.12: Paul Klee, Ad Parnassum (1932)54
Through the painting’s use of multiple colours presented in squares against a 
background of larger squares distinguished by their different colours and overlapping 
paint, Klee creates the visual effect of polyphony that he sought from music.55 The 
similarity of the technique to pointillist painting is notable, but the main effect lies in 
the effect of shimmer or movement of light that seems to occur because of the 
multiple layering or polyphony of colour, which provides a visual analogue to musical 
movement. An orange sun is depicted in the upper right-hand comer. It is possible to 
read this painting architectonically and see the gate-like outline in the bottom left half 
of the image as an opening or path -  the path to knowledge -  leading to Mount
5j See Klee, Notebooks, vol. 1: The Thinking Eye, 485-91.
54 Oil on canvas, 100 x 126 cm, Kunstmuseum, Paul Klee-Stiftung, Bern.
55 See Hajo Diichting, Painting Music, 65-79.
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Parnassus, whose shape as depicted here may have been inspired by the Pyramids, 
which Klee visited during his Egyptian trip of 1928.
Tan employs a quartet of solo string players who, between them, create a still 
backdrop on F# across four octaves (ex. 6.15). From the end of the first bar, the 
gradually thickening texture and rising dynamics seem to presage the onset of some 
event. First, the bass drum is attacked triple forte , masking the quiet entrance of 
Trumpet 1, which crescendos to quadruple forte against a tremolo on the same note in 
Trumpet 3. Then in bar 3, the bass clarinet offers a four-note gestural motif, also 
playing the Klee theme (B-C#-C3), before our attention is diverted by the fast 
syncopated rhythms emanating from Trumpet 2. Accordingly, this episode seems to 
convey a mounting urgency before being suddenly and abruptly cut off at the end of
bar 4, leaving only the hushed string background.
At bar 5, an animal cry, like that in Insert 1, is produced on the oboe and
clarinet reeds. At bar 8, the brass are again instructed to breathe through the 
instrument, as in ‘Insert 2: Senicio’. Also from that movement, the rhythmic ostinato 
of the one- and three-bar episodes returns, again in the strings and brass, in bars 26- 
27. So here we find direct quotations from Inserts 1 and 2. It is hard to determine 
quite what such self-quotation might mean, but it may relate to what Andrew Kagan 
writes regarding Ad Parnassum as the realization of Klee’s theories about 
‘contrapuntal drawing’.56 Indeed, there is a striking counterpoint between the 
mountain’s apex and the opposite-pointing acute triangle next to the ‘gateway’. Its 
exact resemblance to Klee’s drawing of a conductor’s two-in-a-bar time -  ‘the
en
accented first beat appears [as] a downward vertical’ -  affords it a clear musical
56 See Kagan, Paul Klee: Art and Music, 88.
57 For an illustration o f this see Klee, Notebooks, vol. 1: The Thinking Eye, 274.
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description. Tan’s re-use of earlier musical ideas therefore accords with Klee’s own 
re-use of his earlier theories and musical analogies.
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Example 6.15: bars 1-5
Andrew Kagan, in his penetrating discussion of Ad Parnassum, explains how 
Klee eschewed representation and 'sought to create absolute painting, rather than
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musical painting’. Klee, then, as we have said previously, is being careful here to 
avoid nai'Ve imitation; instead he was interested in learning from and applying the 
vertical depth component of polyphonic music. Of import here is the notion that it 
was music that could freeze time by presenting several voices at once. In Klee’s 
words: ‘the simultaneity of several independent themes is something that is possible 
not only in music; typical things in general do not belong just in one place, but have 
their roots and organic anchor everywhere and anywhere.’59 Tan’s re-use of his earlier 
musical themes offers an analogy here, albeit a rather tenuous one. Perhaps the closest 
parallel to the painting that may be drawn is the movement’s steadily increasing 
dynamics, culminating in the crescendo vocalizations across the final five bars of all 
the parts, and its sonic resemblance to the zenith of Ad Parnassum, with its visual and 
metaphorical significance as suggested by Kagan.
Insert 4: The Twittering Machine
This fourth Insert is named after Klee’s painting Die Zwitscher-Maschine (fig. 6.13).
It shows what seems to be a group of four birds perched on a pole turned by a crank 
handle on the right-hand side. The mechanism appears supported on top of some type 
of stand on the left side of the picture -  a music stand, perhaps, from which the birds 
read their songs. The background of the picture is mainly turquoise, with the upper 
third in a cloudy pink, reminiscent of an early sunrise announcing the beginning of 
this unique dawn chorus. The bird on the far left has raised its head to a full vertical 
tilt, and because of the hyperextension of its tongue it appears to be twittering at 
maximum volume. The other three birds seem to be in different phases of their song. 
H. W. Janson wrote of this painting that ‘[w]ith a few simple lines, [Klee] has created
58 Kagan, Paul Klee: Art and Music, 57.
59 Klee, Jena Kunstverein lecture (1924), cited in Kagan, Paul Klee: Art and Music, 54.
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a ghostly mechanism that imitates the sound of birds, simultaneously mocking our 
faith in the miracles of the machine age and our sentimental appreciation of bird
Figure 6.13: Paul Klee, Die Zwitscher-Maschine (1922)61
This painting has been the subject of many musical compositions, in particular 
those by the composers Peter Maxwell Davies, Gunther Schuller, Giselher Klebe and 
Harrison Birtwistle. In the context of Tan’s composition, ‘The Twittering Machine’ 
comes across as the most overtly representational of the work’s ten movements, in its
60 H. W. Janson, History of Art (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1962), 527.
61 Oil drawing (traced) and water-colour on paper backed with cardboard, 63.8 x 48.1 cm, MoMA,
New York.
62 Five Klee Pictures (1959-62), Seven Studies on Themes o f Paul Klee (1959), Die Zwitscher- 
Maschine (1950), and Carmen Arcadiae Mechanicae Perpetuum (1977), respectively.
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extensive use of sound effects created by the standard orchestral instruments. 
‘Twittering Machine’ opens with indeterminately-pitched woodwinds playing 
downward and upward glissandos, emulating the kind of sound that we might imagine 
the birds making on their downward and upward rotation by the machine’s crank.
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Example 6.16: bars 1-5
Insert 4: Twittering M achine
i A lle g ro  (J= 124)
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In addition, Tan instructs the oboists to use the reed only, emphasising the focus on 
the timbral qualities of the sound rather than the pitches themselves. Accordingly, the 
staggered introduction of the winds in bar 1 suggests the turning of the crank and its 
respective activation of each of the birds depicted in the painting, represented here by 
the flute, the oboe and the clarinet. This whole episode is accompanied by the brass, 
who are instructed to clap their mouthpieces alongside the rattling of sleigh bells in 
the percussion. The result is a rhythmic ostinato, possibly intended to represent the 
mechanism turning the crankshaft (ex. 6.16).
On the third beat of bar 4, a half-black circle symbol appears, which Tan 
explains in his performance notes as a vocalization that denotes an ‘unvoiced sound 
such as breathing and whispering’.63 The appearance of the symbol is accompanied 
here by the instruction ‘twittering’ and appears across all the winds parts. The same 
symbol also appears across the strings, again with the ‘twittering’ instruction -  though 
this time on beats two and four. In bar 6, the woodwinds (excluding the flutes) and 
brass (excluding the tuba and trombone) have the instruction ‘key-sounding’ in 
semiquavers, and the strings are directed to finger ‘harshly without bow-playing’, 
which creates an aural simulation of the birds running about their perches. The 
pizzicato quavers, marked ‘behind the bridge’ at bar 11, may be interpreted as a 
suggestion of the birds capering around (ex. 6.17).
Vn.I
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Tan has used techniques, then, which create sonic effects implying the various 
sounds fhat might be made by the birds in the painting, and in this way provide a good 
example of imitative, or what Carolyn Abbate calls ‘isosonorous’, representation, 
discussed in the Introduction. Accordingly, this insert exemplifies an overt kind of 
representation: Tan has decided to interpret the subject matter head-on by giving the 
depicted creatures a voice. In this way, it bears comparison to the earlier movement 
‘Senicio’, for there we argued that the puppet figure was somehow brought to life by 
musical animation. However, the fact that these interpretations are of the subject 
matter depicted draws into question their representational status: can they be said to 
be representations of the paintings themselves if their focus is upon the subject, the 
concept even, rather than the rendering itself? On the other hand, these representations 
would appear to depend more than others on the paintings concerned and a listener’s 
knowledge of them. In other words, do these movements make adequate musical 
sense away from the paintings, and can the movements offer a full aesthetic 
experience without the supplementation of the image?
Insert 5: Earth Witches
The fifth insert is named after Klee’s Erdhexen (1938, fig. 6.14). It appears to be 
some kind of landscape with, once again, a mountain peak and an indistinct orbital 
suggestive of the sun or the moon in the upper left portion. These spheres are, as we 
have seen, ubiquitous in Klee’s output; here, though, the sphere is partially hidden by 
the smoky-brown darkness that fills the sky. Overlaying the painting’s rich earthy 
browns, thick black lines circumscribe ochre symbols that stand in stark relief to the 
landscaped background and firmly inscribe the curious subject matter and figuration. 
This strange imagery, presented in a fiery luminescent orange, is ambiguous save for
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the clearly discernible face, middle right, with its facial identifiers: eyebrows, eyes, 
nose and mouth. The ‘smoked’ effect evokes a sense of swirling movement and 
rhythm and partially obscures the landscape.
Figure 6.14: Paul Klee
Erdhexen, (1938)64
This almost naive style of art, with its innocence and lack of artifice, was of 
special import for Klee, exhibiting a close connection to the ‘nature of creation’. E. H. 
Gombrich discusses how for Klee ‘“form” always comes first and the “subject” 
second’. And that out of the emerging forms always comes some ‘real or fantastic 
subject to his imagination’. Gombrich argues that the influence of the force of nature 
on Klee was a ‘mysterious power that formed the weird shapes of prehistoric animals, 
and the fantastic fairyland of the deep sea fauna, which is still active in the artist’s
64 Oil and watercolour on paper, 48.5 x 31.2 cm, Paul Klee-Stiftung, Kunstmuseum, Bern.
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mind and makes his creatures grow’.65 
Insert 5: Earth Witches
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Example 6.18: bars 1-5 (gestures 1 and 2)
‘Earth Witches’ is the shortest insert of the work at about a minute in duration 
and is scored for the full orchestra, with a percussion section consisting of eight 
stones and a whip. The choice of stones here is significant for their associations with 
the occult. Accordingly, the movement’s subject, ‘Earth Witches’, draws on a long 
history steeped in the use of stones for rituals, for healing, and for spells, and they are
65 See E. H. Gombrich, The Story o f Art, 12th edn (London: Phaidon, 1972), 459, 462.
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clearly identifiable as stones from their first entrance in bar 1 (ex. 6.18). Although of 
short duration, this insert is frenetic and builds to a climactic volume at bar 26, 
marked quadruple forte. The trilling of the instruments, as can be seen in bars 1 to 3, 
produces a whirlwind effect, sustained through further upward and downward 
flourishes, and perhaps serves to emulate the obfuscating cloudiness seen in the 
painting. In bar 3, the rising upward gesture of the horns, marked triple forte, is 
answered by the woodwinds with trills followed by a rapid descent -  gesture 1 (ex. 
6.18). Another gesture of acceleration (gesture 2) is produced in bars 4 and 5, where 
an episode of diminution occurs in the horns through notes of increasingly shorter 
value.
Plee.
FI.
Ob.
Cl. in
B i.C I.
Example »•>
bars 16-20 Hit. in F
These two musical ideas -  the rapid descent in the woodwinds and the 
progressive acceleration in the homs -  form interlocutory gestures that constitute the 
signature of this piece through their subsequent repetition at regular intervals 
throughout the insert. In addition, these gestures are attended by increasing levels of 
orchestral ‘thickening’. At bars 8-10 the gestures recur, but this time the opening 
crotchet of gesture 1 is played flutter tongued by the woodwinds, heightening the 
sense of acceleration and frenzy, and gesture 2 is reinforced by the added forces of the
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tuba and trombone augmenting the rhythm. Between bars 18 and 21 the two units 
reappear, again with some variation: horns and woodwinds enter simultaneously, the 
former with an elaborated ascending flourish, the latter with an extended trill. The 
horns this time also trill their long note, again increasing the tension (ex. 6.19). 
Gesture 2 recurs at bars 20-21, this time joined by the trumpets, trombone and tuba, 
again thickening the musical texture. Moreover, the dynamic volume of these 
recurrent gestural units increases steadily, culminating quadruple forte on the third 
beat of bar 21 across all the brass instruments. The gesture occurs once more on the 
third beat at bar 26 after the climactic episode just gone, presented in canonic form, 
marked triple piano and staccato, and ascending through the woodwinds: from bass 
clarinet, through clarinet, oboe and flute, to piccolo, before it rises to forte on the very 
last beat of the movement.
Following an examination of the painting, these musical gestures may be 
heard as representations of the swirling effect of the paint in Klee’s work through 
their dizzying, overlapping rhythms. The rapid rise-and-fall motion of the horns and 
woodwinds respectively, combined with the trills and flutter tonguing in gesture 1, 
helps to create this whirlwind effect. The abstract motif that dominates the bottom 
half of the picture perhaps finds an analogy with the musical gestures discussed.
Given the dominance of this motif in the painting, the recursive nature of the musical 
gestures mentioned seems to reflect this aspect. Furthermore, Klee’s motif, whilst 
patently abstract, does carry representative implications too. These qualities, however, 
are very much dependent on the viewer’s imagination; the ‘eyes’ represented by the 
two dots left of centre seem to belong to a phantasmic world.
The ambiguity of Klee’s painting invites the viewer to read something into this 
image and ascribe to it particular qualities. A kind of anthropomorphism is at play
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here, but one not necessarily tied to the ascription of human attributes. We, the 
viewers, therefore become constructive in the realisation of the painting’s potential 
through seeing the motif in various guises. In the same way, the musical gestures, 
although obviously not coterminous with these visual motifs, may still come to take 
on various ‘appearances’ in collaboration with the listener. The conceptual ideation 
that emerges from viewing or remembering the painting encourages the listener to 
absorb the musical articulation within this larger imaginative construction. 
Furthermore, Tan has doubtless borrowed the eerie imagery associated with the col 
legno markings in the strings (bars 26-30). For the use of the wood of the bow in this 
manner is heard memorably in the Witches’ Sabbath from the last movement of 
Berlioz’s Symphonie Fantastique (‘Songe d’une Nuit de Sabbat’) as well as in Saint- 
Saens’ symphonic poem Danse Macabre.
It is very interesting to examine how quickly this piece can assume narrative 
proportions: the trilling bassoons and bass clarinet in bars 1 and 2 may be interpreted 
as the ‘Earth Witches’ busy at their work, perhaps stirring a cauldron. The stones in 
the percussion (bars 1 and 2) seem to announce the onset of a ritual, and gestures 1 
and 2 ‘intone’ the spell through their emphatic-sounding articulation. The increasing 
dynamics and orchestral thickening reflects the mounting urgency of this fictional 
incantation. Arguably, then, through associating this movement with both the subject 
and the painting itself, Tan sets forth something like the mechanism of metaphorical 
entailment that we discussed in Chapter 3, whereby the use of the stones and col legno 
techniques opens up the rest of the movement’s musical properties to be absorbed 
within the subject territory of the painting.
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Insert 6: Intoxication
Figure 6.15: Paul Klee, (1939)66
Insert 6 is titled after Klee’s painting Rausch (1939, fig. 6.15). A metallic grey forms 
the background for this strange ensemble of abstract shapes presented in four colours: 
light orange, burnt red, straw yellow and light brown. Each one of these shapes is 
outlined in a smudged, hazy black that seems to make them shimmer against their 
silvery background. The scene looks to be constituted from the scattered parts of a 
dismembered body. A leg form is painted in burnt red (lying bottom right), a rotund 
upturned torso is suggested by the orange balloon-shaped form, the arms are the 
angled yellow object (bottom left) and the brown ‘u’ shape (centre right), and the 
detached head is the burnt-red lozenge shape at the top (left of centre). The elongated 
head lies on its left side, with the nose anchoring the other features in one long
66 Tempera on tracing paper mounted on board, 52.7 x 36.2 cm, MoMA, New York.
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horizontal stripe. The mouth, represented by the black lozenge-shaped dash, is 
perpendicular to the nose and is fitted with four straw-yellow teeth. And, finally, the 
eyes are formed by the two obliquely arranged dots. Several other vagrant shapes 
remain unidentified, but are presumed to represent the remnants of any other body 
parts.
Rausch is an interesting painting, whose title suggests the loss of self-control 
through elation, and whose portrayal of dismembered body parts clearly points 
towards an extreme form of the loss of self -  the collapse of the body’s integrity and a 
visual dispersal of its identity. The misplaced eye on the lopsided head adds to the 
apparent stupefaction, and the shimmery black outlines of the shapes achieved 
through the tempera and tracing paper impart an almost hallucinogenic aura to the 
scene.
V n .l
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Example 6.20: bars 1-5 (string parts only)
The insert is connected to the preceding movement by a trilled (sounding) F in 
the B= clarinet tied over from Insert 5. Accompanying this trill, the string section 
successively presents pizzicato Gs at quaver intervals and in successively higher 
registers, culminating with the G above middle C in Violin 1 (ex. 6.20). This process 
begins again from bar 6, but this time with more frenzy, indicating perhaps the
M o d e r a t e  <« = M l
M JM
L
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increasing ‘intoxication’ of the implied figure in the painting, played arco and at 
twice the speed, while rising in dynamic to the triple forte in bar 7.
One of the notable features of this insert is its use of material from earlier 
sections. The first instance of repetition occurs in the reappearance of the horn gesture 
and woodwind flourishes (bars 9 and 10 respectively) from Insert 5. The double bass 
in bars 15-20 reintroduces material from ‘Self Portrait’, bars 47-52 (omitting only the 
trilled F in bar 50). This material is harmonically thickened by the addition of the 
lower woodwinds doubling two octaves above (bars 18-20 and 23-26). Once again, 
the entailments, enabled by the subject matter, allow the listener to attach the cause of 
this increasing musical intensity to the inebriated figure in the painting.
Pfcrc.
Example 6.21: bars 21-26 (percussion parts only)
This effect is strengthened by the canonic percussion entries (Chinese and roto toms), 
marked forte, between bars 21 and 30, playing a rhythm that accelerates from triplet 
crotchets to sextuplet semiquavers (ex. 6.21). Underscoring this, the double bass and 
lower winds, marked quadruple forte, play the ubiquitous Paul Klee theme (B~-C- 
B3, bars 34-36), and significantly this version of the theme is the one first 
encountered in the opening bar o f ‘Portrait’. Accordingly, both Klee and Tan become 
introduced virtually into the piece through the quotation of passages heard in 
‘Portrait’ and ‘Self Portrait’. The movement ends with the ‘Ha’ vocalization, which
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we encountered also in bar 27 of ‘Portrait’, fading away across two bars, signifying 
repose from the previous turbulent passages.
The painting, then, invites a musical narrative, as if the figure had literally 
blown apart from his intoxication and finally come to rest in one long euphoric sigh. 
However, such a narrative as this would involve quite a sophisticated interpretation, 
remembering thematic moments heard in previous movements and identifying their 
reappearances. For the interpretation to function in this way, the listener must involve 
themselves in a complex process of re-collection. Tan writes that it is his ‘intention 
that the listener should recognise several pasts in one present’, and ‘theprofusion of
f \  7identities characterizing intoxication is not the confusion of drunkenness’. Perhaps 
the juxtaposition of musical materials associated with specific paintings provides an 
analogue to the broken segments of the figure in the painting, and also to Tan’s view 
of Klee’s oeuvre as a whole, because it suggests that the composer views the work as 
a whole not as a set of isolated musical responses to the paintings but as a cohesive 
and integral totality reflecting Klee’s larger aesthetic vision. Moreover, the musical 
materials are not reassembled but retain their earlier identity, like the floating body 
parts in the painting.
Of import, too, is the increasing density of musical texture. The cocktail of re­
presented musical materials conveys with it a concomitant thickening and quickening 
of the musical gestures as well as a steady increase in dynamic that adds to the 
exhilaration assumed from the title ‘Intoxication’. Of course, some of these repetitions 
have not been exactly correspondent, but are variations on rhythmic gestures that are 
sometimes repeated by different instruments and in different registers; this, too, serves
67 Tan, ‘Death and Fire [...]: an Analysis’, 54 (italics original).
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to add to the feeling of intoxication from the slight disorientation that we experience 
under the influence of these past identities.
The interpretation above has evidently also been framed by the painting’s title, 
the word ‘intoxication’ itself, for the narrative here imposed upon the imagery has 
been woven from the word’s literal meaning. The movement, then, serves to represent 
the painting on several levels. First, the ubiquitous restatement of the Klee theme 
from the ‘Portrait’ section during one of the insert’s most frenetic sections announces 
the painter’s presence and provides coherence with the other movements. Second, the 
repetitions of gestural material seen earlier combine to represent a musical 
intoxication through the collection and memory of so many earlier musical identities -  
we become, therefore, intoxicated on the abundance of former sounds and their 
mutual disconnection, like that of the parts of the figure in the painting. Third, the 
increasing density of the musical texture, the variation of previous material, the 
dramatic flourishes and the rising dynamics represent the process of intoxication 
itself. Finally, the presentations of the musical identities that are now steeped in the 
associations of their respective paintings provide something akin to the intoxicating 
effects of seeing a retrospective of Klee’s work at breakneck speed. The abundance of 
the artist’s ideas, motifs and visions, as we move from one painting to another, leave 
one feeling overwhelmed by the impression of a collective, albeit fragmented, whole, 
like Tan’s ‘Intoxication’ here.
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Insert 7: J. S. Bach
As time passes I become more and more afraid o f my growing love of music. I don’t 
understand myself. I play solo sonatas by Bach: next to them, what is BOcklin? It makes me 
smile.68 -  Paul Klee
The seventh insert is perhaps the most unusual movement of the work. The other 
movements, with the exception of Tan’s ‘Self Portrait’, refer to a Klee painting and 
therefore continue his ‘discussion’ with the artist, but this piece refers to a fellow 
composer. The Bach title, however, is not arbitrary and references Klee’s especial 
admiration and respect for Bach who, together with Mozart, represented for him the 
apex of musical achievement. As we saw, Klee wrote extensively about the influence 
of Bach upon his own aesthetic ideas, namely fugal and polyphonic principles 
translated into the visual realm. Will Grohmann writes that Klee believed ‘Bach and 
Mozart could probably help him to formulate certain fundamental principles 
governing painting, whose lack Goethe had felt -  principles around which everything 
else would fall into place’.69 In addition, paintings such as Fugue in Rot (1921) and In 
Bachschen Stil (1919) exemplify, at least nominally, Klee’s links to Bach.
This is the most serene of the ten movements discussed here, in part because 
of its contrast to the clamorous ‘Intoxication’ but also because of the dynamic 
markings which, except in the last few bars, rarely move higher than triple piano. The 
movement opens with the alto flute moving up a tone hinting at the first (whole-tone) 
interval of the Klee theme, while the drone, which concluded Insert 6, continues 
into the first four bars, establishing a notional A= tonality. The material presented
68 Paul Klee writing in 1897, cited in Kagan, Paul Klee: Art and Music, 18.
69 Will Grohmann, Paul Klee (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1954), 70-71.
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here is new to the work and comprises what Tan calls ‘collaged quotation’70 from 
Bach’s forty-eight preludes and fugues, The Well-Tempered Clavier. The first of the 
quotations appears in bars 3-8 and, in keeping with the tonal context, is taken from 
the Prelude no. 17 in A= BWV 886 (ex. 6.21). In bars 5 and 7-8 the B= clarinet 
quotes bars 2 and 20 of the prelude respectively.
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Example 6.21: bars 4-8
In bar 8 the harp introduces the second quotation, taken from the opening of the C 
Major Prelude (BWV 846) of Book I. Its fractured presentation, using additional tied 
notes and rests, creates an effect of hearing this prelude in memory, strands of the 
melody breaking through before they are joined by the other quotations. The next and
70 Tan, ‘Death and Fire [...]: an Analysis’, 56.
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final quotation, seven bars from the Prelude no. 4 in C# minor (BWV 849), is played 
by the solo string quartet from bar 9 onwards (ex. 6.22).
The presentation of these contrapuntal melodies echoes in the independence of 
voices not only Bach’s own counterpoint but also Klee’s use of contrapuntal pictorial 
devices, such as those seen in his Drawing in Two Voices (1921-22). Andrew Kagan 
writes that Klee shifted the focus from closed forms of interactive lines ‘to the 
relationships between lines as distinct, individual entities’.71 He continues, ‘Klee 
found a solution to the problem of relating one independent line to another; namely, 
the principles of counterpoint.’72 To emphasize the function of the melodic line here, 
Tan explains that ‘the degrees of the diatonic scale sound equally, tending to undercut 
any sense of functional harmony’, and ‘ [t]his non-functional character allows a focus 
on the shape of the line as there is no longer a focus on harmonies in which the lines 
are moored’.
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gli a l t r i
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gli a l tr i
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This piece, then, is arguably one of the best examples of a Klee dialogic because it 
highlights the influence of Bach as the supreme contrapuntist upon the painter through 
the collaged Bach quotations mentioned. In this way, it demonstrates a musical
71 Kagan, Paul Klee: Art and Music, 44.
72 Ibid., 45.
73 Tan, ‘Death and Fire [...]: an Analysis’, 58.
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representation that operates refractively because, as well as citing Bach, Tan points 
implicitly to Klee’s interest in the independence of line and the musical systems of 
polyphony and counterpoint, providing a musical representation of no one particular 
painting but of the conceptual underpinnings of Klee’s painterly ethos. It also 
provides dialogue because Tan, like Klee, has looked outside his own artistic medium 
to incorporate conceptual ideas from another.
Figure 6.16: Paul Klee, Polyphon gefasstes Weiss (1930)74
Moreover, because we recognise the quotations and their original tonal 
contexts, the quotation of material from the three Bach preludes also has the effect of 
a collage of colour, through its presentation of fragments in the tonalities of A= major, 
C major and C# minor. Colour was an essential structural feature of Klee’s
74 Watercolour with pen and ink on paper mounted on cardboard, 33.3 x 24.5 cm, Kunstmuseum, Paul 
Klee-Stiftung, Bern.
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‘polyphonic’ canvases. Andrew Kagan maintains that Klee’s Grail for pictorial 
polyphony was ‘inextricably bound up in transparent colour depth’.75 For example, in 
Polyphon gefasstes Weiss (1930, fig. 6.16), the painting demonstrates exactly that 
colour transparency and depth through its overlapping rectangles. In ‘J. S. Bach’ Tan 
has created something comparable through his collage of quotations with their 
associated tonalities.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter it has been argued that Tan attempts a range of musical responses to 
Klee’s paintings and aesthetic ideas and principles. These responses have included 
animation, as evident in the disjointed puppet rhythms o f ‘Senicio’, the simulation of 
the act of drawing itself, seen notably in ‘Portrait’ and in ‘Animals at Full Moon’, and 
the isosonorous effects of bird sounds in ‘The Twittering Machine’. Furthermore, Tan 
has interpreted some of the paintings by creating the musical equivalent of an implied 
narrative.
Thus, we find in ‘Intoxication’ that the fragmented figure is represented by 
quotations from several of the earlier movements, themselves identifiable with 
particular paintings, and so producing a musical analogue to this scattered identity. It 
would seem, also, that in this movement Tan responds more powerfully to the image 
itself than the meaning implied by the title -  that is, the scattered dismemberment of 
an identity. Similarly, a musical narrative seems woven around the symbolic imagery 
of ‘Earth Witches’, with its particular use of instrumental sounds historically 
associated with witchery and ritual. ‘Death and Fire’ also seems to impose a musical 
narrative through its climactic ending. It seems that Tan, in these latter examples,
75 Ibid., 78.
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rather than focusing exclusively on their rendering, has constructed his musical 
response around the concept emanating from their subject matter.
The composition is remarkable for its use of sound effects created from 
conventional orchestral instruments and some less conventional ones too. And this 
produces a wide variety of sounds which provide an analogue to Klee’s interests in 
the expressive effects of colour. Of significance too is the focus on musical line. 
Throughout, Tan composes many single-line gestural units with very little harmonic 
activity beneath, which again provides an analogue with Klee’s investigations into the 
formalisation of the drawn or painted line. In addition, many of these musical lines are 
nonetheless cast into the foreground against sustained background voices, resembling 
Klee’s delineation of subjects and patterns on top of layers of transparent colours.
Interestingly, although Tan’s musical quotation of Bach highlights the 
painter’s interest in contrapuntal techniques, the ‘polyphonic’ component is 
conspicuously absent in the work here. More prominent is the analogy that may be 
drawn between Klee’s working materials and facture (the layering of paint, brush 
strokes dug into the surface, and even the visibility of the actual canvas as in ‘Death 
and Fire’), and Tan’s exploitation of musical materials in a similar way: the scraping 
and digging of the bow into the strings, sound effects from head joints and 
mouthpieces of wind instruments, and vocalisations from the instrumentalists 
involving inarticulate sighs.
Klee, as we have seen, regarded space as a temporal concept, and in creating 
musical animations of this space, Tan has re-temporalized the paintings. Klee’s intent 
to provide a temporal experience of his artwork has the effect of impeding the viewer 
from fixing their focus on any one aspect for too long. Similarly, these musical pieces 
literally extend beyond their frames and so also resist a focused ‘gaze’ -  an effect
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made prominent by the continuation of material from one section to the next and also 
the quotations from earlier and later movements. In Klee’s work, too, there is often a 
sense that the image may be seen from multiple perspectives: ‘we can speak of 
structural rhythm generated by the repetition of the same unit from left to right, or top 
to bottom.’76 And on hearing gestural fragments repeated within the same movement, 
but also in later movements too, we are presented with an audible ‘view’ of the 
music’s line which is, like Klee’s, multidimensional.
However, in comparison with Dutilleux or Feldman, Tan tends more to create 
sound effects or to ‘musicalize’ the various subjects depicted in the paintings than to 
focus on the painted surface and the way it is rendered. Thus, Death and Fire may be 
seen as a departure from these compositions, drawing into question whether its status 
is that of a representation of the paintings, of their subject matter, or of certain aspects 
of Klee’s aesthetic.
76 Klee, Pedagogical Sketchbook, 22.
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CONCLUSION
This project has asked the question -  how, aesthetically, does MaP work? Exploring 
the idea that the aesthetic experience of the music is somehow enriched by its 
relationship to the painting, whether that stimulus is physically present or not, Part I 
aimed to show how the meaning of the work arrives at the point of intersection 
between the music and the painting through our response to this relationship. 
Crucially, however, it has been argued that although such meaning is response 
dependent, it is based on objective properties of the music and the painting. This, 
then, has not been an exercise in showing how one medium translates into another -  
what Siglind Bruhn calls transmedialization -  nor has it shown that the music 
performs some kind of equivalent function to the tightly-woven narratives seen in 
nineteenth-century programme music. Rather it has been an attempt to demonstrate 
the mechanism of how our understanding of the painting as a field of action directs, 
selects and connects our attention to aspects of the musical object. By allowing the 
listener access to the concept of the painting through a title, the composer 
disambiguates what the music might be about, provoking a particular aesthetic 
response using this framework.
In addition, the discussions on phenomenology in Part I served to emphasize 
the bodily unity between the listener and the music, such that, in living through the 
experience, the listener’s identification with the music becomes so complete that the 
two merge into a single essence. Using this approach, it was argued that both music 
and painting have the potential for multi-sensory experiences to occur. Thus despite 
music being processed through ostensibly auditory means it is able to excite in its 
listeners cross-modal experiences, so that music may also be experienced in spatial
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and visual terms. Similarly, applying this model to painting, it can be seen that this 
domain may be experienced in ways which stimulate senses other than the purely 
visual. Further still, dismantling the conventional distinction that painting is about 
space and music about time, we are able to see that there are points where the two 
media might be said to intersect.
However, to account for the obvious mediation which the title of the music 
invites, a response theory was needed in order to accommodate both the listener’s 
response to MaP as contingent on a necessary relationship with the phenomenal object 
-  music as perceived -  and the ideation brought to bear on that experience from the 
absent painting. In other words, the music itself possesses qualities which afford a 
particular subject position in the listener in conjunction with the painting as a frame of 
reference. The result is a dialogue between the music and us, mediated by our 
transference of concepts brought about by the link to the absent painting. The title 
erects a metaphorical bridge between the painting and the music, across which 
attributes belonging to either domain might cross; if meaning emerges from this 
experience it is contingent on this other mediated domain.
It has also been argued that the music does not transparently point at the 
painting in the way language might, but itself comments on this other experiential 
domain through its own causal power. Just as the painter’s brushwork affects our view 
of their painted subject, so, too, the musical realization has the potential to affect and 
elicit experiences in the listener which describe new ways of experiencing the 
painting. And this is the reason the phenomenological perspective retains its 
relevance. The immediate physical texture, dynamics and ‘colour’ of the musical 
space constitutes the musical object, even if ultimately those aspects may be heard 
and interpreted differently in light of the painting. Accordingly, each of the three case
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studies demonstrates a different mechanism of musical representation -  despite there 
being considerable overlap between certain techniques.
In this way, Morton Feldman’s Rothko Chapel saturates musical space and 
time in a similar way to that in which the hues of Rothko’s panels immerse and 
envelop the viewer. The phenomenological encounter with this music seems more 
about generating an analogous experience to the chapel’s quietude rather than the 
paintings themselves. Nevertheless, there are musical attributes here which may be 
heard as representing aspects of the ensemble and their painterly surfaces.
Employing a different approach, Henri Dutilleux’s Timbres, Espace, 
Mouvement: ou La nuit etoilee seems intent on producing something of the 
phenomenal impressions of Van Gogh’s subject-matter in his painting -  as indicated 
by the qualities in the main title. Synaesthetically, the listener experiences a particular 
range of musical colour, moments of extreme movement contrasted against relatively 
static episodes, and space represented by the registral void between the woodwinds 
and double basses. Imaginatively, it is a small leap to ascribe these musical effects to 
representations of the painting and its subject matter. Significantly, though, the music 
seems to express and record something about the turbulent, illusory movement that 
springs forth from the painterly rendering of the starry sky -  it goes beyond the mere 
subject to comment on the way those forces have been captured by the artist.
In contrast to the other case-study compositions, Tan Dun’s Death and Fire: 
Dialogue with Paul Klee animates certain paintings in the set by creating sound 
effects which seem to belong to the subject matter and its concept within the painting, 
while effecting rudimentary narratives about others. In the movements ‘The 
Twittering Machine’, ‘Senicio’ and ‘Earth Witches’, for example, Tan’s focus is more 
on the subject-matter than on its painterly realization. We must ask, therefore, whether
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the music is representing the painting or merely a narrative that the painting might, in 
turn, be said to represent. Notwithstanding this uncertainty, it seems without doubt 
that through his musical animation and sound effects, Tan has represented the 
movement and time he sees as frozen in the drawings, and in so doing, unlocked 
aspects of those forces. Further still, even if Tan is trying to make the subject of the 
paintings ‘audible’ in time, that subject is in no way indifferent to its painted 
formulation. For example, Tan produces sounds from his ‘birds’ which connect 
metonymically with the crank mechanism depicted in the painting Die Zwitscher- 
Maschine, and this ‘turning’ is not merely a concept, but an implied operation taken 
exclusively from the domain of the painting.
Finally, then, for the listener, can knowledge of these paintings somehow 
enrich -  or at least affect -  the aesthetic experience of the music? We have shown 
how attributes may cross in either direction across the metaphorical bridge that is 
erected from this territorial intersection between the two media, and potentially this 
union also allows the musical (and the painterly) attributes to be heard from a certain 
perspective. It is argued that without this context, the music in many cases would 
simply not make musical sense. With context, however, it is able to predicate 
something about its subject -  it is no longer dependent entirely on musical meaning -  
and can thus be heard within this extended field of meaning. There is a possible, 
although not inevitable, aesthetic experience at stake here. As a potential bearer of 
meaning, the music stands to signify aspects of the painting and complete the 
‘picture’, but only if it ‘fits’ this other domain at some comparative level.
As we said at the beginning of this thesis, whatever helps to form part of an 
aesthetic experience may be considered as a valid and essential component. In this 
way, it has been argued that we supplement the musical experience with some kind of
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imaginative recreation of the absent painting, allowing us to marshal the musical 
attributes accordingly. The title effectively mandates such an action, and thus to hear 
the musical attributes in relation to the painting must to some extent change their 
function. Accordingly, the music does not change, but its meaning or significance 
does; and it is this meaning which constitutes the aesthetic experience of the music.
Ultimately, though, it is the listener’s esthesic response, in tandem with the 
phenomenal perception of the music, which determines whether the conceptual 
components from the painting are transmissible into the audible domain. Furthermore, 
the music may be said to signify aspects of the painting, but these significations are in 
no way independent of either the music’s intrinsic properties or of the painting’s field 
of experience. This fact exposes the fallacy whereby we attach the meaning to the 
musical object rather than to the experience to which it gives rise in a suitably primed 
listener. Accordingly, this is not a straightforward linear representation, such as we 
might find in language or painting. Hearing the musical sounds as belonging to the 
painting affords them an additional experiential dimension, but on the condition that 
the listener makes recourse to the domains of both music and painting. And if this 
mechanism affects how the music is heard, then the meaning that arises cannot be said 
to be entirely musical, but must also depend on the painting as a frame of reference.
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